Appendix C to Part 5 - DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
6:1.0.1.1.4.5.1.1.5 : Appendix C
Appendix C to Part 5 - DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the
Privacy Act
This appendix implements provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974
that permit the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to exempt its
systems of records from provisions of the Act. During the course of
normal agency operations, exempt materials from other systems of
records may become part of the records in these and other DHS
systems. To the extent that copies of records from other exempt
systems of records are entered into any DHS system, DHS hereby
claims the same exemptions for those records that are claimed for
the original primary systems of records from which they originated
and claims any additional exemptions in accordance with this
rule.
Portions of the following DHS systems of records are exempt from
certain provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(j)
and (k):
1. The DHS/ALL - 001 Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act
Records System of Records consists of electronic and paper records
and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/ALL - 001
Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Records System of
Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to
section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/ALL - 001 Freedom of
Information Act and Privacy Act Records System of Records contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4): (d); (e)(1),
(e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8),
(e)(12); (f); (g)(1); and (h) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3): (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), (k)(5), and (k)(6). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (e)(12) (Computer Matching) if the agency is
a recipient agency or a source agency in a matching program with a
non-Federal agency, with respect to any establishment or revision
of a matching program, at least 30 days prior to conducting such
program, publish in the Federal Register notice of such
establishment or revision.
(j) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
(k) From subsection (h) (Legal Guardians) the parent of any
minor, or the legal guardian of any individual who has been
declared to be incompetent due to physical or mental incapacity or
age by a court of competent jurisdiction, may act on behalf of the
individual.
2. The DHS/ALL-029 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Records
System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/ALL-029 Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Records System of Records is a repository of
information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including, but not limited to the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings thereunder; national security and intelligence
activities; and protection of the President of the United States or
other individuals pursuant to Section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18.
The DHS/ALL-029 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Records System of
Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in
support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may
contain personally identifiable information collected by other
Federal, state, local, Tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), and (k)(5). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the individual
who is the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting
would, therefore, present a serious impediment to law enforcement
efforts and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of
the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject
of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses
or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
individual who is the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
3. DHS-ALL-005, Redress and Response Records System. A portion
of the following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3),
(4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g); however, these
exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system
records is recompiled or is created from information contained in
other systems of records subject to such exemptions pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5). Further, no
exemption shall be asserted with respect to information submitted
by and collected from the individual or the individual's
representative in the course of any redress process associated with
this system of records. After conferring with the appropriate
component or agency, DHS may waive applicable exemptions in
appropriate circumstances and where it would not appear to
interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement or national
security purposes of the systems from which the information is
recompiled or in which it is contained. Exemptions from the above
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, when information in this
system records is recompiled or is created from information
contained in other systems of records subject to exemptions for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record
subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him
or her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the
individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be expected
to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected
terrorist by notifying the record subject that he or she is under
investigation. This information could also permit the record
subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy
evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid
or impede the investigation.
(b) From subsection (c)(4) because portions of this system are
exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection
(d).
(c) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these
provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain
records contained in this system, including law enforcement
counterterrorism, investigatory, and intelligence records.
Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an
investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or
the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement
agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national
security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by
leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of
witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject;
could identify a confidential source or disclose information which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal
privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence
technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety
of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and
witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing
counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations
and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative
burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be
continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(d) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for
DHS or other agencies to know in advance what information is
relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison
between the individual seeking redress and a known or suspected
terrorist. Also, because DHS and other agencies may not always know
what information about an encounter with a known or suspected
terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of
conducting an operational response.
(e) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision
could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism, law
enforcement, or intelligence efforts in that it would put the
subject of an investigation, study, or analysis on notice of that
fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed
to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of
counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations
is such that vital information about an individual frequently can
be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such
individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not
feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual
concerning his own activities.
(f) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection
is interpreted to require DHS to provide notice to an individual if
DHS or another agency receives or collects information about that
individual during an investigation or from a third party. Should
the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is
necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism, law enforcement, or
intelligence efforts by putting the subject of an investigation,
study, or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the
subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that
activity.
(g) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(h) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this
system coming from other system of records are derived from other
domestic and foreign agency record systems and therefore it is not
possible for DHS to vouch for their compliance with this provision;
however, the DHS has implemented internal quality assurance
procedures to ensure that data used in the redress process is as
thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, in the
collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism,
and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance
what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With
the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information
may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new
details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit
the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and
intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting
investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary
for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. The DHS
has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to
ensure that the data used in the redress process is as thorough,
accurate, and current as possible.
(i) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice
of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would
pose an impossible administrative burden on DHS and other agencies
and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement,
or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations
when not previously known.
(j) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d).
(k) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
4. The Department of Homeland Security Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by DHS and its components. IDENT is the
primary repository of biometric information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws (including the immigration law); investigations,
inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national security and
intelligence activities. IDENT is a centralized and dynamic
DHS-wide biometric database that also contains limited biographic
and encounter history information needed to place the biometric
information in proper context. The information is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies.
Pursuant to exemptions 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act,
portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and
(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and
(e)(8); (f)(2) through (5); and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2), this system is exempt from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in those
subsections: 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), and
(e)(4)(H). Exemptions from these particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation; and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise the existence of a confidential
investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential
informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f)(2 through 5) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system
are exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d)
and thereby would not require DHS to establish requirements or
rules for records which are exempted from access.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
5. The DHS/OIG-002 Investigative Records System of Records
consists of electronic and paper records used by the DHS OIG. The
DHS/OIG-002 Investigative Records System of Records is a repository
of information held by DHS in connection with its several and
varied missions and functions, including, but not limited to the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings there under; and national security and intelligence
activities. The DHS/OIG-002 Investigative Records System of Records
contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support
of, or in cooperation with DHS components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (c)(4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8);
(f); and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set
forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H);
and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for
Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could
alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation; and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, tamper with witnesses or evidence, and avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject as to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby providing an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; revealing the identity of
witnesses in investigations thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or revealing the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informants' usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish rules or procedures with respect to such
access. Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence
of records pertaining to them in this system of records or
otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may
access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system
would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of
witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants and other law enforcement mechanisms that
may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act
relating to individuals' rights to access and amend their records
contained in the system. Therefore, DHS is not required to
establish rules or procedures pursuant to which individuals may
seek a civil remedy for the agency's refusals to amend a record;
refusal to comply with a request for access to records; failure to
maintain accurate, relevant, timely, and complete records; or
failure to otherwise comply with an individual's right to access or
amend records.
6. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Pattern
Analysis and Information Collection (ICEPIC) System consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components. ICEPIC is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws (including the immigration law); investigations,
inquiries, and proceedings there under; and national security and
intelligence activities. ICEPIC contains information that is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies.
Pursuant to exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act,
portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and
(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and
(e)(8); (f), and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), this system
is exempt from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject
to the limitations set forth in those subsections: 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; Refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
7. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Enterprise
Records System (ERS) consists of records including intelligence
information and other properly acquired information received from
agencies and components of the federal government, foreign
governments, organizations or entities, international
organizations, state and local government agencies (including law
enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, as well as
information provided by individuals, regardless of the medium used
to submit the information or the agency to which it was submitted.
This system also contains: Information regarding persons on watch
lists with known or suspected links to terrorism; the results of
intelligence analysis and reporting; ongoing law enforcement
investigative information, information systems security analysis
and reporting; active immigration, customs, border and
transportation, security related records; historical law
enforcement, operational, immigration, customs, border and
transportation security, and other administrative records; relevant
and appropriately acquired financial information; and public-source
data such as that contained in media reports and commercially
available databases, as appropriate. Data about the providers of
information, including the means of transmission of the data, is
also retained.
(a) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (2), (3), and (5), this
system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1), (2),
(3), (4), and (5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). These
exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system
is subject to exemption. Where compliance would not appear to
interfere with or adversely affect the intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, and related law enforcement
purposes of this system, the applicable exemption may be waived by
DHS.
(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for
the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any
interest in the individual of an intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, or related investigative nature. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing
efforts of the Department to identify, understand, analyze,
investigate, and counter the activities of:
(i) Known or suspected terrorists and terrorist groups;
(ii) Groups or individuals known or believed to be assisting or
associated with known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
groups;
(iii) Individuals known, believed to be, or suspected of being
engaged in activities constituting a threat to homeland security,
including (1) activities which impact or concern the security,
safety, and integrity of our international borders, including any
illegal activities that either cross our borders or are otherwise
in violation of the immigration or customs laws and regulations of
the United States; (2) activities which could reasonably be
expected to assist in the development or use of a weapon of mass
effect; (3) activities meant to identify, create, or exploit the
vulnerabilities of, or undermine, the “key resources” (as defined
in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) and “critical
infrastructure” (as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(c)) of the United
States, including the cyber and national telecommunications
infrastructure and the availability of a viable national security
and emergency preparedness communications infrastructure; (4)
activities detrimental to the security of transportation and
transportation systems; (5) activities which violate or are
suspected of violating the laws relating to counterfeiting of
obligations and securities of the United States and other financial
crimes, including access device fraud, financial institution fraud,
identity theft, computer fraud; and computer-based attacks on our
nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure;
(6) activities, not wholly conducted within the United States,
which violate or are suspected of violating the laws which prohibit
the production, transfer, or sale of narcotics or substances
controlled in accordance with Title 21 of the United States Code,
or those associated activities otherwise prohibited by Titles 21
and 46 of the United States Code; (7) activities which impact,
concern, or otherwise threaten the safety and security of the
President and Vice President, their families, heads of state, and
other designated individuals; the White House, Vice President's
residence, foreign missions, and other designated buildings within
the United States; (8) activities which impact, concern, or
otherwise threaten domestic maritime safety and security, maritime
mobility and navigation, or the integrity of the domestic maritime
environment; (9) activities which impact, concern, or otherwise
threaten the national operational capability of the Department to
respond to natural and manmade major disasters and emergencies,
including acts of terrorism; (10) activities involving the
importation, possession, storage, development, or transportation of
nuclear or radiological material without authorization or for use
against the United States;
(iv) Foreign governments, organizations, or persons (foreign
powers); and
(v) Individuals engaging in intelligence activities on behalf of
a foreign power or terrorist group.
Thus, by notifying the record subject that he/she is the focus
of such efforts or interest on the part of DHS, or other agencies
with whom DHS is cooperating and to whom the disclosures were made,
this information could permit the record subject to take measures
to impede or evade such efforts, including the taking of steps to
deceive DHS personnel and deny them the ability to adequately
assess relevant information and activities, and could
inappropriately disclose to the record subject the sensitive
methods and/or confidential sources used to acquire the relevant
information against him/her. Moreover, where the record subject is
the actual target of a law enforcement investigation, this
information could permit him/her to take measures to impede the
investigation, for example, by destroying evidence, intimidating
potential witnesses, or avoiding detection or apprehension.
(2) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to
Records) because these provisions concern individual rights of
access to and amendment of records (including the review of agency
denials of either) contained in this system, which consists of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and related
investigatory records concerning efforts of the Department, as
described more fully in subsection (b)(1), above. Compliance with
these provisions could inform or alert the subject of an
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, or investigatory
effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by another agency
with whom DHS is cooperating, of the fact and nature of such
efforts, and/or the relevant intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, or investigatory interest of DHS and/or other
intelligence, counterterrorism, or law enforcement agencies.
Moreover, compliance could also compromise sensitive information
either classified in the interest of national security, or which
otherwise requires, as appropriate, safeguarding and protection
from unauthorized disclosure; identify a confidential source or
disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of another individual's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
intelligence or investigative technique or method, including
interfering with intelligence or law enforcement investigative
processes by permitting the destruction of evidence, improper
influencing or intimidation of witnesses, fabrication of statements
or testimony, and flight from detection or apprehension; or
constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement personnel, confidential sources and informants, and
potential witnesses. Amendment of the records would interfere with
ongoing intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement investigations and activities, including incident
reporting and analysis activities, and impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring investigations, reports, and
analyses to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevant and Necessary) because it
is not always possible for DHS to know in advance of its receipt
the relevance and necessity of each piece of information it
acquires in the course of an intelligence, counterterrorism, or
investigatory effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by
another agency with whom DHS is cooperating. In the context of the
authorized intelligence, counterterrorism, and investigatory
activities undertaken by DHS personnel, relevance and necessity are
questions of analytic judgment and timing, such that what may
appear relevant and necessary when acquired ultimately may be
deemed unnecessary upon further analysis and evaluation. Similarly,
in some situations, it is only after acquired information is
collated, analyzed, and evaluated in light of other available
evidence and information that its relevance and necessity can be
established or made clear. Constraining the initial acquisition of
information included within the ERS in accordance with the relevant
and necessary requirement of subsection (e)(1) could discourage the
appropriate receipt of and access to information which DHS and
I&A are otherwise authorized to receive and possess under law,
and thereby impede efforts to detect, deter, prevent, disrupt, or
apprehend terrorists or terrorist groups, and/or respond to
terrorist or other activities which threaten homeland security.
Notwithstanding this claimed exemption, which would permit the
acquisition and temporary maintenance of records whose relevance to
the purpose of the ERS may be less than fully clear, DHS will only
disclose such records after determining whether such disclosures
are themselves consistent with the published ERS routine uses.
Moreover, it should be noted that, as concerns the receipt by
I&A, for intelligence purposes, of information in any record
which identifies a U.S. Person, as defined in Executive Order
12333, as amended, such receipt, and any subsequent use or
dissemination of that identifying information, is undertaken
consistent with the procedures established and adhered to by
I&A pursuant to that Executive Order. Specifically, I&A
intelligence personnel may acquire information which identifies a
particular U.S. Person, retain it within or disseminate it from
ERS, as appropriate, only when it is determined that the personally
identifying information is necessary for the conduct of I&A's
functions, and otherwise falls into one of a limited number of
authorized categories, each of which reflects discrete activities
for which information on individuals would be utilized by the
Department in the overall execution of its statutory mission.
(4) From subsections (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) (Access), and (f)
(Agency Rules), inasmuch as it is unnecessary for the publication
of rules and procedures contemplated therein since the ERS,
pursuant to subsections (1) and (2), above, will be exempt from the
underlying duties to provide to individuals notification about,
access to, and the ability to amend or correct the information
pertaining to them in, this system of records. Furthermore, to the
extent that subsection (e)(4)(I) is construed to require more
detailed disclosure than the information accompanying the system
notice for ERS, as published in today's Federal Register, exemption
from it is also necessary to protect the confidentiality, privacy,
and physical safety of sources of information, as well as the
methods for acquiring it. Finally, greater specificity concerning
the description of categories of sources of properly classified
records could also compromise or otherwise cause damage to the
national or homeland security.
8. The information in MAGNET establishes Maritime Domain
Awareness. Maritime Domain Awareness is the collection of as much
information as possible about the maritime world. In other words,
MAGNET establishes a full awareness of the entities (people,
places, things) and their activities within the maritime industry.
MAGNET collects the information and connects the information in
order to fulfill this need.
Coast Guard Intelligence (through MAGNET) will provide awareness
to the field as well as to strategic planners by aggregating data
from existing sources internal and external to the Coast Guard or
DHS. MAGNET will correlate and provide the medium to display
information such as ship registry, current ship position, crew
background, passenger lists, port history, cargo, known criminal
vessels, and suspect lists. Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) will
serve as MAGNET's executive agent and will share appropriate
aggregated data to other law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.
(a) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 522a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) this
system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4),
(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4) (G),
(H), and (I), e(5), e(8), e(12), (f), and (g). These exemptions
apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject
to exemption. Where compliance would not appear to interfere with
or adversely affect the intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland
security, and related law enforcement purposes of this system, the
applicable exemption may be waived by DHS.
(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for
the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting of Certain Disclosures)
because making available to a record subject the accounting of
disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically
reveal any interest in the individual of an intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, law enforcement or related
investigative nature. Revealing this information could reasonably
be expected to compromise ongoing efforts of the Department to
identify, understand, analyze, investigate, and counter the
activities of:
(i) Known or suspected terrorists and terrorist groups;
(ii) Groups or individuals known or believed to be assisting or
associated with known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
groups;
(iii) Individuals known, believed to be, or suspected of being
engaged in activities constituting a threat to homeland security,
including (1) activities which impact or concern the security,
safety, and integrity of our international borders, including any
illegal activities that either cross our borders or are otherwise
in violation of the immigration or customs laws and regulations of
the United States; (2) activities which could reasonably be
expected to assist in the development or use of a weapon of mass
effect; (3) activities meant to identify, create, or exploit the
vulnerabilities of, or undermine, the “key resources” (as defined
in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) and “critical
infrastructure” (as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(c)) of the United
States, including the cyber and national telecommunications
infrastructure and the availability of a viable national security
and emergency preparedness communications infrastructure; (4)
activities detrimental to the security of transportation and
transportation systems; (5) activities which violate or are
suspected of violating the laws relating to counterfeiting of
obligations and securities of the United States and other financial
crimes, including access device fraud, financial institution fraud,
identity theft, computer fraud; and computer-based attacks on our
nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure;
(6) activities, not wholly conducted within the United States,
which violate or are suspected of violating the laws which prohibit
the production, transfer, or sale of narcotics or substances
controlled in accordance with Title 21 of the United States Code,
or those associated activities otherwise prohibited by Titles 21
and 46 of the United States Code; (7) activities which impact,
concern, or otherwise threaten the safety and security of the
President and Vice President, their families, heads of state, and
other designated individuals; the White House, Vice President's
residence, foreign missions, and other designated buildings within
the United States; (8) activities which impact, concern, or
otherwise threaten domestic maritime safety and security, maritime
mobility and navigation, or the integrity of the domestic maritime
environment; (9) activities which impact, concern, or otherwise
threaten the national operational capability of the Department to
respond to natural and manmade major disasters and emergencies,
including acts of terrorism; (10) activities involving the
importation, possession, storage, development, or transportation of
nuclear or radiological material without authorization or for use
against the United States;
(iv) Foreign governments, organizations, or persons (foreign
powers); and
(v) Individuals engaging in intelligence activities on behalf of
a foreign power or terrorist group.
Thus, by notifying the record subject that he/she is the focus
of such efforts or interest on the part of DHS, or other agencies
with whom DHS is cooperating and to whom the disclosures were made,
this information could permit the record subject to take measures
to impede or evade such efforts, including the taking of steps to
deceive DHS personnel and deny them the ability to adequately
assess relevant information and activities, and could
inappropriately disclose to the record subject the sensitive
methods and/or confidential sources used to acquire the relevant
information against him/her. Moreover, where the record subject is
the actual target of a law enforcement investigation, this
information could permit him/her to take measures to impede the
investigation, for example, by destroying evidence, intimidating
potential witnesses, or avoiding detection or apprehension.
(2) From subsection (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosure, notice of
dispute) because certain records in this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), this requirement
to inform any person or other agency about any correction or
notation of dispute that the agency made with regard to those
records, should not apply.
(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to
Records) because these provisions concern individual rights of
access to and amendment of records (including the review of agency
denials of either) contained in this system, which consists of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and related
investigatory records concerning efforts of the Department, as
described more fully in subsection (b)(1), above. Compliance with
these provisions could inform or alert the subject of an
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, or investigatory
effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by another agency
with whom DHS is cooperating, of the fact and nature of such
efforts, and/or the relevant intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, or investigatory interest of DHS and/or other
intelligence, counterterrorism, or law enforcement agencies.
Moreover, compliance could also compromise sensitive information
either classified in the interest of national security, or which
otherwise requires, as appropriate, safeguarding and protection
from unauthorized disclosure; identify a confidential source or
disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of another individual's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
intelligence or investigative technique or method, including
interfering with intelligence or law enforcement investigative
processes by permitting the destruction of evidence, improper
influencing or intimidation of witnesses, fabrication of statements
or testimony, and flight from detection or apprehension; or
constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement personnel, confidential sources and informants, and
potential witnesses. Amendment of the records would interfere with
ongoing intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement investigations and activities, including incident
reporting and analysis activities, and impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring investigations, reports, and
analyses to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(4) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevant and Necessary) because it
is not always possible for DHS to know in advance of its receipt
the relevance and necessity of each piece of information it
acquires in the course of an intelligence, counterterrorism, or
investigatory effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by
another agency with whom DHS is cooperating. In the context of the
authorized intelligence, counterterrorism, and investigatory
activities undertaken by DHS personnel, relevance and necessity are
questions of analytic judgment and timing, such that what may
appear relevant and necessary when acquired ultimately may be
deemed unnecessary upon further analysis and evaluation. Similarly,
in some situations, it is only after acquired information is
collated, analyzed, and evaluated in light of other available
evidence and information that its relevance and necessity can be
established or made clear. Constraining the initial acquisition of
information included within the MAGNET in accordance with the
relevant and necessary requirement of subsection (e)(1) could
discourage the appropriate receipt of and access to information
which DHS and MAGNET are otherwise authorized to receive and
possess under law, and thereby impede efforts to detect, deter,
prevent, disrupt, or apprehend terrorists or terrorist groups,
and/or respond to terrorist or other activities which threaten
homeland security. Notwithstanding this claimed exemption, which
would permit the acquisition and temporary maintenance of records
whose relevance to the purpose of the MAGNET may be less than fully
clear, DHS will only disclose such records after determining
whether such disclosures are themselves consistent with the
published MAGNET routine uses. Moreover, it should be noted that,
as concerns the receipt by USCG, for intelligence purposes, of
information in any record which identifies a U.S. Person, as
defined in Executive Order 12333, as amended, such receipt, and any
subsequent use or dissemination of that identifying information, is
undertaken consistent with the procedures established and adhered
to by USCG pursuant to that Executive Order. Specifically, USCG
intelligence personnel may acquire information which identifies a
particular U.S. Person, retain it within or disseminate it from
MAGNET, as appropriate, only when it is determined that the
personally identifying information is necessary for the conduct of
USCG's functions, and otherwise falls into one of a limited number
of authorized categories, each of which reflects discrete
activities for which information on individuals would be utilized
by the Department in the overall execution of its statutory
mission.
(5) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because application of this provision could present a
serious impediment to counterterrorism or law enforcement efforts
in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or
analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to
engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity.
The nature of counterterrorism and law enforcement investigations
is such that vital information about an individual frequently can
be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such
individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not
feasible to rely solely upon information furnished by the
individual concerning his own activities.
(6) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects), to the extent
that this subsection is interpreted to require DHS to provide
notice to an individual if DHS or another agency receives or
collects information about that individual during an investigation
or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted,
exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding
counterterrorism or law enforcement efforts by putting the subject
of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact,
thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to
frustrate or impede that activity.
(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) (Access), and (f)
(Agency Rules), inasmuch as it is unnecessary for the publication
of rules and procedures contemplated therein since the MAGNET,
pursuant to subsections (3), above, will be exempt from the
underlying duties to provide to individuals notification about,
access to, and the ability to amend or correct the information
pertaining to them in, this system of records. Furthermore, to the
extent that subsection (e)(4)(I) is construed to require more
detailed disclosure than the information accompanying the system
notice for MAGNET, as published in today's Federal Register,
exemption from it is also necessary to protect the confidentiality,
privacy, and physical safety of sources of information, as well as
the methods for acquiring it. Finally, greater specificity
concerning the description of categories of sources of properly
classified records could also compromise or otherwise cause damage
to the national or homeland security.
(8) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
many of the records in this system coming from other system of
records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record
systems and therefore it is not possible for DHS to vouch for their
compliance with this provision; however, the DHS has implemented
internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in
its screening processes is as complete, accurate, and current as
possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law
enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, it is impossible to
determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant,
timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly
irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as
further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions
imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies'
trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their
judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and
counterterrorism efforts.
(9) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of
counterterrorism or law enforcement investigations to the fact of
those investigations then not previously known.
(10) From subsection (e)(12) (Matching Agreements) because
requiring DHS to provide notice of alterations to existing matching
agreements would impair DHS operations by indicating which data
elements and information are valuable to DHS's analytical
functions, thereby providing harmful disclosure of information to
individuals who would seek to circumvent or interfere with DHS's
missions.
(11) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
9. The Law Enforcement Information Data Base (LEIDB)/Pathfinder
is a historical repository of selected Coast Guard message traffic.
LEIDB/Pathfinder supports law enforcement intelligence activities.
LEIDB/Pathfinder users can query archived message traffic and link
relevant information across multiple data records within
LEIDB/Pathfinder. Users have system tools enabling the user to
identify potential relationships between information contained in
otherwise unrelated documents. These tools allow the analysts to
build high precision and low return queries, which minimize false
hits and maximize analyst productivity while working with
unstructured, unformatted, free test documents.
(a) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) certain
records or information in the above mentioned system of records are
exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4);
(e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (e)(5), and (8); (f), and
(g). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in
this system is subject to exemption. Where compliance would not
appear to interfere with or adversely affect the intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, and related law enforcement
purposes of this system, the applicable exemption may be waived by
DHS.
(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for
the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any
interest in the individual of an intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, or related investigative nature. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing
efforts of the Department to identify, understand, analyze,
investigate, and counter the activities of:
(i) Known or suspected terrorists and terrorist groups;
(ii) Groups or individuals known or believed to be assisting or
associated with known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
groups;
(iii) Individuals known, believed to be, or suspected of being
engaged in activities constituting a threat to homeland security,
including (1) activities which impact or concern the security,
safety, and integrity of our international borders, including any
illegal activities that either cross our borders or are otherwise
in violation of the immigration or customs laws and regulations of
the United States; (2) activities which could reasonably be
expected to assist in the development or use of a weapon of mass
effect; (3) activities meant to identify, create, or exploit the
vulnerabilities of, or undermine, the “key resources” (as defined
in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) and “critical
infrastructure” (as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(c)) of the United
States, including the cyber and national telecommunications
infrastructure and the availability of a viable national security
and emergency preparedness communications infrastructure; (4)
activities detrimental to the security of transportation and
transportation systems; (5) activities which violate or are
suspected of violating the laws relating to counterfeiting of
obligations and securities of the United States and other financial
crimes, including access device fraud, financial institution fraud,
identity theft, computer fraud; and computer-based attacks on our
nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure;
(6) activities, not wholly conducted within the United States,
which violate or are suspected of violating the laws which prohibit
the production, transfer, or sale of narcotics or substances
controlled in accordance with Title 21 of the United States Code,
or those associated activities otherwise prohibited by Titles 21
and 46 of the United States Code; (7) activities which impact,
concern, or otherwise threaten the safety and security of the
President and Vice President, their families, heads of state, and
other designated individuals; the White House, Vice President's
residence, foreign missions, and other designated buildings within
the United States; (8) activities which impact, concern, or
otherwise threaten domestic maritime safety and security, maritime
mobility and navigation, or the integrity of the domestic maritime
environment; (9) activities which impact, concern, or otherwise
threaten the national operational capability of the Department to
respond to natural and manmade major disasters and emergencies,
including acts of terrorism; (10) activities involving the
importation, possession, storage, development, or transportation of
nuclear or radiological material without authorization or for use
against the United States;
(iv) Foreign governments, organizations, or persons (foreign
powers); and
(v) Individuals engaging in intelligence activities on behalf of
a foreign power or terrorist group.
Thus, by notifying the record subject that he/she is the focus
of such efforts or interest on the part of DHS, or other agencies
with whom DHS is cooperating and to whom the disclosures were made,
this information could permit the record subject to take measures
to impede or evade such efforts, including the taking of steps to
deceive DHS personnel and deny them the ability to adequately
assess relevant information and activities, and could
inappropriately disclose to the record subject the sensitive
methods and/or confidential sources used to acquire the relevant
information against him/her. Moreover, where the record subject is
the actual target of a law enforcement investigation, this
information could permit him/her to take measures to impede the
investigation, for example, by destroying evidence, intimidating
potential witnesses, or avoiding detection or apprehension.
(2) From subsection (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosure, notice of
dispute) because certain records in this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), this requirement
to inform any person or other agency about any correction or
notation of dispute that the agency made with regard to those
records, should not apply.
(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to
Records) because these provisions concern individual rights of
access to and amendment of records (including the review of agency
denials of either) contained in this system, which consists of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and related
investigatory records concerning efforts of the Department, as
described more fully in subsection (b)(1), above. Compliance with
these provisions could inform or alert the subject of an
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, or investigatory
effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by another agency
with whom DHS is cooperating, of the fact and nature of such
efforts, and/or the relevant intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, or investigatory interest of DHS and/or other
intelligence, counterterrorism, or law enforcement agencies.
Moreover, compliance could also compromise sensitive information
either classified in the interest of national security, or which
otherwise requires, as appropriate, safeguarding and protection
from unauthorized disclosure; identify a confidential source or
disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of another individual's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
intelligence or investigative technique or method, including
interfering with intelligence or law enforcement investigative
processes by permitting the destruction of evidence, improper
influencing or intimidation of witnesses, fabrication of statements
or testimony, and flight from detection or apprehension; or
constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement personnel, confidential sources and informants, and
potential witnesses. Amendment of the records would interfere with
ongoing intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement investigations and activities, including incident
reporting and analysis activities, and impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring investigations, reports, and
analyses to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(4) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevant and Necessary) because it
is not always possible for DHS to know in advance of its receipt
the relevance and necessity of each piece of information it
acquires in the course of an intelligence, counterterrorism, or
investigatory effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by
another agency with whom DHS is cooperating. In the context of the
authorized intelligence, counterterrorism, and investigatory
activities undertaken by DHS personnel, relevance and necessity are
questions of analytic judgment and timing, such that what may
appear relevant and necessary when acquired ultimately may be
deemed unnecessary upon further analysis and evaluation. Similarly,
in some situations, it is only after acquired information is
collated, analyzed, and evaluated in light of other available
evidence and information that its relevance and necessity can be
established or made clear. Constraining the initial acquisition of
information included within the LEIDB in accordance with the
relevant and necessary requirement of subsection (e)(1) could
discourage the appropriate receipt of and access to information
which DHS and USCG are otherwise authorized to receive and possess
under law, and thereby impede efforts to detect, deter, prevent,
disrupt, or apprehend terrorists or terrorist groups, and/or
respond to terrorist or other activities which threaten homeland
security. Notwithstanding this claimed exemption, which would
permit the acquisition and temporary maintenance of records whose
relevance to the purpose of the LEIDB may be less than fully clear,
DHS will only disclose such records after determining whether such
disclosures are themselves consistent with the published LEIDB
routine uses. Moreover, it should be noted that, as concerns the
receipt by USCG, for intelligence purposes, of information in any
record which identifies a U.S. Person, as defined in Executive
Order 12333, as amended, such receipt, and any subsequent use or
dissemination of that identifying information, is undertaken
consistent with the procedures established and adhered to by USCG
pursuant to that Executive Order. Specifically, USCG intelligence
personnel may acquire information which identifies a particular
U.S. Person, retain it within or disseminate it from LEIDB, as
appropriate, only when it is determined that the personally
identifying information is necessary for the conduct of USCG's
functions, and otherwise falls into one of a limited number of
authorized categories, each of which reflects discrete activities
for which information on individuals would be utilized by the
Department in the overall execution of its statutory mission.
(5) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because application of this provision could present a
serious impediment to counterterrorism or law enforcement efforts
in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or
analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to
engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity.
The nature of counterterrorism, and law enforcement investigations
is such that vital information about an individual frequently can
be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such
individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not
feasible to rely solely upon information furnished by the
individual concerning his own activities.
(6) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects), to the extent
that this subsection is interpreted to require DHS to provide
notice to an individual if DHS or another agency receives or
collects information about that individual during an investigation
or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted,
exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding
counterterrorism or law enforcement efforts by putting the subject
of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact,
thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to
frustrate or impede that activity.
(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) (Access), inasmuch
as it is unnecessary for the publication of rules and procedures
contemplated therein since the LEIDB, pursuant to subsections (2)
and (3), above, will be exempt from the underlying duties to
provide to individuals notification about, access to, and the
ability to amend or correct the information pertaining to them in,
this system of records. Furthermore, to the extent that subsection
(e)(4)(I) is construed to require more detailed disclosure than the
information accompanying the system notice for LEIDB, as published
in today's Federal Register, exemption from it is also necessary to
protect the confidentiality, privacy, and physical safety of
sources of information, as well as the methods for acquiring it.
Finally, greater specificity concerning the description of
categories of sources of properly classified records could also
compromise or otherwise cause damage to the national or homeland
security.
(8) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
many of the records contained in this system are derived from other
domestic and foreign sources, it is not possible for DHS to vouch
for those records' compliance with this provision; however, the DHS
has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure
that data used in its screening processes is as complete, accurate,
and current as possible. In addition, in the collection of
information for law enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly
irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as
further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions
imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies'
trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their
judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and
counterterrorism efforts.
(9) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of
counterterrorism or law enforcement investigations to the fact of
those investigations then not previously known.
(10) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d). Access to, and amendment of, system records that
are not exempt or for which exemption is waived may be obtained
under procedures described in the related SORN or subpart B of this
part.
(11) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
10. DHS-ICE-001, The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) collects
and maintains pertinent information on nonimmigrant students and
exchange visitors and the schools and exchange visitor program
sponsors that host them while in the United States. The system
permits DHS to monitor compliance by these individuals with the
terms of their admission into the United States. Pursuant to
exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act,
portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d);
(e)(1); (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I). Exemptions from the particular
subsections are justified, on a case by case basis, to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation, of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension, which
undermines the entire system.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation, of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation and avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the
records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law
enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative
burden by requiring investigations to be continuously
reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and amendment to
such information also could disclose security-sensitive information
that could be detrimental to homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective enforcement of federal laws, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing
patterns of unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).
11. The General Counsel Electronic Management System (GEMS)
consists of records and information created or collected by
attorneys for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which will
be used in the preparation and presentation of cases before a court
or other adjudicative body. ICE attorneys work closely with ICE law
enforcement personnel throughout the process of adjudicating
immigration cases. GEMS allows ICE attorneys to store all the
materials pertaining to immigration adjudications, including
documents related to investigations, case notes and other hearing
related information, and briefs and memoranda of law related to
cases. Having this information in one system should not only
facilitate the work of the ICE attorneys involved in the particular
case, but also will provide a legal resource for other attorneys
who are adjudicating similar cases. The system will also provide
management capabilities for tracking time and effort expended in
the preparation and presentation of cases. Pursuant to exemptions 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act, portions of this system are
exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f)(2) through
(5); and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(1) and (k)(2), this
system is exempt from the following provisions of the Privacy Act,
subject to the limitations set forth in those subsections: 5 U.S.C.
552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation, to the existence of the investigation, which
in some cases may be classified, and reveal investigative interest
on the part of DHS or ICE. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation pertaining to an immigration matter,
which in some cases may be classified, and prematurely reveal
investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access
to the records could permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the
records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law
enforcement activities and would impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring investigations to be
continuously reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and
amendment to such information could disclose security-sensitive
information that could be detrimental to homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal immigration law, the accuracy of information
obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the
information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific
investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement and
for the protection of national security, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject of the
nature or existence of an investigation, which could cause
interference with the investigation, a related inquiry or other law
enforcement activities, some of which may be classified.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise the existence of a confidential
investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential
informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
(f) (Agency Rules), and (g) (Civil Remedies) because portions of
this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d).
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with ICE's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants and other law enforcement mechanisms that
may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
12. DHS/CBP-005, Advanced Passenger Information System. A
portion of the following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3),
(4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g); however, these
exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system
records is recompiled or is created from information contained in
other systems of records subject to such exemptions pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), and (k)(2). Further, no exemption shall be
asserted with respect to information submitted by and collected
from the individual or the individual's representative in the
course of any redress process associated with this system of
records. After conferring with the appropriate component or agency,
DHS may waive applicable exemptions in appropriate circumstances
and where it would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect
the law enforcement or national security purposes of the systems
from which the information is recompiled or in which it is
contained. Exemptions from the above particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, when information in this system records is
recompiled or is created from information contained in other
systems of records subject to exemptions for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosure) because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him or her would specifically reveal any
investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing
efforts to investigate a known or suspected terrorist by notifying
the record subject that he or she is under investigation. This
information could also permit the record subject to take measures
to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate
potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the
investigation.
(b) From subsection (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosure, notice of
dispute) because portions of this system are exempt from the access
and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(c) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to
Records) because these provisions concern individual access to and
amendment of certain records contained in this system, including
law enforcement counterterrorism, investigatory, and intelligence
records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject
of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation,
and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law
enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to
national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement
process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper
influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight
of the subject; could identify a confidential source or disclose
information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or
intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the
health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential
informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would
interfere with ongoing counterterrorism, law enforcement, or
intelligence investigations and analysis activities and impose an
impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations,
analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and
revised.
(d) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because it is not always possible for DHS or other
agencies to know in advance what information is relevant and
necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between the
individual seeking redress and a known or suspected terrorist.
Also, because DHS and other agencies may not always know what
information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist
will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting
an operational response.
(e) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because application of this provision could present a
serious impediment to counterterrorism, law enforcement, or
intelligence efforts in that it would put the subject of an
investigation, study, or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby
permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate
or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism, law
enforcement, or intelligence investigations is such that vital
information about an individual frequently can be obtained only
from other persons who are familiar with such individual and
his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to
rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his
own activities.
(f) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects), to the extent
that this subsection is interpreted to require DHS to provide
notice to an individual if DHS or another agency receives or
collects information about that individual during an investigation
or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted,
exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding
counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts by
putting the subject of an investigation, study, or analysis on
notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in
conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.
(g) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(h) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
many of the records in this system coming from other system of
records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record
systems and therefore it is not possible for DHS to vouch for their
compliance with this provision; however, the DHS has implemented
internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in
the redress process is as thorough, accurate, and current as
possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law
enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly
irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as
further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions
imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies'
trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their
judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and
counterterrorism efforts. The DHS has, however, implemented
internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that the data used
in the redress process is as thorough, accurate, and current as
possible.
(i) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of
counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations
to the fact of those investigations when not previously known.
(j) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d).
(k) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
13. The Department of Homeland Security General Training Records
system of records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by DHS and its components. The Department of Homeland
Security General Training Records system of records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components and offices to maintain records about individual
training, including enrollment and participation information,
information pertaining to class schedules, programs, and
instructors, training trends and needs, testing and examination
materials, and assessments of training efficacy. The data will be
collected by employee name or other unique identifier. The
collection and maintenance of this information will assist DHS in
meeting its obligation to train its personnel and contractors in
order to ensure that the agency mission can be successfully
accomplished. Pursuant to exemptions 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) of the
Privacy Act, portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C.
552a(d) to the extent that records in this system relate to testing
or examination materials used solely to determine individual
qualifications for appointment in the Federal service. Access to or
amendment of this information by the data subject would compromise
the objectivity and fairness of the testing and examination
process.
14. The U.S. ICE-005 Trade Transparency Analysis and Research
(TTAR) System consists of electronic and paper records and will be
used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). TTAR is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. TTAR contains
information that is collected by other federal and foreign
government agencies and may contain personally identifiable
information. Pursuant to exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the
Privacy Act, portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2), this system is exempt from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in those
subsections: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions from these particular subsections
are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time
a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses,
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
15. The DHS/ALL - 013 Claims Records system of records consists
of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/ALL - 013 Claims Records system is a repository
of information held by DHS in connection with its several and
varied missions and functions, including, but not limited to: the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings there under; and national security, intelligence
activities; and protection of the President of the United States or
other individuals pursuant to section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18.
The DHS/ALL - 013 Claims Records system contains information that
is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation
with DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, Tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (I), and
(f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(3). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
16. [Reserved]
17. The DHS/ALL - 006 Accident Records system of records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS
and its components. The DHS/ALL - 006 Accident Records system is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to
section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/ALL - 006 Accident
Records system contains information that is collected by, on behalf
of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components
and may contain personally identifiable information collected by
other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or international
government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has
exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy
Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(3). Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons: From
subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records
contained in this system of records could inform the subject of
information related to the protection of a President of the United
States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 and 3056A of
Title 18. Permitting access and amendment to such information could
disclose security-sensitive information that could be detrimental
to homeland security.
18. The DHS/ALL - 020 Internal Affairs Records system of records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS
and its components. The DHS/ALL - 020 Internal Affairs Records
system is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to
section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/ALL - 020 Internal
Affairs Records system contains information that is collected by,
on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g) pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a
(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), and (k)(5).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training, and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
19. The DHS/ALL - 024 Facility and Perimeter Access Control and
Visitor Management system of records consists of electronic and
paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The
DHS/ALL - 024 Facility and Perimeter Access Control and Visitor
Management system is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: the enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/ALL - 024 Facility and Perimeter Access Control and Visitor
Management system contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
20. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/ALL-038 Insider
Threat Program System of Records consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/ALL-038
Insider Threat Program System of Records is a repository of
information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including the enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under; national security and intelligence activities; and
protection of the President of the U.S. or other individuals
pursuant to Section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/ALL-038
Insider Threat Program System of Records contains information that
is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation
with DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other federal, state, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (e)(12); (f); and (g)(1).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5), has exempted this system
from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f).
Where a record received from another system has been exempted in
that source system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1),
(k)(2), and (k)(5), DHS will claim the same exemptions for those
records that are claimed for the original primary systems of
records from which they originated and claims any additional
exemptions set forth here. Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process. When an investigation
has been completed, information on disclosures made may continue to
be exempted if the fact that an investigation occurred remains
sensitive after completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (e)(12) (Matching Agreements) because
requiring DHS to provide notice of a new or revised matching
agreement with a non-Federal agency, if one existed, would impair
DHS operations by indicating which data elements and information
are valuable to DHS's analytical functions, thereby providing
harmful disclosure of information to individuals who would seek to
circumvent or interfere with DHS's missions.
(j) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
21. The DHS/CBP - 010 Persons Engaged in International Trade in
CBP Licensed/Regulated Activities system of records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/CBP - 010 Persons Engaged in International
Trade in CBP Licensed/Regulated Activities is a repository of
information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including, but not limited to: The
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings thereunder; and national security and intelligence
activities. The DHS/CBP - 010 Persons Engaged in International
Trade in CBP Licensed/Regulated Activities contains information
that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in
cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other Federal, State, local,
tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f),
and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
national security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
22. The DHS/CBP - 011 TECS system of records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS, its
Components, and other Federal agencies. The DHS/CBP-011 TECS is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national
security and intelligence activities. The DHS/CBP-011 TECS contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other Federal,
State, local, Tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and
(e)(8); (f), and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally,
the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from
the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
national security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation or subject of interest would alert
the subject to the nature or existence of an investigation, thereby
interfering with the related investigation and law enforcement
activities or national security matter.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
23. The DHS/CBP - 012 Closed Circuit Television system of
records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/CBP - 012 Closed Circuit
Television system is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/CBP - 012 Closed Circuit Television system contains information
that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in
cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other Federal, State, local,
tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f),
and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
24. The DHS/CBP - 013 Seized Assets and Case Tracking System
(SEACATS) consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/CBP - 013 Seized Assets and Case
Tracking System is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/CBP - 013 Seized Assets and Case Tracking System contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other Federal,
State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and
(e)(8); (f), and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally,
the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from
the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
national security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude the officers and agents of DHS components' from using
their investigative training and exercise of good judgment to both
conduct and report on investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
25. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/U.S. Customs and
Border Protection-014 Regulatory Audit Archive System (RAAS) System
of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be
used by DHS and its Components. The DHS/CBP-014 RAAS System of
Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations; inquiries; and proceedings there under. The
DHS/CBP-014 RAAS System of Records contains information that is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its Components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3). Exemptions from these particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
26. DHS/CBP-001, Import Information System (IIS). A portion of
the following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3),
(e)(8), and (g)(1) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), and from 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Further, no
exemption shall be asserted with respect to information maintained
in the system as it relates to data submitted by or on behalf of a
person who travels to visit the United States and crosses the
border, nor shall an exemption be asserted with respect to the
resulting determination (approval or denial). After conferring with
the appropriate component or agency, DHS may waive applicable
exemptions in appropriate circumstances and where it would not
appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement
purposes of the systems from which the information is recompiled or
in which it is contained. Exemptions from the above particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, when information in this system of
records is may impede a law enforcement, intelligence activities
and national security investigation:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosure) because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him or her would specifically reveal any
investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing
efforts to investigate a violation of U.S. law, including
investigations of a known or suspected terrorist, by notifying the
record subject that he or she is under investigation. This
information could also permit the record subject to take measures
to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence,
intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede
the investigation.
(b) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of
counterterrorism or law enforcement investigations to the fact of
those investigations when not previously known.
(c) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
27. The DHS/CBP-009 Nonimmigrant Information system of records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS
and it's Components. The DHS/CBP-009 Nonimmigrant Information
System is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
Investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national
security and intelligence activities. The DHS/CBP-009 Nonimmigrant
Information System contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, Tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. This system may contain records
or information pertaining to the accounting of disclosures made
from the Nonimmigrant Information System to other law enforcement
and counterterrorism agencies (Federal, State, Local, Foreign,
International or Tribal) in accordance with the published routine
uses. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system
from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 522(c)(3), (e) (8), and (g) of
the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as necessary and appropriate
to protect accounting of these disclosures only, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), and (k)(2). Further, no exemption shall be
asserted with respect to biographical or travel information
submitted by, and collected from, a person's travel documents or
submitted from a government computer system to support or to
validate those travel documents. After conferring with the
appropriate component or agency, DHS may waive applicable
exemptions in appropriate circumstances and where it would not
appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement
purposes of the systems from which the information is recompiled or
in which it is contained. Exemptions from the above particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, when information in this system of
records is recompiled or is created from information contained in
other systems of records subject to exemptions for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosure) because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him or her would specifically reveal any
investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing
efforts to investigate a violation of U.S. law, including
investigations of a known or suspected terrorist, by notifying the
record subject that he or she is under investigation. This
information could also permit the record subject to take measures
to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate
potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the
investigation.
(b) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of
counterterrorism or law enforcement investigations to the fact of
those investigations when not previously known.
(c) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
28. The DHS/ICE - 007 Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC)
Alien Criminal Response Information Management (ACRIMe) system of
records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/ICE - 007 Law Enforcement
Support Center Alien Criminal Response Information Management
system is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national
security and intelligence activities. The DHS/ICE - 007 Law
Enforcement Support Center Alien Criminal Response Information
Management system contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system of records from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g) pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular subsections
are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time
a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in identifying or establishing
patterns of unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) (Agency Requirements), and
(f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt from
the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons
noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
29. The DHS/ICE - 008 Search, Arrest, and Seizure system of
records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/ICE - 008 Search, Arrest, and
Seizure system is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/ICE - 008 Search, Arrest, and Seizure system contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other Federal,
State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8);
(f), and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
30. The DHS/ICE - 009 External Investigations system of records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS
and its components. The DHS/ICE - 009 External Investigations
system is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/ICE - 009
External Investigations system contains information that is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g) pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular subsections
are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time
a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
31. The DHS/ICE - 010 Confidential and Other Sources of
Information (COSI) system of records consists of electronic and
paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The
DHS/ICE - 010 Confidential and Other Sources of Information system
is a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: the enforcement of civil and criminal laws; and
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/ICE - 010
Confidential and Other Sources of Information system contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other Federal,
State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8);
(f), and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
32. The DHS/USCIS - 006 Fraud Detection and National Security
Data System (FDNS-DS) system of records consists of a stand alone
database and paper files that will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/USCIS - 006 Fraud Detection and National
Security Data System is a case management system used to record,
track, and manage immigration inquiries, investigative referrals,
law enforcement requests, and case determinations involving benefit
fraud, criminal activity, public safety and national security
concerns. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a
(k)(2). These exemptions apply only to the extent that records in
the system are subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a
(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified,
on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is
made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation; and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) (Agency
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the
individual access provisions of subsection (d) which exempts
providing access because it could alert a subject to the nature or
existence of an investigation, and thus there could be no
procedures for that particular data. Procedures do exist for access
for those portions of the system that are not exempted.
(e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) because
providing such source information would impede law enforcement or
intelligence by compromising the nature or existence of a
confidential investigation.
(f) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d).
33. The DHS/USCG - 028 Family Advocacy Case Records system of
records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/USCG - 028 Family Advocacy Case
Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under. The
DHS/USCG - 028 Family Advocacy Case Records contains information
that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in
cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other Federal, State, local,
tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
34. The DHS/USCG-029 Notice of Arrival and Departure System of
Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/USCG-029 Notice of Arrival and
Departure System of Records is a repository of information held by
DHS in connection with its several and varied missions and
functions, including, but not limited to the enforcement of civil
and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under. The DHS/USCG-029 Notice of Arrival and Departure System of
Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in
support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may
contain personally identifiable information collected by other
federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies.
The Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2), exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act: Sections (c)(3), (e)(8), and (g) of the Privacy
Act of 1974, as amended, as is necessary and appropriate to protect
this information. Further, DHS has exempted section (c)(3) of the
Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2),
as is necessary and appropriate to protect this information.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process. When an investigation has been
completed, information on disclosures made may continue to be
exempted if the fact that an investigation occurred remains
sensitive after completion.
(b) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(c) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
35. The DHS/Secret Service - 001 Criminal Investigation
Information system of records consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/Secret
Service - 001 Criminal Investigation Information system is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; the
protection of the President of the United States or other
individuals and locations pursuant to section 3056 and 3056A of
Title 18. The DHS/Secret Service - 001 Criminal Investigation
Information system contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign,
international government agencies, as well as private corporate,
education and other entities. The Secretary of Homeland Security
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g) pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (I), and (f)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(3). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, or protective inquiry, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious
impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or the Secret Service's
protective mission. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit
the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, or inquiry, to tamper with witnesses or evidence,
and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative or inquiry process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, or protective inquiry to the
existence of the investigation or inquiry, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the
records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record
to impede the investigation or inquiry, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the
records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law
enforcement or protective activities and/or could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security or the protective mission of the Secret
Service.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law or protective inquiries, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or
the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a
specific investigation or protective inquiry. In the interests of
effective law enforcement, and/or the protective mission of the
Secret Service, it is appropriate to retain all information that
may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity, or a threat
to an individual, location or event protected or secured by the
Secret Service.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation or protective inquiry would alert
the subject to the nature or existence of an investigation or
inquiry, thereby interfering with the related investigation or
inquiry and law enforcement or protective activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Individuals Providing
Information) because providing such detailed information would
impede law enforcement or protective activities in that it could
compromise investigations or inquires by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation or inquiry and thereby
provide an opportunity for the subject of an investigation or
inquiry to conceal evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take
other actions that could thwart investigative or protective
efforts; reveal the identity of witnesses in investigations or
inquiries, thereby providing an opportunity for the subjects of the
investigations or inquiries or others to harass, intimidate, or
otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations or
protective activities and discourage members of the public from
cooperating as confidential informants in any future investigations
or protective activities.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to the existence of records pertaining to them in the
system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to
which individuals may access and view records pertaining to
themselves in the system would undermine investigative or
protective efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Maintenance of Information Used in
Making any Determination) because in the collection of information
for law enforcement and protective purposes it is impossible to
determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant,
timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would preclude Secret
Service DHS agents from using their investigative and protective
training and exercising good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations or other protective activities.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, or/and could result in disclosure of
investigative or protective techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act
relating to individuals' rights to access and amend their records
contained in the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish
rules or procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil
remedy for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to
comply with a request for access to records; failure to maintain
accurate, relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to
otherwise comply with an individual's right to access or amend
records.
36. The DHS/Secret Service - 003 Non-Criminal Investigation
Information system of records consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/Secret
Service - 003 Non-Criminal Investigation Information system is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws; criminal,
civil, protective and background investigations and inquiries, and
proceedings thereunder; the protection of the President of the
United States or other individuals and locations pursuant to
section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18; and the hiring of employees
through an application process which includes the use of polygraph
examinations. The DHS/Secret Service - 003 Non-Criminal
Investigation Information system contains information that is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies, as well as private
corporate, educational and other entities. The Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3),
(k)(5), and (k)(6). Exemptions from these particular subsections
are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time
a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, or protective inquiry, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious
impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or the Secret Service's
protective mission. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit
the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation or inquiry, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative or inquiry process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, or protective inquiry to the
existence of the investigation or inquiry, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the
records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record
to impede the investigation or inquiry, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the
records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law
enforcement or protective activities and/or could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security or the protective mission of the Secret
Service.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law or protective inquiries, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or
the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a
specific investigation or protective inquiry. In the interests of
effective law enforcement and/or the protective mission of the
Secret Service, it is appropriate to retain all information that
may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity, or a threat
to an individual, location or event protected or secured by the
Secret Service.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation or protective inquiry would alert
the subject to the nature or existence of an investigation or
inquiry, thereby interfering with the related investigation or
inquiry and law enforcement or protective activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Individuals Providing
Information) because providing such detailed information would
impede law enforcement or protective activities in that it could
compromise investigations or inquiries by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation or inquiry and thereby
provide an opportunity for the subject of an investigation or
inquiry to conceal evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take
other actions that could thwart investigative or protective
efforts; reveal the identity of witnesses in investigations or
inquiries, thereby providing an opportunity for the subjects of the
investigations or inquiries or others to harass, intimidate, or
otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations or
protective activities and discourage members of the public from
cooperating as confidential informants in any future investigations
or protective activities.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to the existence of records pertaining to them in the
system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to
which individuals may access and view records pertaining to
themselves in the system would undermine investigative or
protective efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Maintenance of Information Used in
Making any Determination) because in the collection of information
for law enforcement and protective purposes it is impossible to
determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant,
timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would preclude Secret
Service agents from using their investigative and protective
training, and exercising good judgment to both conduct and report
on investigations or other protective activities.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, or could result in disclosure of
investigative or protective techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act
relating to individuals' rights to access and amend their records
contained in the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish
rules or procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil
remedy for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to
comply with a request for access to records; failure to maintain
accurate, relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to
otherwise comply with an individual's right to access or amend
records.
37. The DHS/Secret Service - 004 Protection Information system
of records consists of electronic and paper records and will be
used by DHS and its components. The DHS/Secret Service - 004
Protection Information system is a repository of information held
by DHS in connection with its several and varied missions and
functions, including, but not limited to: the enforcement of civil
and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and the protection of the President of the United
States or other individuals and locations pursuant to Sections 3056
and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/Secret Service - 004 Protection
Information system contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, Tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies, as well as private corporate or
other entities. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act,
subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and
(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I),
(e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(3). Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation or a protective inquiry to the
existence of the investigation or inquiry, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious
impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or the Secret Service's
protective mission. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit
the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation or inquiry, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative or inquiry process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, or protective inquiry to the
existence of the investigation or inquiry, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the
records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record
to impede the investigation, or inquiry to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the
records could interfere with ongoing investigations, law
enforcement or protective activities and/or could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security or the protective mission of the Secret
Service.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law or protective inquiries, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or
the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a
specific investigation or protective inquiry. In the interests of
effective law enforcement and/or the protective mission of the
Secret Service, it is appropriate to retain all information that
may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity, or a
possible threat to an individual, location or event protected or
secured by the Secret Service.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation or protective inquiry would alert
the subject to the nature or existence of an investigation or
inquiry, thereby interfering with the related investigation or
inquiry and law enforcement or protective activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Individuals Providing
Information) because providing such detailed information would
impede law enforcement or protective activities in that it could
compromise investigations or inquiries by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation or inquiry and thereby
provide an opportunity for the subject of an investigation or
inquiry to conceal evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take
other actions that could thwart investigative or protective
efforts; reveal the identity of witnesses, thereby providing an
opportunity for the subjects of the investigations or inquiries or
others to harass, intimidate, or otherwise interfere with the
collection of evidence or other information from such witnesses; or
reveal the identity of confidential informants, which would
negatively affect the informant's usefulness in any ongoing or
future investigations or protective activities and discourage
members of the public from cooperating as confidential informants
in any future investigations or protective activities.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to the existence of records pertaining to them in the
system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to
which individuals may access and view records pertaining to
themselves in the system would undermine investigative and
protective efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Maintenance of Information Used in
Making any Determination) because in the collection of information
for law enforcement and protective purposes it is impossible to
determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant,
timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would preclude Secret
Service agents from using their investigative and protective
training and exercising good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations or other protective activities.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative or protective techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act
relating to individuals' rights to access and amend their records
contained in the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish
rules or procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil
remedy for the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to
comply with a request for access to records; failure to maintain
accurate, relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to
otherwise comply with an individual's right to access or amend
records.
38. The DHS/ALL - 025 Law Enforcement Authority in Support of
the Protection of Property Owned or Occupied by the Department of
Homeland Security system of records consists of electronic and
paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The
DHS/ALL - 025 Law Enforcement Authority in Support of the
Protection of Property Owned or Occupied by the Department of
Homeland Security system is a repository of information held by DHS
in connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/ALL - 025 Law Enforcement Authority in Support of the
Protection of Property Owned or Occupied by the Department of
Homeland Security system contains information that is collected by,
on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
39. The DHS/ALL - 017 General Legal Records system of records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS
and its components. The DHS/ALL - 017 General Legal Records system
of records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to
section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/ALL - 017 General Legal
Records system of records contains information that is collected
by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g), pursuant to
exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (I),
and (f), pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3) and
(k)(5). Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified,
on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is
made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
40. The DHS/ALL - 023 Personnel Security Management system of
records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/ALL - 023 Personnel Security
Management system is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; national security and intelligence activities; and
protection of the President of the United States or other
individuals pursuant to section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The
DHS/ALL - 023 Personnel Security Management system contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other Federal,
State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), and (k)(5). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
41. The DHS/NPPD/US-VISIT - 001 Arrival and Departure
Information system of records notice is a system for the storage
and use of biographic, biometric indicator, and encounter data
consolidated from various systems regarding aliens who have applied
for entry, entered, or departed the United States. Information in
the DHS/NPPD/US-VISIT - 001 Arrival and Departure Information
system of records notice is used primarily to facilitate the
investigation of subjects of interest who may have violated their
immigration status by remaining in the United States beyond their
authorized stay; thereby supporting the several and varied missions
and functions of DHS, including but not limited to: the enforcement
of civil and criminal laws (including the immigration law);
investigations, inquiries; national security and intelligence
activities in support of the DHS mission to identify and prevent
acts of terrorism against the United States. The information is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f); and (g) pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H); and (f) pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3) and (k)(5). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation; and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identities of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Requirements) because portions of this system are
exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for
the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to
establish requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such
access. Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence
of records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act
relating to individuals' rights to access and amend their records
contained in the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish
rules or procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil
remedy for the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to
comply with a request for access to records; failure to maintain
accurate, relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to
otherwise comply with an individual's right to access or amend
records.
42. The DHS/NPPD/US-VISIT - 003 Technical Reconciliation
Analysis Classification system of records (TRACS) consists of stand
alone database and paper files that will be used by DHS and its
components. This system of records will be used to perform a range
of information management and analytic functions involving
collecting, verifying, and resolving tracking of data primarily on
individuals who are not United States citizens or legal permanent
residents (LPRs). However, it will contain data on: (1.) U.S.
citizens or LPRs who have a connection to the DHS mission (e.g.,
individuals who have submitted a visa application to the UK, or
have made requests for a license or credential as part of a
background check or security screening in connection with their
hiring or retention, performance of a job function or the issuance
of a license or credential for employment at DHS); (2.) U.S.
citizens and LPRs who have an incidental connection to the DHS
mission (e.g., individuals living at the same address as
individuals who have remained in this country beyond their
authorized stays); and (3.) individuals who have, over time,
changed their status and became U.S. citizens or LPRs. The
DHS/NPPD/US-VISIT - 003 Technical Reconciliation Analysis
Classification system of records is managed and maintained by the
US-VISIT Program. The data contained in the DHS/NPPD/US-VISIT - 003
Technical Reconciliation Analysis Classification system of records
is primarily derived from DHS/NPPD/U.S-VISIT - 001 Arrival and
Departure Information System (ADIS); DHS/CBP - 011 TECS; DHS/ICE -
001 Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS);
DHS/ICE/CBP/USCIS - 001 - 03 Enforcement Operational Immigration
Records (ENFORCE/IDENT); DHS/ICE - 011 Removable Alien Records
System (RARS); DHS/USCIS - 001 Alien File (A-File) and Central
Index System (CIS); DHS/USCIS - 007 Benefits Information System
covering Computer Linked Application Information Management System
3 (Claims 3) and Computer Linked Application Information Management
System 4 (Claims 4); DHS/USCIS Refugees, Asylum & Parole System
(RAPS); and from the Department of State's Consolidated Consular
Database (CCD). The DHS/NPPD/US-VISIT - 003 Technical
Reconciliation Analysis Classification system of records also
contains data from web searches for addresses and phone numbers.
This data is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in
cooperation with DHS and its components. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f); and (g) pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), and (e)(4)(H) (Agency
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the
individual access provisions of subsection (d) which exempts
providing access because it could alert a subject to the nature or
existence of an investigation, and thus there could be no
procedures for that particular data. Procedures do exist for access
for those portions of the system that are not exempted.
(g) From subsection (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) because
providing such source information would impede enforcement or
intelligence by compromising the nature or existence of a
confidential investigation.
(h) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(i) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures and evidence.
(j) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d).
(k) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
43. The DHS/USCG - 013 Marine Information for Safety and Law
Enforcement system of records consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/USCG -
013 Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement system of
records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to: the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; national
security and intelligence activities. The DHS/USCG - 013 Marine
Information for Safety and Law Enforcement system of records
contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support
of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other Federal,
State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and
(e)(8); (f); and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally,
the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from
the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H); (I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
44. The DHS/USCG - 030 Merchant Seaman's Records system of
records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/USCG - 030 Merchant Seaman's
Records system of records is a repository of information held by
DHS in connection with its several and varied missions and
functions, including, but not limited to: the enforcement of civil
and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under. The DHS/USCG - 030 Merchant Seaman's Records system of
records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in
support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may
contain personally identifiable information collected by other
Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
45. The DHS/CBP - 006 Automated Targeting system of records
performs screening of both inbound and outbound cargo, travelers,
and conveyances. As part of this screening function and to
facilitate DHS's border enforcement mission, the DHS/CBP - 006
Automated Targeting system of records compares information received
with CBP's law enforcement databases, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Terrorist Screening Center's Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB), information on outstanding wants or warrants,
information from other government agencies regarding high-risk
parties, and risk-based rules developed by analysts using law
enforcement data, intelligence, and past case experience. The
modules also facilitate analysis of the screening results of these
comparisons. This supports the several and varied missions and
functions of DHS, including but not limited to: The enforcement of
civil and criminal laws (including the immigration law);
investigations, inquiries; national security and intelligence
activities in support of the DHS mission to identify and prevent
acts of terrorism against the United States. The information is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. Certain records or
information in DHS/CBP - 006 Automated Targeting system of records
are exempt from the Privacy Act. With respect to the ATS-P module,
exempt records are the targeting rule sets, risk assessment
analyses, and business confidential information contained in the
PNR that relates to the air and vessel carriers. No exemption shall
be asserted regarding PNR data about the requester, provided by
either the requester or a booking agent, brokers, or another person
on the requester's behalf. This information, upon request, may be
provided to the requester in the form in which it was collected
from the respective carrier, but may not include certain business
confidential information of the air carrier that is also contained
in the record, such as use and application of frequent flier miles,
internal annotations to the air fare, etc. For other DHS/CBP - 006
Automated Targeting system of records modules the only information
maintained in the system is the targeting rule sets, risk
assessment analyses, and a pointer to the data from the source
system of records. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act,
subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and
(4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through
(I), (e)(5), and (8); (f); and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1),
(2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (e)(5),
and (8); (f); and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). These
exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system
of records is recompiled or is created from information contained
in other systems of records. After conferring with the appropriate
component or agency, DHS may waive applicable exemptions in
appropriate circumstances and where it would not appear to
interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement purposes of
the systems from which the information is recompiled or in which it
is contained. Exemptions from these particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosure)
because making available to a record subject the accounting of
disclosures from records concerning him or her would specifically
reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing
efforts to investigate a known or suspected criminal or terrorist,
or other person of interest, by notifying the record subject that
he or she is under investigation. This information could also
permit the record subject to take measures to impede the
investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential
witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting
for Disclosure) because making available to a record subject the
accounting of disclosures from records concerning him or her would
specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual.
Revealing this information could reasonably be expected to
compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected
terrorist by notifying the record subject that he or she is under
investigation. This information could also permit the record
subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy
evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid
or impede the investigation.
(b) From subsection (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosure, notice of
dispute) because certain records in this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), this requirement
to inform any person or other agency about any correction or
notation of dispute that the agency made with regard to those
records, should not apply.
(c) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to
Records) because these provisions concern individual access to and
amendment of certain records contained in this system, including
law enforcement, counterterrorism, and investigatory records.
Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an
investigation to the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or
the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement
agencies; compromise sensitive information related to law
enforcement, including matters bearing on national security;
interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to
the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses,
fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could
identify a confidential source; reveal a sensitive investigative or
intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the
health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential
informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would
interfere with ongoing counterterrorism or law enforcement
investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and
reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(d) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because it is not always possible for DHS or other
agencies to know in advance what information is relevant and
necessary for it to complete screening of cargo, conveyances, and
passengers. Information relating to known or suspected criminals or
terrorists or other persons of interest, is not always collected in
a manner that permits immediate verification or determination of
relevancy to a DHS purpose. For example, during the early stages of
an investigation, it may not be possible to determine the immediate
relevancy of information that is collected - only upon later
evaluation or association with further information, obtained
subsequently, may it be possible to establish particular relevance
to a law enforcement program. Lastly, this exemption is required
because DHS and other agencies may not always know what information
about an encounter with a known or suspected criminal or terrorist
or other person of interest will be relevant to law enforcement for
the purpose of conducting an operational response.
(e) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because application of this provision could present a
serious impediment to counterterrorism or other law enforcement
efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study
or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject
to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity.
The nature of counterterrorism, and law enforcement investigations
is such that vital information about an individual frequently can
be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such
individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not
feasible to rely solely upon information furnished by the
individual concerning his own activities.
(f) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects), to the extent
that this subsection is interpreted to require DHS to provide
notice to an individual if DHS or another agency receives or
collects information about that individual during an investigation
or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted,
exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding
counterterrorism or other law enforcement efforts by putting the
subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that
fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended
to frustrate or impede that activity.
(g) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(h) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
many of the records in this system coming from other systems of
records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record
systems and therefore it is not possible for DHS to vouch for their
compliance with this provision; however, the DHS has implemented
internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in
its screening processes is as complete, accurate, and current as
possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law
enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, it is impossible to
determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant,
timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly
irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as
further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions
imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies'
trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their
judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and
counterterrorism efforts.
(i) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of
counterterrorism or law enforcement investigations to the fact of
those investigations when not previously known.
(j) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d). Access to, and amendment of, system records that
are not exempt or for which exemption is waived may be obtained
under procedures described in the related SORN or subpart B of this
part.
(k) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
46. The DHS/CBP-007 Border Crossing Information System of
Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its Components. The DHS/CBP-007 Border Crossing
Information System of Records is a repository of information held
by DHS in connection with its several and varied missions and
functions including, but not limited to the enforcement of civil
and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and law enforcement, border security, and intelligence
activities. The DHS/CBP-007 Border Crossing Information System of
Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in
support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its Components and may
contain personally identifiable information collected by other
Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. At the time of border crossing and during the process of
determining admissibility, CBP collects two types of data for which
it claims different exemptions.
(a) CBP will not assert any exemption to limit an individual
from accessing or amending his or her record with respect to
information maintained in the system that is collected from a
person at the time of crossing and submitted by that person's air,
sea, bus, or rail carriers. The Privacy Act requires DHS to
maintain an accounting of the disclosures made pursuant to all
routine uses. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), CBP will not
disclose the fact that a law enforcement or intelligence agency has
sought particular records because it may affect ongoing law
enforcement activities. The Secretary of Homeland Security has
exempted this system from subsections (c)(3), (e)(8), and (g) of
the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as is necessary and
appropriate to protect this information. Further, DHS will claim
exemption from subsection (c)(3) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as
amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) as is necessary and
appropriate to protect this information. Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(i) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(ii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(iii) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
(b) Additionally, this system contains records or information
recompiled from or created from information contained in other
systems of records that are exempt from certain provisions of the
Privacy Act. For these records or information only, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d)(1)-(4); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f); and (g).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1)-(4);
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(i) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for
Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could
alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(ii) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the 6records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, and to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of
the records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law
enforcement activities and would impose an unreasonable
administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continually
reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and amendment to
such information could disclose security-sensitive information that
could be detrimental to homeland security.
(iii) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(iv) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(v) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(vi) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I)
(Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of
this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(vii) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(viii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(ix) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
47. The Visa Security Program Records (VSPR) system of records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). VSPR consists of information created in support
of the Visa Security Program, the purpose of which is to identify
persons who may be ineligible for a U.S. visa because of criminal
history, terrorism association, or other factors and convey that
information to the State Department, which decides whether to issue
the visa. VSPR contains records on visa applicants for whom a visa
security review is conducted. VSPR contains information that is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other Federal, State, local, Tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. Pursuant to
exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act, portions of this
system are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), and (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f);
and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2), this system is
exempt from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in those subsections: 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
individual to the existence of an investigation in the form of a
visa security review predicated on classified, national security,
law enforcement, foreign government, or other sensitive
information. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a
serious impediment to ICE's Visa Security Program, immigration
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve national security.
Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who
is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, thereby
undermining the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could alert the
individual to the existence of an investigation in the form of a
visa security review predicated on classified, national security,
law enforcement, foreign government, or other sensitive
information. Revealing the existence of an otherwise confidential
investigation could also provide the visa applicant an opportunity
to conceal adverse information or take other actions that could
thwart investigative efforts; and reveal the identity of other
individuals with information pertinent to the visa security review,
thereby providing an opportunity for the applicant to interfere
with the collection of adverse or other relevant information from
such individuals. Access to the records would therefore present a
serious impediment to the enforcement of Federal immigration laws,
law enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve national
security. Amendment of the records could interfere with ICE's
ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and would
impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
classified and other security-sensitive information that could be
detrimental to national or homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations of visa
applications, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly
relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interest
of effective enforcement of Federal immigration laws, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may be relevant to the
determination whether an individual is eligible for a U.S.
visa.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information From
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the visa applicant would alert the subject to the fact of an
investigation in the form of a visa security review, and to the
existence of adverse information about the individual, thereby
interfering with the related investigation and law enforcement
activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede immigration
enforcement activities in that it could compromise investigations
by: Revealing the existence of an otherwise confidential
investigation and thereby provide an opportunity for the visa
applicant to conceal adverse information, or take other actions
that could thwart investigative efforts; Reveal the identity of
other individuals with information pertinent to the visa security
review, thereby providing an opportunity for the applicant to
interfere with the collection of adverse or other relevant
information from such individuals; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative and immigration enforcement efforts as described
above.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice
of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would
pose an impossible administrative burden on DHS and other agencies
and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement,
or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations
when not previously known.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
48. The DHS/ICE-011 Immigration and Enforcement Operational
Records system of records consists of electronic and paper records
and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/ICE-011
Immigration and Enforcement Operational Records system of records
is a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/ICE-011
Immigration and Enforcement Operational Records system of records
contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support
of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5), and (e)(8);
(f); and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
49. The DHS/USCIS - 009 Compliance Tracking and Management
System of Records consists of electronic and paper files that will
be used by DHS and its components. This system of records will be
used to perform a range of information management and analytic
functions involving minimizing misuse, abuse, discrimination,
breach of privacy, and fraudulent use of SAVE and E-Verify. The
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitation
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interest of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
50. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) - 006
Intelligence Records System (IIRS) consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). IIRS is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: the enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and national security and intelligence activities. IIRS
contains information that is collected by other federal and foreign
government agencies and may contain personally identifiable
information. Pursuant to exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the
Privacy Act, portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2), this system is exempt from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in those
subsections: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions from these particular subsections
are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time
a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
51. The DHS/ALL - 027 The History of the Department of Homeland
Security System of Records consists of electronic and paper records
and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/ALL - 027 The
History of the Department of Homeland Security System of Records is
a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to
section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/ALL - 027 The History
of the Department of Homeland Security System of Records contain
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8),
(e)(12); (f); (g)(1); and (h) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), and (k)(5). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (e)(12) (Computer Matching) if the agency is
a recipient agency or a source agency in a matching program with a
non-Federal agency, with respect to any establishment or revision
of a matching program, at least 30 days prior to conducting such
program, publish in the Federal Register notice of such
establishment or revision.
(j) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
(k) From subsection (h) (Legal Guardians) the parent of any
minor, or the legal guardian of any individual who has been
declared to be incompetent due to physical or mental incapacity or
age by a court of competent jurisdiction, may act on behalf of the
individual.
52. The DHS/ALL - 031 ISE SAR Initiative System of Records
consists of electronic records and will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/ALL - 031 ISE SAR Initiative System of Records
is a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the U.S. or other individuals pursuant to Section 3056
and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/ALL - 031 ISE SAR Initiative System
of Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of,
in support of, or in cooperation with DHS, its components, as well
as other federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign agencies or
private sector organization and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other federal, state, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), and (e)(12); (f);
(g)(1); and (h) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
the limitation set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) of the Privacy Act
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(3). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for
Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could
alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (e)(12) (Computer Matching) if the agency is
a recipient agency or a source agency in a matching program with a
non-Federal agency, with respect to any establishment or revision
of a matching program, at least 30 days prior to conducting such
program, publish in the Federal Register notice of such
establishment or revision.
(j) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
(k) From subsection (h) (Legal Guardians) the parent of any
minor, or the legal guardian of any individual who has been
declared to be incompetent due to physical or mental incapacity or
age by a court of competent jurisdiction, may act on behalf of the
individual.
53. The DHS/USCIS-012 CIDR System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/USCIS-012 CIDR System of Records is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the U.S. or other individuals pursuant to Section 3056
and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS/USCIS-012 CIDR System of Records
contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support
of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
PII collected by other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(1) and (k)(2). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
could also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
54. The DHS/USCG - 008 Courts Martial Case Files System of
Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS/USCG. The DHS/USCG - 008 Courts Martial Case Files System of
Records is a repository of information held by DHS/USCG in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: the enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/USCG - 008 Courts Martial Case Files System of Records contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS/USCG and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other federal, state, local,
tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f);
and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations
set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and
(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified,
on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is
made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for
Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could
alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal
evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that
could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of
witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for
the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate,
or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of
confidential informants, which would negatively affect the
informant's usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and
discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential
informants in any future investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with
a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
55. The DHS/FEMA-011 Training and Exercise Program Records
System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by FEMA. The DHS/FEMA-011 Training and Exercise Program
Records System of Records consists of electronic and paper records
and will be used by DHS and its components and offices to maintain
records about individual training, including enrollment and
participation information, information pertaining to class
schedules, programs, and instructors, training trends and needs,
testing and examination materials, and assessments of training
efficacy. The data will be collected by employee name or other
unique identifier. The collection and maintenance of this
information will assist DHS in meeting its obligation to train its
personnel and contractors in order to ensure that the agency
mission can be successfully accomplished. The DHS/FEMA-011 General
Training and Exercise Program Records System of Records contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other Federal,
State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a
(k)(6) where it states: “For testing or examination material used
solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or
promotion in the Federal service the disclosure of which would
compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or
examination process.”
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
56. The DHS/TSA-023 Workplace Violence Prevention Program System
of Records consists of electronic and paper records and is used by
the TSA in the administration of its Workplace Violence Prevention
Program, an internal TSA program designed to prevent and respond to
workplace violence. The DHS/TSA-023 Workplace Violence Prevention
Program System of Records is a repository of information held by
TSA in connection with its several and varied missions and
functions, including, but not limited to: The enforcement of civil
and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under. The DHS/TSA-023 Workplace Violence Prevention Program System
of Records contains information collected by TSA, and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted portions
of this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act,
subject to the limitations set forth in (c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G); (e)(4)(H); (e)(4)(I); and (f) of the Privacy Act
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
57. The DHS/OPS-002 National Operations Center Tracker and
Senior Watch Officer Logs Records System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/OPS-002 National Operations Center Tracker and
Senior Watch Officer Logs Records System of Records is a repository
of information held by DHS in connection with its several and
varied missions and functions, including, but not limited to the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings there under; national security and intelligence
activities; and protection of the President of the U.S. or other
individuals pursuant to Section 3056 and 3056A of Title 18. The
DHS/OPS-002 National Operations Center Tracker and Senior Watch
Officer Logs Records System of Records contains information that is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other federal, state, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of
Homeland Security is exempting this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I);
and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(3).
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
59. The DHS/NPPD-001 NICC Records System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/NPPD-001 NICC Records System of Records is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; national
security and intelligence activities The DHS/NPPD-001 NICC Records
System of Records contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, state, local, Tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f)
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
64. The DHS/USCIS-015 Electronic Immigration System-2 Account
and Case Management System of Records consists of electronic and
paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The
DHS/USCIS-015 Electronic Immigration System-2 Account and Case
Management is a repository of information held by USCIS to serve
its mission of processing immigration benefits. This system also
supports certain other DHS programs whose functions include, but
are not limited to, the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/USCIS-015
Electronic Immigration System-2 Account and Case Management System
of Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of,
in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and
may contain personally identifiable information collected by other
federal, state, local, Tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. This system is exempted from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2): 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f).
Additionally, many of the functions in this system require
retrieving records from law enforcement systems. Where a record
received from another system has been exempted in that source
system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), DHS will claim the same
exemptions for those records that are claimed for the original
primary systems of records from which they originated and claims
any additional exemptions in accordance with this rule. Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and/or reveal investigative interest on the part of
DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records, or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system, would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
65. The DHS/USCIS-016 Electronic Immigration System-3 Automated
Background Functions System of Records consists of electronic and
paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The
DHS/USCIS-016 Electronic Immigration System-3 Automated Background
Functions System of Records is a repository of information held by
USCIS to serve its mission of processing immigration benefits. This
system also supports certain other DHS programs whose functions
include, but are not limited to, the enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/USCIS-016 Electronic Immigration System-3 Automated Background
Functions System of Records contains information that is collected
by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other federal, state, local, Tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. This system is exempted from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I); and (f). Additionally, many of the functions in this
system require retrieving records from law enforcement systems.
Where a record received from another system has been exempted in
that source system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), DHS will claim the
same exemptions for those records that are claimed for the original
primary systems of records from which they originated and claims
any additional exemptions in accordance with this rule. Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and/or reveal investigative interest on the part of
DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records, or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system, would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
66. The DHS/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database
System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by DHS and its Components. The DHS/ALL-030 Use of the
Terrorist Screening Database System of Records is a repository of
information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including, the enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and national security and intelligence activities. The
Terrorist Screening Database belongs to the Department of Justice
(DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). DHS does not change or
alter these records. All records within the DHS/ALL-030 Use of the
Terrorist Screening Database System of Records are collected and
disseminated by the DOJ/FBI and are covered by the DOJ/FBI-019,
“Terrorist Screening Records Center System,” 72 FR 77846 (Dec. 14,
2011). Because DHS does not make any changes to the records
obtained from DOJ/FBI, the same exemptions outlined in the DOJ/FBI
SORN, and reasons provided in its implementing regulations for use
of such exemptions at 28 CFR 16.96, transfer and apply. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2),
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(5), (e)(8), and (g). When a record has been received
from DOJ/FBI-019 Terrorist Screening Records System of Records and
has been exempted in that source system, DHS will claim the same
exemptions for those records that are claimed for that original
primary system of records from which they originated and claims any
additional exemptions set forth here. Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(g) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(h) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
67. The DHS/FEMA-012 Suspicious Activity Reporting System of
Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS/FEMA and its components. The DHS/FEMA - 012 Suspicious
Activity Reporting System of Records is a repository of information
held by DHS/FEMA to serve its mission to support our citizens and
first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to
build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect
against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. This
system also supports certain other DHS/FEMA programs whose
functions include, but are not limited to, the enforcement of civil
and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there
under; and national security and intelligence activities. The
DHS/FEMA-012 Suspicious Activity Reporting System of Records
contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support
of, or in cooperation with DHS/FEMA and its components and may
contain personally identifiable information collected by other
federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2); (c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I); and (f). Exemptions from these particular subsections
are justified, on a case-by-case basis determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS/FEMA as well as
the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of
DHS/FEMA or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS/FEMA
is not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures
with respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
68. The DHS OPS-003 Operations Collection, Planning,
Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of Records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS
and its components. The DHS OPS-003 Operations Collection,
Planning, Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of
Records is a repository of information held by DHS to serve its
several and varied missions and functions. This system also
supports certain other DHS programs whose functions include, but
are not limited to, the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; national
security and intelligence activities; and protection of the
President of the U.S. or other individuals pursuant to Section 3056
and 3056A of Title 18. The DHS OPS-003 Operations Collection,
Planning, Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of
Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in
support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may
contain personally identifiable information collected by other
federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. This system is exempted from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3): 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I);
and (f). Exemptions from these particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
69. The DHS/CBP - 017 Analytical Framework for Intelligence
(AFI) System of Records consists of electronic and paper records
and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/CBP - 017
Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI) System of Records is a
repository of information held by DHS to enhance DHS's ability to:
Identify, apprehend, and/or prosecute individuals who pose a
potential law enforcement or security risk; aid in the enforcement
of the customs and immigration laws, and other laws enforced by DHS
at the border; and enhance United States security. This system also
supports certain other DHS programs whose functions include, but
are not limited to, the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/CBP - 017
Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI) System of Records
contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support
of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies.
(a) The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system
from certain provisions of the Privacy Act as follows:
(1) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), the system is exempt from 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (c)(4), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
(2) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), the system (except for any
records that were ingested by AFI where the source system of
records already provides access and/or amendment under the Privacy
Act) is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and
(d)(4).
(3) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), the system is exempt from 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and
(f).
(4) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), the system is exempt from
(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4).
(5) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), the system is exempt from 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and
(f).
(6) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2),the system (except for any
records that were ingested by AFI where the source system of
records already provides access and/or amendment under the Privacy
Act) is exempt from (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4).
(b) Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified,
on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is
made, for the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement and national security,
it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in
establishing patterns of unlawful activity.
(4) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement and national
security activities.
(5) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Individuals) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement
and national security by compromising the existence of a
confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or
confidential informants.
(6) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(7) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(8) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(9) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
70. DHS/USCIS-ICE-CBP-001 Alien File, Index, and National File
Tracking System of Records consists of electronic and paper records
and will be used by USCIS, ICE, and CBP. DHS/USCIS-ICE-CBP-001
Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records is
a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: The enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national
security and intelligence activities. DHS/USCIS-ICE-CBP-001 Alien
File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or
in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, territorial, foreign, or international
government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has
exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy
Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and
(c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (e)(12), (f), (g)(1), and (h).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f). Exemptions from these
particular subsections may be justified, on a case-by-case basis to
be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Individuals) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses, DHS employees, or confidential
informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would impede DHS officials' ability to effectively use their
investigative training and exercise good judgment to both conduct
and report on investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (e)(12) (Computer Matching) if the agency is
a recipient agency or a source agency in a matching program with a
non-Federal agency, with respect to any establishment or revision
of a matching program, at least 30 days prior to conducting such
program, publish in the Federal Register notice of such
establishment or revision.
(j) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act. (k) From subsection (h) (Legal Guardians) if the parent of any
minor, or the legal guardian of any individual who has been
declared to be incompetent due to physical or mental incapacity or
age by a court of competent jurisdiction, is acting on behalf of
the individual.
71. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Transportation
Security Administration (TSA)-021 TSA Pre✓ TM Application Program
System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by DHS/TSA. The DHS/TSA-021 Pre✓ TM Application Program
System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS/TSA on
individuals who voluntarily provide personally identifiable
information (PII) to TSA in return for enrollment in a program that
will make them eligible for expedited security screening at
designated airports. This System of Records contains PII in
biographic application data, biometric information, pointer
information to law enforcement databases, payment tracking, and
U.S. application membership decisions that support the TSA Pre✓ TM
Application Program membership decisions. The DHS/TSA-021 TSA Pre✓
TM Application Program System of Records contains information that
is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation
with DHS and its components and may contain PII collected by other
federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1) and (k)(2), has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1);
(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I); and (f). Where a record received from
another system has been exempted in that source system under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2), DHS will claim the same exemptions
for those records that are claimed for the original primary systems
of records from which they originated and claims any additional
exemptions set forth here. Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
also would permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to the existence of records pertaining to them in the
system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to
which individuals may access and view records pertaining to
themselves in the system would undermine investigative efforts and
reveal the identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and
confidential informants.
72. The DHS/ICE-014 Homeland Security Investigations Forensic
Laboratory System of Records consists of electronic and paper
records that will be used by DHS and its components. The
DHS/ICE-014 Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Laboratory
System of Records contains records of evidence and cases submitted
to the HSI-FL. This information will include information on the
individual submitting the request, identify the evidence submitted,
track the evidence as it moves throughout the HSI-FL, capture case
notes and results of examinations, store electronic images of
evidence, and produce reports of findings. Other case-related
records are maintained, including descriptions of expert witness
testimony provided by HSI-FL employees. Records in the DHS/ICE-014
Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Laboratory System of
Records also include the library of genuine, altered, and
counterfeit travel and identity documents provided to the HSI-FL by
international organizations, government agencies, and law
enforcement organizations from across the United States and around
the world to research methods of document production and
authenticate documents through comparative forensic examinations.
The DHS/ICE-014 Homeland Security Investigations Forensic
Laboratory System of Records contains information that is collected
by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components, and may contain personally identifiable information
(PII) collected by other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act,
subject to limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4);
(d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I),
(e)(5), (e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act,
subject to limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). Where a record
received from another system has been exempted in that source
system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), DHS will claim the same
exemptions for those records that are claimed for the original
primary systems of records from which they originated and claims
any additional exemptions set forth here. Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
73. The DHS/NPPD - 002 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Personnel Surety Program System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its
components. The DHS/NPPD - 002 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Personnel Surety Program System of Records is a
repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including, but not
limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national
security and intelligence activities. The DHS/NPPD - 002 Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program System
of Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of,
in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and
may contain personally identifiable information collected by other
federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to
limitations set forth therein: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). These exemptions are made
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2).
In addition to records under the control of DHS, the DHS/NPPD -
002 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety
Program System of Records may include records originating from
systems of records of other law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, which may be exempt from certain provisions of the
Privacy Act. DHS does not, however, assert exemption from any
provisions of the Privacy Act with respect to information submitted
by high-risk chemical facilities.
To the extent the DHS/NPPD - 002 Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program System of Records
contains records originating from other systems of records, DHS
will rely on the exemptions claimed for those records in the
originating systems of records. Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest, on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or
efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting
would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
74. The DHS/CBP-022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System
of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be
used by DHS and its components. The DHS/CBP-022 EVUS System of
Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings thereunder; national security and intelligence
activities. This system of records covers information collected by,
on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. As part of the process of
determining EVUS eligibility or admissibility to the United States,
CBP collects two types of data for which it claims different
exemptions.
(a) CBP will not assert any exemption to limit an individual
from accessing or amending his or her record under subsection
552a(d) with respect to information maintained in the system as it
relates to data submitted by or on behalf of a person who travels
to visit the United States and crosses the border, nor shall an
exemption be asserted with respect to the resulting determination
(approval or denial). However, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), CBP
will not disclose the fact that a law enforcement or intelligence
agency has sought particular records because it may affect ongoing
law enforcement activities, and thus, the Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted such records covered by this system from
sections (c)(3), (e)(8), and (g) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as
amended, as is necessary and appropriate to protect this
information. Further, DHS will claim exemption from section (c)(3)
of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2) as is necessary and appropriate to protect this
information.
(b) Additionally, this system contains law enforcement and other
derogatory records or information recompiled from or created from
information contained in other systems of records that are exempt
from certain provisions of the Privacy Act, and possibly relied
upon as the basis for denial of an EVUS application. For these
records or information only, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3),
(c)(4); (d)(1)-(4); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I), (e)(5), and (e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2),
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1)-(4); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f).
Exemptions from these particular subsections cited above under
(a) and (b) are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(i) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for
Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could
alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(ii) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(iii) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(iv) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(v) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(vi) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I)
(Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of
this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(vii) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(viii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(ix) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
75. The DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by ICE investigative
and homeland security personnel. The DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of
Records is a repository of information held by ICE for analytical
and investigative purposes. The system is used to conduct research
supporting the production of law enforcement activities; provide
lead information for investigative inquiry and follow-up; assist in
the conduct of ICE criminal and administrative investigations;
assist in the disruption of terrorist or other criminal activity;
and discover previously unknown connections among existing ICE
investigations. The DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of Records contains
aggregated data from ICE and DHS law enforcement and homeland
security IT systems, as well as data uploaded by ICE personnel for
analysis from various public, private, and commercial sources
during the course of an investigation or analytical project. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2),
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8); (f); and
(g). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). When a record
received from another system has been exempted in that source
system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) or (k)(2), DHS will claim the same
exemptions for those records that are claimed for the original
primary systems of records from which they originated and claims
any additional exemptions set forth here.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process. Disclosure of
corrections or notations of dispute may impede investigations by
requiring DHS to inform each witness or individual contacted during
the investigation of each correction or notation pertaining to
information provided them during the investigation.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
classified and other security-sensitive information that could be
detrimental to homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise establishing procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
76. The DHS/CBP-023 Border Patrol Enforcement Records (BPER)
System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/CBP-023 BPER System of
Records is a repository of information held by DHS/CBP in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal
laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/CBP-023 BPER
System of Records contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this system
from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a
(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(5), (e)(8); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted this system
from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a
(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), and (e)(4)(H). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) (Agency
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the
individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons
noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise
setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and
view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
77. The DHS/USCG-031 USCG Law Enforcement (ULE) System of
Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/USCG-031 USCG Law Enforcement
(ULE) System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS
in connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal
laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/USCG-031
USCG Law Enforcement (ULE) System of Records contains information
that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in
cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other federal, state, local,
tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2),
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3-4); (d); (e)(1-3), (e)(5), (e)(8);
and (g). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). When a record received
from another system has been exempted in that source system under 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), DHS will claim the same exemptions for those
records that are claimed for the original primary systems of
records from which they originated and claims any additional
exemptions set forth here.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(g) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(h) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
78. The DHS/ALL-039 Foreign Access Management System of Records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS
and its components. The DHS/ALL-039 Foreign Access Management
System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal
laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; and
national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/ALL-039
Foreign Access Management System of Records contains information
that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in
cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other federal, state, local,
tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1),
(k)(2), and (k)(5), has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). When a record received
from another system has been exempted in that source system under 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), DHS will claim the same exemptions for those
records that are claimed for the original primary systems of
records from which they originated and claims any additional
exemptions set forth here. Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and efforts
to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would
also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede
the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to
avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire
investigative process. When an investigation has been completed,
information on disclosures made may continue to be exempted if the
fact that an investigation occurred remains sensitive after
completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
79. The DHS/CBP-024 CBP Intelligence Records System (CIRS)
System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by DHS and its components. The CIRS is a repository of
information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including, but not limited to the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings there under; and national security and intelligence
activities. The CIRS contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland
Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this system
from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); (e)(5), and (e)(8); (f); and (g).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2), has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f). When this system
receives a record from another system exempted in that source
system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (j)(2), DHS will claim
the same exemptions for those records that are claimed for the
original primary systems of records from which they originated and
claims any additional exemptions set forth here. Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on a case by case basis
to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process. Information on a
completed investigation may be withheld and exempt from disclosure
if the fact that an investigation occurred remains sensitive after
completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access and amendment
provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and
therefore DHS is not required to establish requirements, rules, or
procedures with respect to such access. Providing notice to
individuals with respect to existence of records pertaining to them
in the system of records or otherwise setting up procedures
pursuant to which individuals may access, amend, and view records
pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and
potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore, DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy
for the agency's refusal to amend a record, refusal to comply with
a request for access to records, failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records, or its failure to otherwise
comply with an individual's right to access or amend records.
80. The DHS/ICE-007 Criminal History and Immigration
Verification (CHIVe) System of Records consists of electronic and
paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The CHIVe
System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national
security and intelligence activities. The CHIVe System of Records
contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support
of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain
personally identifiable information collected by other federal,
state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the following provisions
of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (c)(4); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8);
(f); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H); and (f). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process. Information on a
completed investigation may be withheld and exempt from disclosure
if the fact that an investigation occurred remains sensitive after
completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(j) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
81. The DHS/ICE-016 FALCON Search and Analysis (FALCON-SA)
System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will
be used by DHS and its components. The FALCON-SA System of Records
is a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings thereunder; and national security and intelligence
activities. The FALCON-SA System of Records contains information
that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in
cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other federal, state, local,
tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The
Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set
forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (c)(4): (d); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8); (f); and
(g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Additionally, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I);
and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process. Information on a
completed investigation may be withheld and exempt from disclosure
if the fact that an investigation occurred remains sensitive after
completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or
reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(j) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
82. The DHS/ALL-045 Statistical Immigration Data Production and
Reporting System of Records consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by DHS and its Components. The DHS/ALL-045
Statistical Immigration Data Production and Reporting System of
Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection
with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but
not limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; national
security and intelligence activities. The DHS/ALL-045 Statistical
Immigration Data Production and Reporting System of Records System
of Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of,
in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and
may contain personally identifiable information collected by other
federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government
agencies.
For records created and aggregated by DHS OIS, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I);
and (f). In addition to the reasons stated below, the reason for
exempting the system of records is that disclosure of statistical
records (including release of accounting for disclosures) would in
most instances be of no benefit to a particular individual since
the records do not have a direct effect on a given individual.
Where a record received from another system has been exempted in
that source system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) or (k)(2), DHS will
claim the same exemptions for those records that are claimed for
the original primary systems of records from which they originated
and claims any additional exemptions set forth here.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures for records derived from
DHS operational systems could alert the subject of an investigation
of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation
to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious
impediment to law enforcement efforts and efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit
the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire
investigative process. When an investigation has been completed,
information on disclosures made may continue to be exempted if the
fact that an investigation occurred remains sensitive after
completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
that are derived from records from DHS operational systems could
inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and
would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity, including statistics records covered by this
system that derived from records originating from DHS operational
systems.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is
not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with
respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the
identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
[71 FR 20523, Apr. 21, 2006] Editorial Note:For Federal Register
citations affecting appendix C to part 5, see the List of CFR
Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the
printed volume and at
www.govinfo.gov.