Appendix D to Part 516 - Department of Defense Directive 7050.5, Coordination of Remedies for Fraud and Corruption Related to Procurement Activities
32:3.1.1.1.4.12.11.1.4 : Appendix D
Appendix D to Part 516 - Department of Defense Directive 7050.5,
Coordination of Remedies for Fraud and Corruption Related to
Procurement Activities Department of Defense Directive June 7,
1989, Number 7050.5, IG, DOD Subject: Coordination of Remedies for
Fraud and Corruption Related to Procurement Activities References:
(a) DoD Directive 7050.5, subject as above, June 28, 1985 (hereby
canceled) (b) Public Law 97-291, “The Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982,” October 12, 1982 (c) Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS),
Subpart 4.6, “Contract Reporting” (d) DoD Instruction 4105.61, “DoD
Procurement Coding Manual,” May 4, 1973 (e) DoD 4105.61-M,
“Procurement Coding Manual” (Volume I), October 1988, authorized by
DoD Instruction 4105.61 May 4, 1973 A. Reissuance and Purpose
This Directive reissues reference (a) to update policies,
procedures, and responsibilities for the coordination of criminal,
civil, administrative, and contractual remedies stemming from
investigation of fraud or corruption related to procurement
activities. More effective and timely communication of information
developed during such investigations will enable the Department of
Defense to take the most appropriate of the available measures.
B. Applicability
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD); the Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG, DoD); the
Military Departments; the Defense Agencies; and the DoD Field
Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as “DoD
Components”).
C. Definitions
1. DoD Criminal Investigative Organizations. Refers to
the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command; the Naval
Investigative Service Command; the U.S. Air Force Office of Special
Investigations; and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service,
Office of the IG, DoD (OIG, DoD).
2. Significant. Refers to all fraud cases involving an
alleged loss of $100,000, or more; all corruption cases related to
procurement that involved bribery, gratuities, or conflicts of
interest; and any investigation into defective products or product
substitution in which a SERIOUS HAZARD to health, safety, or
operational readiness is indicated, regardless of loss value.
D. Policy
It is DoD policy that:
1. Each of the DoD Components shall monitor, from its inception,
all significant investigations of fraud or corruption related to
procurement activities affecting its organizations, for the purpose
of ensuring that all possible criminal, civil, administrative, and
contractual remedies in such cases are identified to cognizant
procurement and command officials and that appropriate remedies are
pursued expeditiously. This process shall include appropriate
coordination with all other affected DoD Components.
2. All investigations of fraud or corruption related to
procurement activities shall be reviewed to determine and implement
the appropriate contractual and administrative actions that are
necessary to recover funds lost through fraud or corruption and to
ensure the integrity of DoD programs and operations.
3. Appropriate civil, contractual, and administrative actions,
including those set forth in enclosure 1, shall be taken
expeditiously. During an investigation and before prosecution or
litigation, and when based in whole or in part on evidence
developed during an investigation, such actions shall be taken with
the advance knowledge of the responsible DoD criminal investigative
organization and, when necessary, the appropriate legal counsel in
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice (DoJ). When
appropriate, such actions shall be taken before final resolution of
the criminal or civil case.
E. Responsibilities
1. The Heads of DoD Components shall:
a. Establish a centralized organization (hereafter referred to
as “the centralized organization”) to monitor and ensure the
coordination of criminal, civil, administrative, and contractual
remedies for each significant investigation of fraud or corruption
related to procurement activities affecting the DoD Component.
b. Establish procedures requiring the centralized organization
to discuss regularly with the assigned DoD criminal investigative
organization(s) such issues as the current status of significant
investigations and their coordination with prosecutive
authorities.
c. Establish procedures requiring that all coordination
involving the DoJ, during the pendency of a criminal investigation,
is accomplished by or with the advance knowledge of the appropriate
DoD criminal investigative organization(s).
d. Establish procedures to ensure appropriate coordination of
actions between the centralized organizations of any DoD Components
affected by a significant investigation of fraud or corruption
related to procurement activities.
e. Establish procedures to ensure that all proper and effective
civil, administrative, and contractual remedies available to the
Department of Defense are, when found applicable and appropriate,
considered and undertaken promptly by the necessary DoD officials
(e.g., commanders, programs officials, and contracting officers).
This includes initiation of any suspension and debarment action
within 30 days of an indictment or conviction. The centralized
organization shall ensure that all proposed actions are coordinated
with appropriate investigative organization.
f. Establish procedures to ensure that a specific comprehensive
remedies plan is developed for each significant investigation
involving fraud or corruption related to procurement activities.
These procedures shall include the participation of the appropriate
DoD criminal investigative organization in the development of the
plan.
g. Establish procedures to ensure that in those significant
investigations of fraud or corruption related to procurement
activities when adverse impact on a DoD mission can be determined,
such adverse impact is identified and documented by the centralized
organization. This information is to be used by the centralized
organization of the DoD Component concerned in development of the
remedies plan required in paragraph E.1.f., above, and shall be
furnished to prosecutors as stated in paragraph E.2.e., below. The
information shall also be used by the centralized organizations in
development and preparation of “Victim Impact Statements” for use
in sentencing proceedings, as provided for P.L. 97-291 (reference
(b)). Some examples of adverse impact on a DoD mission are as
follows:
(1) Endangerment of personnel or property.
(2) Monetary loss.
(3) Denigration of program or personnel integrity.
(4) Compromise of the procurement process.
(5) Reduction or loss of mission readiness.
h. Ensure training materials are developed on fraud and
corruption in the procurement process, and that all procurement and
procurement-related training includes a period of such instruction
appropriate to the duration and nature of the training.
i. Establish procedures enabling the centralized organization to
ensure that safety and readiness issues are examined and
appropriately dealt with for all cases in which a notice is
required under paragraph E.2.i., below. The minimum procedures to
be followed by the centralized organization are in enclosure 3.
j. Ensure that appropriate command, procurement, and
investigative organizations are provided sufficient information to
determine if further inquiry is warranted on their part to prevent
reoccurrence and detect other possible fraud within their
activity.
2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the
Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG, DoD), or their
designees, shall establish procedures that ensure that their
respective criminal investigative organizations will:
a. Notify, in writing, the centralized organization for the
affected DoD Component of the start of all significant
investigations involving fraud or corruption that are related to
procurement activities. Initial notification shall include the
following elements:
(1) Case title.
(2) Case control number.
(3) Investigative agency and office of primary
responsibility.
(4) Date opened.
(5) Predication.
(6) Suspected offense(s).
b. Notify expeditiously the Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
of any investigations that develop evidence that would impact on
DoD-cleared industrial facilities or personnel.
c. Discuss regularly with the centralized organization such
issues as the current status of significant investigations and
their coordination with prosecutive authorities. If the DoD
criminal investigative organization has prepared any documents
summarizing the current status of the investigation, such documents
shall be provided to the centralized organization. Completed
reports of significant investigations also should be provided to
the centralized organization.
d. Provide to the appropriate procurement officials, commanders,
and suspension and debarment authorities, when needed to allow
consideration of applicable remedies, any court records, documents,
or other evidence of fraud or corruption related to procurement
activities. Such information shall be provided in a timely manner
to enable the suspension and debarment authority to initiate
suspension and debarment action within 30 days of an indictment or
conviction.
e. Provide expeditiously to prosecutive authorities the
information regarding any adverse impact on a DoD mission, that is
gathered under paragraph E.1.g., above, for the purpose of
enhancing the prosecutability of a case. Such information also
should be used in preparing a victim impact statement for use in
sentencing proceedings as provided for in Public Law 97-291.
f. Gather, at the earliest practical point in the investigation,
without reliance on grand jury subpoenas whenever possible,
relevant information concerning responsible individuals, the
organizational structure, finances, and contract history of DoD
contractors under investigation for fraud or corruption related to
procurement activities, to facilitate the criminal investigation as
well as any civil, administrative, or contractual actions or
remedies that may be taken. Some available sources of such
information are listed in enclosure 2.
g. Provide timely notice to other cognizant DoD criminal
investigative organizations of evidence of fraud by a contractor,
subcontractor, or employees of either, on current or past contracts
with, or affecting, other DoD Components.
h. Ascertain the impact upon any ongoing investigation or
prosecution of civil, contractual, and administrative actions being
considered and advise the appropriate centralized organization of
any adverse impact.
i. Obtain a DD 350 report in every investigation into defective
products or product substitution in which a SERIOUS HAZARD to
health, safety, or operational readiness is indicated. Timely
notification shall be made to the centralized organization of each
DoD Component that is identified as having contract actions with
the subject of the investigation.
j. Obtain a DD 350 report in all significant fraud
investigations, as defined in subsection C.2. above, whether or not
the case involved defective products or product substitution.
Timely notification shall be made to the centralized organization
of each DoD Component that is identified as having contract actions
with the subject of the investigation.
3. The Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG,
DoD), shall:
a. Develop training materials relating to fraud and corruption
in procurement related activities which shall be utilized in all
procurement related training in conjunction with training materials
developed by the DoD Components. (See paragraph E.1.h., above.)
b. Establish procedures for providing to the DoD criminal
investigative organizations, through the Office of the Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing (OAIG-AUD), reports of data
contained in the Individual Procurement Action Report (DD Form 350)
System.
F. Procedures
Transmissions of information by DoD criminal investigative
organizations required by subsection E.2., above, shall be made as
expeditiously as possible, consistent with efforts not to
compromise any ongoing criminal investigation. The transmission of
the information may be delayed when, in the judgment of the head of
the DoD criminal investigative organization, failure to delay would
compromise the success of any investigation or prosecution. The
prosecutive authorities dealing with the investigation shall be
consulted, when appropriate, in making such determinations.
G. Effective Date and Implementation
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward two copies of
implementing documents to the Inspector General, Department of
Defense, within 120 days.
Donald J. Atwood,
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Enclosures - 3
1. Civil Contractual and Administrative Actions That Can Be
Taken in Response to Evidence of Procurement Fraud
2. Sources of Information Relating to Government Contractors
3. Actions to be Taken in Product Substitution
Investigations
Civil, Contractual, and Administrative Actions That Can Be Taken
in Response to Evidence of Procurement Fraud A. Civil 1.
Statutory
a. False Claims Act (31 USC 3729 et seq.).
b. Anti-Kickback Act (41 USC 51 et seq.).
c. Voiding Contracts (18 USC 218).
d. Truth in Negotiations Act (10 USC 2306(f)).
e. Fraudulent Claims-Contract Disputes Act (41 USC 604)
2.
Nonstatutory
a. Breach of contract.
b. Breach of warranty.
c. Money paid under mistake of fact.
d. Unjust enrichment.
e. Fraud and/or Deceit.
f. Conversion.
g. Recision and/or Cancellation.
h. Reformation.
i. Enforcement of performance bond/guarantee agreement.
3.
Contractual
a. Termination of contract for default.
b. Termination of contract for convenience of Government.
c. Termination for default and exemplary damages under the
gratuities clause.
d. Recision of contract.
e. Contract warranties.
f. Withholding of payments to contractor.
g. Offset of payments due to contractor from other
contracts.
h. Price reduction.
i. Correction of defects (or cost of correction).
j. Refusal to accept nonconforming goods.
k. Revocation of acceptance.
l. Denial of claims submitted by contractors.
m. Disallowance of contract costs.
n. Removal of the contractor from automated solicitation or
payment system.
4.
Administrative
a. Change in contracting forms and procedures.
b. Removal or reassignment of Government personnel.
c. Review of contract administration and payment controls.
d. Revocation of warrant contracting officer.
e. Suspension of contractor and contractor employees.
f. Debarment of contractor and contractor employees.
g. Revocation of facility security clearances.
h. Nonaward of contract based upon a finding of contractor
nonresponsibility.
i. Voluntary refunds.
Sources of Information Relating to
Government Contractors
Type of information |
Possible source |
Location, dollar
value, type, and number of current contracts with the Department of
Defense |
a. DD Form 350 Report.
1
b. Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) “Contract Administration
Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) Contract Administration Report
(CAR Report) on contracts DLA administers. |
2. Financial
status of corporation, history of corporation, owners, and
officers |
a. Dunn and Bradstreet
Reports.
b. Corporate filings with local secretaries of the State, or
corporate recorders. |
|
c. Securities and Exchange
Commission (public corporations). |
|
d. Small Business
Administration (SBA) (small businesses). |
|
e. General Accounting Office
(bid protests, and contractors indebted to the Government). |
|
f. Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or court litigation. |
|
g. List of Contractors
Indebted to the United States (maintained, published and
distributed by the U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center,
Indianapolis, Indiana 46249). |
3. Security
clearance background information on facility and officers |
a. Defense Investigative
Service. |
4. Performance
history of contractor |
a. Local contracting
officers. |
|
b. Defense Contract
Administration Service preaward surveys. |
|
c. SBA Certificate of
Competency records. |
5. Name, location,
offense alleged, and previous investigative efforts involving
DLA-awarded or DLA-administered contracts |
DLA Automated Criminal Case
Management System. (Available through field offices of the DLA
Counsel's office.) |
6. Bid protests,
litigation, and bankruptcy involving DLA-awarded or
DLA-administered contracts |
Field offices of the DLA
Counsel's office. |
Actions to be Taken in Product Substitution Investigations
A. The centralized organization, in all cases involving
allegations of product substitution in which a SERIOUS HAZARD to
health, safety, or operational readiness is indicated shall:
1. Review the notice of the case immediately after receiving it
from the Defense criminal investigative organization. Review the
notice to determine any potential safety or readiness issues
indicated by the suspected fraud.
2. Notify all appropriate safety, procurement, and program
officials of the existence of the case.
3. Obtain a complete assessment from safety, procurement, and
program officials of the adverse impact of the fraud on DoD
programs and operations.
4. Ensure that the DoD Component provides the Defense criminal
investigative organization with full testing support to completely
identify the defective nature of the substituted products. Costs
associated with the testing shall be assumed by the appropriate
procurement program.
5. Prepare a comprehensive impact statement describing the
adverse impact of the fraud on DoD programs for use in any
criminal, civil, or contractual action related to the case.
B. In all cases involving allegations of product substitution
that affect more than one DoD Component, that centralized
organizations of the affected DoD Components shall identify a lead
Agency. The lead centralized organization shall ensure that
information on the fraud is provided to the centralized
organization of all other affected DoD Components. The lead
centralized organization shall ensure compliance with the
requirements of section A., above. The lead centralized
organization shall then be responsible for preparing a
comprehensive “Victim Impact Statement” as required by paragraph
E.1.g. of this Directive.
C. In all cases involving allegations of product substitution,
the Defense Criminal Investigative Organization shall:
1. Immediately notify the appropriate centralized organization
of the beginning of the case.
2. Continue to provide to the centralized organization any
information developed during the course of the investigation that
indicates substituted products have been, or might be, provided to
the Department of Defense.
3. Ensure that any request for testing of substituted products
is provided to the centralized organization.