Appendix E to Part 50 - Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities
10:1.0.1.1.30.0.117.88.27 : Appendix E
Appendix E to Part 50 - Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities Table of Contents I.
Introduction II. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report III. The
Final Safety Analysis Report IV. Content of Emergency Plans V.
Implementing Procedures VI. Emergency Response Data System I.
Introduction
1. Each applicant for a construction permit is required by §
50.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a
discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Each
applicant for an operating license is required by § 50.34(b) to
include in the final safety analysis report plans for coping with
emergencies. Each applicant for a combined license under subpart C
of part 52 of this chapter is required by § 52.79 of this chapter
to include in the application plans for coping with emergencies.
Each applicant for an early site permit under subpart A of part 52
of this chapter may submit plans for coping with emergencies under
§ 52.17 of this chapter.
2. This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency
plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency
preparedness. These plans shall be described generally in the
preliminary safety analysis report for a construction permit and
submitted as part of the final safety analysis report for an
operating license. These plans, or major features thereof, may be
submitted as part of the site safety analysis report for an early
site permit.
3. The potential radiological hazards to the public associated
with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel
facilities licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 and 70 involve
considerations different than those associated with nuclear power
reactors. Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning Zones 1
(EPZs) for facilities other than power reactors and the degree to
which compliance with the requirements of this section and sections
II, III, IV, and V of this appendix as necessary will be determined
on a case-by-case basis. 2
1 EPZs for power reactors are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA
520/1-78-016, “Planning Basis for the Development of State and
Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support
of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,” December 1978. The size of
the EPZs for a nuclear power plant shall be determined in relation
to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are
affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land
characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The
size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for
gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized
power level less than 250 MW thermal. Generally, the plume exposure
pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level
greater than 250 MW thermal shall consist of an area about 10 miles
(16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an
area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
2 Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as guidance for the
acceptability of research and test reactor emergency response
plans.
4. Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, in the case of an
operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power
operations up to 5 percent of rated power, no NRC or FEMA review,
findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite
emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and the capability to
implement State and local offsite emergency plans, as defined in
this Appendix, are required prior to the issuance of such a
license.
5. Each applicant for a combined license or early site permit
under part 52 of this chapter whose application is docketed before
December 23, 2011 may defer compliance with any change to emergency
preparedness regulations under the final rule issued November 23,
2011. If that applicant chooses to defer compliance, it shall
subsequently request to amend the combined license or early site
permit to comply with those changes no later than December 31,
2013. An applicant that does not receive a combined license or
early site permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its
combined license or early site permit application to comply with
those changes no later than December 31, 2013. Notwithstanding any
Commission finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g) regarding the combined
license holder's facility, the combined license holder may not
operate the facility until the NRC has approved the license
amendment demonstrating compliance with the final rule.
6. The Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit
2, holding a construction permit under the provisions of part 50 of
this chapter, shall meet the requirements of the final rule issued
November 23, 2011 as applicable to operating nuclear power reactor
licensees.
II. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient
information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans
for both onsite areas and the EPZs, with facility design features,
site layout, and site location with respect to such considerations
as access routes, surrounding population distributions, land use,
and local jurisdictional boundaries for the EPZs in the case of
nuclear power reactors as well as the means by which the standards
of § 50.47(b) will be met.
As a minimum, the following items shall be described:
A. Onsite and offsite organizations for coping with emergencies
and the means for notification, in the event of an emergency, of
persons assigned to the emergency organizations.
B. Contacts and arrangements made and documented with local,
State, and Federal governmental agencies with responsibility for
coping with emergencies, including identification of the principal
agencies.
C. Protective measures to be taken within the site boundary and
within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of an
accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out
(e.g., in the case of an evacuation, who authorizes the evacuation,
how the public is to be notified and instructed, how the evacuation
is to be carried out); and the expected response of offsite
agencies in the event of an emergency.
D. Features of the facility to be provided for onsite emergency
first aid and decontamination and for emergency transportation of
onsite individuals to offsite treatment facilities.
E. Provisions to be made for emergency treatment at offsite
facilities of individuals injured as a result of licensed
activities.
F. Provisions for a training program for employees of the
licensee, including those who are assigned specific authority and
responsibility in the event of an emergency, and for other persons
who are not employees of the licensee but whose assistance may be
needed in the event of a radiological emergency.
G. A preliminary analysis that projects the time and means to be
employed in the notification of State and local governments and the
public in the event of an emergency. A nuclear power plant
applicant shall perform a preliminary analysis of the time required
to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, noting major
impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions.
H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include
facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of
seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of
emergency situations within and outside the site boundary,
including capabilities for dose projection using real-time
meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological
monitoring teams within the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis
reflecting the role of the onsite technical support center and the
emergency operations facility in assessing information,
recommending protective action, and disseminating information to
the public.
III. The Final Safety Analysis Report; Site Safety Analysis Report
The final safety analysis report or the site safety analysis
report for an early site permit that includes complete and
integrated emergency plans under § 52.17(b)(2)(ii) of this chapter
shall contain the plans for coping with emergencies. The plans
shall be an expression of the overall concept of operation; they
shall describe the essential elements of advance planning that have
been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with
emergency situations. The plans shall incorporate information about
the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and
offsite agencies. That information shall be sufficient to provide
assurance of coordination among the supporting groups and with the
licensee. The site safety analysis report for an early site permit
which proposes major features must address the relevant provisions
of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, within the scope of
emergency preparedness matters addressed in the major features.
The plans submitted must include a description of the elements
set out in Section IV for the emergency planning zones (EPZs) to an
extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken
in the event of an emergency.
IV. Content of Emergency Plans
1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not
necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate
compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e.,
organization for coping with radiological emergencies, assessment
actions, activation of emergency organization, notification
procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training,
maintaining emergency preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective
actions during hostile action. In addition, the emergency response
plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor
operating license under this part, or for an early site permit (as
applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain
information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards
described in § 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those
standards.
2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also
provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various
sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for
transient and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S.
Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its
application to the NRC.
3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use NRC approved
evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the
formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide
the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental
authorities for use in developing offsite protective action
strategies.
4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of the availability
of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census
Bureau or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall
develop an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it
under § 50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE
analysis to the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form
protective action recommendations and providing it to State and
local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite
protective action strategies.
5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power
reactor licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population
changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of
the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau
annual resident population estimate and State/local government
population data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these
estimates so that they are available for NRC inspection during the
period between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates
to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis.
6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent
resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE
value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected
Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to
increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the
nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or updated
ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the
impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the
updated ETE analysis to the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 days
after the licensee's determination that the criteria for updating
the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form
protective action recommendations and providing it to State and
local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite
protective action strategies.
7. After an applicant for a combined license under part 52 of
this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall conduct at
least one review of any changes in the population of its EPZ at
least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall
estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes using the most
recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and
State/local government population data, if available. If the EPZ
permanent resident population increases such that it causes the
longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all
affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire
10-mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is
less, from the licensee's currently approved ETE, the licensee
shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that
population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE
analysis to the NRC for review under § 50.4 of this chapter no
later than 365 days before the licensee's scheduled fuel load.
A. Organization
The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall
be described, including definition of authorities,
responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the
licensee's emergency organization and the means for notification of
such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the
following shall be included:
1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.
2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization
(ERO) with a detailed discussion of:
a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the
individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency;
b. Plant staff emergency assignments;
c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite
emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of
information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating
and implementing offsite emergency measures.
3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of
the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant
site to augment the onsite emergency organization.
4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of
persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible
for making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these
projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and
local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental
entities.
5. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of
other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for
coping with emergency conditions that may arise. Other persons with
special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees
of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for
emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of
these persons shall be described.
6. A description of the local offsite services to be provided in
support of the licensee's emergency organization.
7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a description of the
assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal
agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies,
including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this
appendix, “hostile action” is defined as an act directed toward a
nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of
violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or
intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by
air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles,
or other devices used to deliver destructive force.
8. Identification of the State and/or local officials
responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate
protective actions, including evacuations when necessary.
9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a
detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned
emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned
responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their
assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.
B. Assessment Actions
1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and
for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive
materials shall be described, including emergency action levels
that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for
notification and participation of local and State agencies, the
Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action
levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of
protective measures should be considered within and outside the
site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action
levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in
addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for
nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include
hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant.
The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed
on by the applicant or licensee and state and local governmental
authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action
levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental
authorities on an annual basis.
2. A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action
level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its
license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change.
Licensees shall follow the change process in § 50.54(q) for all
other emergency action level changes.
C. Activation of Emergency Organization
1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the
alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the
total emergency organization shall be described. The communication
steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under
each class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels
(based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring
information but also on readings from a number of sensors that
indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment
and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for
notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence,
but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be
noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall
include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site
area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are
further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.
2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall
establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and
declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the
availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency
action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the
emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of
the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not
construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore
plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an
emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not
construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response
actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public
health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not
deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement
measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.
D. Notification Procedures
1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State,
and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with
these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the
public and for public evacuation or other protective measures,
should they become necessary, shall be described. This description
shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title
and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the
EPZs.
2. Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency
planning information, such as the methods and times required for
public notification and the protective actions planned if an
accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects
of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will
be used for dissemination of information during an emergency. Signs
or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any
transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ
appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident
occurs.
3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible
State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after
declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the
appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a
public alerting and notification decision promptly on being
informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to
initial operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of
the first reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactor licensee
shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been
established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective
of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have
the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and
initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and
notification capability will range from immediate alerting and
notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that
State and local officials are notified that a situation exists
requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is
substantial time available for the appropriate governmental
authorities to make a judgment whether or not to activate the
public alert and notification system. The alerting and notification
capability shall additionally include administrative and physical
means for a backup method of public alerting and notification
capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting
and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or
notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ
population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert
and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but
does not need to meet the 15-minute design objective for the
primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there is
a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the
appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to
activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or
in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating
such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the
appropriate governmental authorities.
4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power reactor site's alert and
notification design report, including the backup alert and
notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, then the backup
alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3
must be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the alert and
notification design report does not include a backup alert and
notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate backup
alert and notification capability, then a revision of the alert and
notification design report must be submitted to FEMA for review by
June 24, 2013, and the FEMA-approved backup alert and notification
means must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval.
However, the total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup
alert and notification means must not exceed June 22, 2015.
E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment
Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency
facilities and equipment, including:
1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;
2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for
continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive
materials to the environment;
3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of
onsite individuals;
4. Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate
emergency first aid treatment;
5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to
handle radiological emergencies onsite;
6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured
individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment
facilities outside the site boundary;
7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support
of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside
the site boundary;
8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an
emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be
given and effective control can be exercised during an
emergency;
(ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite
operational support center;
b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations
facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a
facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power
reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles
from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility
located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor
site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one
nuclear power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an
emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear
power reactor site shall request prior Commission approval by
submitting an application for an amendment to its license. For an
emergency operations facility located more than 25 miles from a
nuclear power reactor site, provisions must be made for locating
NRC and offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site
so that NRC and offsite responders can interact face-to-face with
emergency response personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power
reactor site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders
closer to a nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles
from the emergency operations facility must include the
following:
(1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State,
and local responders;
(2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency
response personnel;
(3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency
response facilities;
(4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and
(5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies;
c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's
emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this
section, a facility having the following capabilities:
(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and
radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power
reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the
facility serves;
(2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and
provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to
licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a
nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site
that the facility serves; and
(3) The capability to support response to events occurring
simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the
emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and
d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an alternative facility
(or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under
threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging
area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively
having the following characteristics: the capability for
communication with the emergency operations facility, control room,
and plant security; the capability to perform offsite
notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment
activities, including damage control team planning and preparation,
for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed
during hostile action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must
be implemented no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception
of the capability for staging emergency response organization
personnel at the alternative facility (or facilities) and the
capability for communications with the emergency operations
facility, control room, and plant security, which must be
implemented no later than June 20, 2012.
e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of
paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations
facility approved as of December 23, 2011;
9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system;
each system shall have a backup power source. All communication
plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and
alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication
links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where
consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these
arrangements will include:
a. Provision for communications with contiguous State/local
governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such
communications shall be tested monthly.
b. Provision for communications with Federal emergency response
organizations. Such communications systems shall be tested
annually.
c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor
control room, the onsite technical support center, and the
emergency operations facility; and among the nuclear facility, the
principal State and local emergency operations centers, and the
field assessment teams. Such communications systems shall be tested
annually.
d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC
Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations
Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite
technical support center, and the emergency operations facility.
Such communications shall be tested monthly.
F. Training
1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and
exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that
employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific
emergency response duties, and (b) The participation in the
training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed
in the event of a radiological emergency shall be described. This
shall include a description of specialized initial training and
periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the
following categories of emergency personnel:
i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency
organization;
ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including
control room shift personnel;
iii. Radiological monitoring teams;
iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades);
v. Repair and damage control teams;
vi. First aid and rescue teams;
vii. Medical support personnel;
viii. Licensee's headquarters support personnel;
ix. Security personnel.
In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall
be made available to local services personnel; e.g., local
emergency services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel,
local news media persons.
2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of
emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test
the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and
methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test
the public alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency
organization personnel are familiar with their duties. 3
3 Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable for
any exercise.
a. A full participation 4 exercise which tests as much of the
licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably
achievable without mandatory public participation shall be
conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located.
Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios
under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in a full participation
exercise required by this paragraph 2.a.
4 Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency
preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate
offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel
physically and actively take part in testing their integrated
capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a
commercial nuclear power plant. Full participation includes testing
major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans
and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other
resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond
to the accident scenario.
(i) For an operating license issued under this part, this
exercise must be conducted within 2 years before the issuance of
the first operating license for full power (one authorizing
operation above 5 percent of rated thermal power) of the first
reactor and shall include participation by each State and local
government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each state
within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full
participation exercise is conducted more than 1 year prior to
issuance of an operating licensee for full power, an exercise which
tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted
within one year before issuance of an operating license for full
power. This exercise need not have State or local government
participation.
(ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this
chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full
participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests
the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one
year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This
exercise need not have State or local government participation. If
FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite
emergency preparedness as the result of the first full
participation exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state
of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the
event of a radiological emergency, the provisions of § 50.54(gg)
apply.
(iii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this
chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the
site, an exercise, either full or partial participation, 5 shall be
conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This
exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of
Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one
or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness
as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or if the
Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the
provisions of § 50.54(gg) apply.
5 Partial participation when used in conjunction with emergency
preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate
offsite authorities shall actively take part in the exercise
sufficient to test direction and control functions; i.e.,
(a) protective action decision making related to emergency action
levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and
local authorities and the licensee.
b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent
exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power
reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at
least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this paragraph
2.b. The exercise may be included in the full participation
biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this section. In
addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to ensure that
adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained during the
interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills, including
at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal
functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency response
capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response
include activities such as management and coordination of emergency
response, accident assessment, event classification, notification
of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and offsite impact
of radiological releases, protective action recommendation
development, protective action decision making, plant system repair
and mitigative action implementation. During these drills,
activation of all of the licensee's emergency response facilities
(Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would not be
necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider
accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be
permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would
have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather
than have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the
onsite exercise training objectives.
c. Offsite plans for each site shall be exercised biennially
with full participation by each offsite authority having a role
under the radiological response plan. Where the offsite authority
has a role under a radiological response plan for more than one
site, it shall fully participate in one exercise every two years
and shall, at least, partially participate in other offsite plan
exercises in this period. If two different licensees each have
licensed facilities located either on the same site or on adjacent,
contiguous sites, and share most of the elements defining
co-located licensees, 6 then each licensee shall:
6 Co-located licensees are two different licensees whose
licensed facilities are located either on the same site or on
adjacent, contiguous sites, and that share most of the following
emergency planning and siting elements:
a. Plume exposure and ingestion emergency planning zones;
b. Offsite governmental authorities;
c. Offsite emergency response organizations;
d. Public notification system; and/or
e. Emergency facilities.
(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite emergency
plan;
(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite biennial full or
partial participation exercise;
(3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and interactions
in the years between its participation in the offsite full or
partial participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test
and maintain interface among the affected State and local
authorities and the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also
participate in emergency preparedness activities and interaction
with offsite authorities for the period between exercises;
(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite emergency
plan in each exercise cycle; and
(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial
participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise
cycles.
d. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor
emergency preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion
pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In
States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure
pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site
to site. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor
emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action
exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in
one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more
than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should
rotate this participation from site to site.
e. Licensees shall enable any State or local government located
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the
licensee's drills when requested by such State or local
government.
f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is
not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that
NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken
in the event of a radiological emergency or (2) determine that the
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills
specific to emergency response. The extent of State and local
participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that
appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the
elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous
exercises.
g. All exercises, drills, and training that provide performance
opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills must
provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient
areas that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are
identified in a critique of exercises, drills, or training must be
corrected.
h. The participation of State and local governments in an
emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant
has identified those governments as refusing to participate further
in emergency planning activities, pursuant to § 50.47(c)(1). In
such cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or
licensee and such governmental entities as elect to participate in
the emergency planning process.
i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide
reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result
from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear
power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of
radiological releases and events, including hostile action.
Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate must emphasize
coordination among onsite and offsite response organizations.
j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by
nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for
the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to
implement the principal functional areas of emergency response
identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must
provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills
specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC,
OSC, EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each
8-calendar-year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees
shall vary the content of scenarios during exercises conducted
under paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for
the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to
respond to the following scenario elements: hostile action directed
at the plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal
radiological release that does not require public protective
actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site
Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies,
procedures, and guidance under § 50.155(b)(2), and integration of
offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain
a record of exercises conducted during each 8-year exercise cycle
that documents the content of scenarios used to comply with the
requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall conduct a
hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later than
December 31, 2015. The first 8-year exercise cycle for a site will
begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile action
exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under 10 CFR part 52,
the first 8-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the
initial exercise required by section IV.F.2.a of this appendix.
G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness
Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its
implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are
maintained up to date shall be described.
H. Recovery
Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident,
reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation
could be resumed shall be described.
I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action
By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a range
of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile
action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the
licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions
of the licensee's emergency plan.
V. Implementing Procedures
No less than 180 days before the scheduled issuance of an
operating license for a nuclear power reactor or a license to
possess nuclear material, or the scheduled date for initial loading
of fuel for a combined license under part 52 of this chapter, the
applicant's or licensee's detailed implementing procedures for its
emergency plan shall be submitted to the Commission as specified in
§ 50.4.
VI. Emergency Response Data System
1. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is a direct near
real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite
computer system and the NRC Operations Center that provides for the
automated transmission of a limited data set of selected
parameters. The ERDS supplements the existing voice transmission
over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) by providing the NRC
Operations Center with timely and accurate updates of a limited set
of parameters from the licensee's installed onsite computer system
in the event of an emergency. When selected plant data are not
available on the licensee's onsite computer system, retrofitting of
data points is not required. The licensee shall test the ERDS
periodically to verify system availability and operability. The
frequency of ERDS testing will be quarterly unless otherwise set by
NRC based on demonstrated system performance.
2. Except for Big Rock Point and all nuclear power facilities
that are shut down permanently or indefinitely, onsite hardware
shall be provided at each unit by the licensee to interface with
the NRC receiving system. Software, which will be made available by
the NRC, will assemble the data to be transmitted and transmit data
from each unit via an output port on the appropriate data system.
The hardware and software must have the following
characteristics:
a. Data points, if resident in the in-plant computer systems,
must be transmitted for four selected types of plant conditions:
Reactor core and coolant system conditions; reactor containment
conditions; radioactivity release rates; and plant meteorological
tower data. A separate data feed is required for each reactor unit.
While it is recognized that ERDS is not a safety system, it is
conceivable that a licensee's ERDS interface could communicate with
a safety system. In this case, appropriate isolation devices would
be required at these interfaces. 7 The data points, identified in
the following parameters will be transmitted:
7 See 10 CFR 50.55a(h) Protection Systems.
(i) For pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the selected plant
parameters are: (1) Primary coolant system: pressure, temperatures
(hot leg, cold leg, and core exit thermocouples), subcooling
margin, pressurizer level, reactor coolant charging/makeup flow,
reactor vessel level, reactor coolant flow, and reactor power; (2)
Secondary coolant system: Steam generator levels and pressures,
main feedwater flows, and auxiliary and emergency feedwater flows;
(3) Safety injection: High- and low-pressure safety injection
flows, safety injection flows (Westinghouse), and borated water
storage tank level; (4) Containment: pressure, temperatures,
hydrogen concentration, and sump levels; (5) Radiation monitoring
system: Reactor coolant radioactivity, containment radiation level,
condenser air removal radiation level, effluent radiation monitors,
and process radiation monitor levels; and (6) Meteorological data:
wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability.
(ii) For boiling water reactors (BWRs), the selected parameters
are: (1) Reactor coolant system: Reactor pressure, reactor vessel
level, feedwater flow, and reactor power; (2) Safety injection:
Reactor core isolation cooling flow, high-pressure coolant
injection/high-pressure core spray flow, core spray flow,
low-pressure coolant injection flow, and condensate storage tank
level; (3) Containment: drywell pressure, drywell temperatures,
drywell sump levels, hydrogen and oxygen concentrations,
suppression pool temperature, and suppression pool level; (4)
Radiation monitoring system: Reactor coolant radioactivity level,
primary containment radiation level, condenser off-gas radiation
level, effluent radiation monitor, and process radiation levels;
and (5) Meteorological data: Wind speed, wind direction, and
atmospheric stability.
b. The system must be capable of transmitting all available ERDS
parameters at time intervals of not less than 15 seconds or more
than 60 seconds. Exceptions to this requirement will be considered
on a case by case basis.
c. All link control and data transmission must be established in
a format compatible with the NRC receiving system 8 as configured
at the time of licensee implementation.
8 Guidance is provided in NUREG-1394, Revision 1.
3. Maintaining Emergency Response Data System:
a. Any hardware and software changes that affect the transmitted
data points identified in the ERDS Data Point Library 9 (site
specific data base residing on the ERDS computer) must be submitted
to the NRC within 30 days after the changes are completed.
9 See NUREG-1394, Revision 1, appendix C, Data Point
Library.
b. Hardware and software changes, with the exception of data
point modifications, that could affect the transmission format and
computer communication protocol to the ERDS must be provided to the
NRC as soon as practicable and at least 30 days prior to the
modification.
c. In the event of a failure of NRC-supplied equipment, a
replacement will be furnished by the NRC for licensee
installation.
4. Implementing the Emergency Response Data System Program:
a. Each licensee shall develop and submit an ERDS implementation
program plan to the NRC by October 28, 1991. To ensure
compatibility with the guidance provided for the ERDS, the ERDS
implementation program plan, 10 must include, but not be limited
to, information on the licensee's computer system configuration
(i.e., hardware and software), interface, and
procedures.
10 See NUREG-1394, Revision 1, section 3.
b. Licensees must comply with appendix E to part 50, section
V.
c. Licensees that have submitted the required information under
the voluntary ERDS implementation program will not be required to
resubmit this information. The licensee shall meet the
implementation schedule of appendix E to part 50, section
VI.4d.
d. Each licensee shall complete implementation of the ERDS by
February 13, 1993, or before initial escalation to full power,
whichever comes later. Licensees with currently operational ERDS
interfaces approved under the voluntary ERDS implementation program
11 will not be required to submit another implementation plan and
will be considered to have met the requirements for ERDS under
appendix E to part 50, section VI.1 and 2 of this part.
11 See NUREG-1394, Revision 1.
[45 FR 55410, Aug. 19, 1980; 46 FR 28839, May 29, 1981, as amended
at 46 FR 63032, Dec. 30, 1981; 47 FR 30236, July 13, 1982; 47 FR
57671, Dec. 28, 1982; 49 FR 27736, July 6, 1984; 51 FR 40310, Nov.
6, 1986; 52 FR 16829, May 6, 1987; 52 FR 42086, Nov. 3, 1987; 56 FR
40185, Aug. 13, 1991; 59 FR 14090, Mar. 25, 1994; 61 FR 30132, June
14, 1996; 72 FR 49506, Aug. 28, 2007; 73 FR 42674, July 23, 2008;
76 FR 72596, Nov. 23, 2011; 78 FR 34248, June 7, 2013; 80 FR 74980,
Dec. 1, 2015; 84 FR 39719, Aug. 9, 2019] Editorial Note:At 72 FR
49506, Aug. 28, 2007, Appendix E to part 50 was amended by
redesignating footnotes 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 as 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12;
however, the amendment could not be incorporated due to inaccurate
amendatory instruction.