Title 17
PART 23 APPENDIX A
Number of exceptions | Multiplication factor |
---|---|
4 or fewer | 3.00 |
5 | 3.40 |
6 | 3.50 |
7 | 3.65 |
8 | 3.75 |
9 | 3.85 |
10 or more | 4.00 |
(iv) For purposes of computing the credit equivalent amount of the swap dealer's exposures to a counterparty, the swap dealer must determine the appropriate multiplication factor as follows:
(A) Beginning three months after it begins using the VaR model to calculate maximum potential exposure, the swap dealer must conduct back-testing of the model by comparing, for at least 80 counterparties (or the actual number of counterparties if the swap dealer does not have 80 counterparties) with widely varying types and sizes of positions with the firm, the ten business day change in its current exposure to the counterparty based on its positions held at the beginning of the ten-business day period with the corresponding ten-business day maximum potential exposure for the counterparty generated by the VaR model;
(B) As of the last business day of each quarter, the swap dealer must identify the number of back-testing exceptions of the VaR model, that is, the number of ten-business day periods in the past 250 business days, or other period as may be appropriate for the first year of its use, for which the change in current exposure to a counterparty, assuming the portfolio remains static for the ten-business day period, exceeds the corresponding maximum potential exposure; and
(C) The swap dealer will propose, as part of its application, a schedule of multiplication factors, which must be approved by the Commission, or a registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member, based on the number of back-testing exceptions of the VaR model. The swap dealer must use the multiplication factor indicated in the approved schedule in determining the credit equivalent amount of its exposures to a counterparty until it obtains the next quarter's back-testing results, unless the Commission or the registered futures association determines, based on, among other relevant factors, a review of the swap dealer's internal risk management control system, including a review of the VaR model, that a different adjustment or other action is appropriate.
(2) Quantitative requirements. (i) For purposes of determining market risk exposure, the VaR model must use a 99 percent, one-tailed confidence level with price changes equivalent to a ten business-day movement in rates and prices;
(ii) For purposes of determining maximum potential exposure, the VaR model must use a 99 percent, one-tailed confidence level with price changes equivalent to a one-year movement in rates and prices; or based on a review of the swap dealer's procedures for managing collateral and if the collateral is marked to market daily and the swap dealer has the ability to call for additional collateral daily, the Commission, or the registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member, may approve a time horizon of not less than ten business days;
(iii) The VaR model must use an effective historical observation period of at least one year. The swap dealer must consider the effects of market stress in its construction of the model. Historical data sets must be updated at least monthly and reassessed whenever market prices or volatilities change significantly or portfolio composition warrant; and
(iv) The VaR model must take into account and incorporate all significant, identifiable market risk factors applicable to positions in the accounts of the swap dealer, including:
(A) Risks arising from the non-linear price characteristics of derivatives and the sensitivity of the fair value of those positions to changes in the volatility of the derivatives' underlying rates, prices, or other material risk factors. A swap dealer with a large or complex portfolio with non-linear derivatives (such as options or positions with embedded optionality) must measure the volatility of these positions at different maturities and/or strike prices, where material;
(B) Empirical correlations within and across risk factors provided that the swap dealer validates and demonstrates the reasonableness of its process for measuring correlations, if the VaR-based measure does not incorporate empirical correlations across risk categories, the swap dealer must add the separate measures from its internal models used to calculate the VaR-based measure for the appropriate risk categories (interest rate risk, credit spread risk, equity price risk, foreign exchange rate risk, and/or commodity price risk) to determine its aggregate VaR-based measure, or, alternatively, risk factors sufficient to cover all the market risk inherent in the positions in the proprietary or other trading accounts of the swap dealer, including interest rate risk, equity price risk, foreign exchange risk, and commodity price risk; and
(C) Spread risk, where applicable, and segments of the yield curve sufficient to capture differences in volatility and imperfect correlation of rates along the yield curve for securities and derivatives that are sensitive to different interest rates. For material positions in major currencies and markets, modeling techniques must incorporate enough segments of the yield curve - in no case less than six - to capture differences in volatility and less than perfect correlation of rates along the yield curve.
(j) Stressed VaR-based Measure. A stressed VaR model must meet the following minimum requirements in order to be approved:
(1) Requirements for stressed VaR-based measure. (i) A swap dealer must calculate a stressed VaR-based measure for its positions using the same model(s) used to calculate the VaR-based measure under paragraph (i) of this appendix, subject to the same confidence level and holding period applicable to the VaR-based measure, but with model inputs calibrated to historical data from a continuous 12-month period that reflects a period of significant financial stress appropriate to the swap dealer's current portfolio.
(ii) The stressed VaR-based measure must be calculated at least weekly and be no less than the swap dealer's VaR-based measure.
(iii) A swap dealer must have policies and procedures that describe how it determines the period of significant financial stress used to calculate the swap dealer's stressed VaR-based measure under this appendix and must be able to provide empirical support for the period used. The swap dealer must obtain the prior approval of the Commission, or a registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member, if the swap dealer makes any material changes to these policies and procedures. The policies and procedures must address:
(A) How the swap dealer links the period of significant financial stress used to calculate the stressed VaR-based measure to the composition and directional bias of its current portfolio; and
(B) The swap dealer's process for selecting, reviewing, and updating the period of significant financial stress used to calculate the stressed VaR-based measure and for monitoring the appropriateness of the period to the swap dealer's current portfolio.
(iv) Nothing in this appendix prevents the Commission or the registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member from requiring a swap dealer to use a different period of significant financial stress in the calculation of the stressed VaR-based measure.
(k) Specific Risk. A specific risk model must meet the following minimum requirements in order to be approved:
(1) General requirement. A swap dealer must use one of the methods in this paragraph (k) to measure the specific risk for each of its debt, equity, and securitization positions with specific risk.
(2) Modeled specific risk. A swap dealer may use models to measure the specific risk of its proprietary positions. A swap dealer must use models to measure the specific risk of correlation trading positions that are modeled under paragraph (m) of this appendix.
(i) Requirements for specific risk modeling. (A) If a swap dealer uses internal models to measure the specific risk of a portfolio, the internal models must:
(1) Explain the historical price variation in the portfolio;
(2) Be responsive to changes in market conditions;
(3) Be robust to an adverse environment, including signaling rising risk in an adverse environment; and
(4) Capture all material components of specific risk for the debt and equity positions in the portfolio. Specifically, the internal models must:
(i) Capture name-related basis risk;
(ii) Capture event risk and idiosyncratic risk; and
(iii) Capture and demonstrate sensitivity to material differences between positions that are similar but not identical and to changes in portfolio composition and concentrations.
(B) If a swap dealer calculates an incremental risk measure for a portfolio of debt or equity positions under paragraph (l) of this appendix, the swap dealer is not required to capture default and credit migration risks in its internal models used to measure the specific risk of those portfolios.
(C) A swap dealer shall validate a specific risk model through back-testing.
(ii) Specific risk fully modeled for one or more portfolios. If the swap dealer's VaR-based measure captures all material aspects of specific risk for one or more of its portfolios of debt, equity, or correlation trading positions, the swap dealer has no specific risk add-on for those portfolios.
(3) Specific risk not modeled. (i) If the swap dealer's VaR-based measure does not capture all material aspects of specific risk for a portfolio of debt, equity, or correlation trading positions, the swap dealer must calculate a specific-risk add-on for the portfolio under the standardized measurement method as described in 12 CFR 217.210.
(ii) A swap dealer must calculate a specific risk add-on under the standardized measurement method as described in 12 CFR 217.200 for all of its securitization positions that are not modeled under this paragraph (k).
(l) Incremental Risk. An incremental risk model must meet the following minimum requirements in order to be approved:
(1) General requirement. A swap dealer that measures the specific risk of a portfolio of debt positions under paragraph (k) of this appendix using internal models must calculate at least weekly an incremental risk measure for that portfolio according to the requirements in this appendix. The incremental risk measure is the swap dealer's measure of potential losses due to incremental risk over a one-year time horizon at a one-tail, 99.9 percent confidence level, either under the assumption of a constant level of risk, or under the assumption of constant positions. With the prior approval of the Commission or a registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member, a swap dealer may choose to include portfolios of equity positions in its incremental risk model, provided that it consistently includes such equity positions in a manner that is consistent with how the swap dealer internally measures and manages the incremental risk of such positions at the portfolio level. If equity positions are included in the model, for modeling purposes default is considered to have occurred upon the default of any debt of the issuer of the equity position. A swap dealer may not include correlation trading positions or securitization positions in its incremental risk measure.
(2) Requirements for incremental risk modeling. For purposes of calculating the incremental risk measure, the incremental risk model must:
(i) Measure incremental risk over a one-year time horizon and at a one-tail, 99.9 percent confidence level, either under the assumption of a constant level of risk, or under the assumption of constant positions.
(A) A constant level of risk assumption means that the swap dealer rebalances, or rolls over, the swap dealer's trading positions at the beginning of each liquidity horizon over the one-year horizon in a manner that maintains the swap dealer's initial risk level. The swap dealer must determine the frequency of rebalancing in a manner consistent with the liquidity horizons of the positions in the portfolio. The liquidity horizon of a position or set of positions is the time required for a swap dealer to reduce its exposure to, or hedge all of its material risks of, the position(s) in a stressed market. The liquidity horizon for a position or set of positions may not be less than the shorter of three months or the contractual maturity of the position.
(B) A constant position assumption means that the swap dealer maintains the same set of positions throughout the one-year horizon. If a swap dealer uses this assumption, it must do so consistently across all portfolios.
(C) A swap dealer's selection of a constant position or a constant risk assumption must be consistent between the swap dealer's incremental risk model and its comprehensive risk model described in paragraph (m) of this appendix, if applicable.
(D) A swap dealer's treatment of liquidity horizons must be consistent between the swap dealer's incremental risk model and its comprehensive risk model described in paragraph (m) of this appendix, if applicable.
(ii) Recognize the impact of correlations between default and migration events among obligors.
(iii) Reflect the effect of issuer and market concentrations, as well as concentrations that can arise within and across product classes during stressed conditions.
(iv) Reflect netting only of long and short positions that reference the same financial instrument.
(v) Reflect any material mismatch between a position and its hedge.
(vi) Recognize the effect that liquidity horizons have on dynamic hedging strategies. In such cases, a swap dealer must:
(A) Choose to model the rebalancing of the hedge consistently over the relevant set of trading positions;
(B) Demonstrate that including rebalancing results in a more appropriate risk measurement;
(C) Demonstrate that the market for the hedge is sufficiently liquid to permit rebalancing during periods of stress; and
(D) Capture in the incremental risk model any residual risks arising from such hedging strategies.
(vii) Reflect the nonlinear impact of options and other positions with material nonlinear behavior with respect to default and migration changes.
(viii) Maintain consistency with the swap dealer's internal risk management methodologies for identifying, measuring, and managing risk.
(m) Comprehensive Risk. A comprehensive risk model must meet the following minimum requirements in order to be approved:
(1) General requirement. (i) Subject to the prior approval of the Commission or a registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member, a swap dealer may use the method in this paragraph to measure comprehensive risk, that is, all price risk, for one or more portfolios of correlation trading positions.
(ii) A swap dealer that measures the price risk of a portfolio of correlation trading positions using internal models must calculate at least weekly a comprehensive risk measure that captures all price risk according to the requirements of this paragraph (m). The comprehensive risk measure is either:
(A) The sum of:
(1) The swap dealer's modeled measure of all price risk determined according to the requirements in paragraph (m)(2) of this appendix; and
(2) A surcharge for the swap dealer's modeled correlation trading positions equal to the total specific risk add-on for such positions as calculated under paragraph (k) of this appendix multiplied by 8.0 percent; or
(B) With approval of the Commission, or the registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member, and provided the swap dealer has met the requirements of this paragraph (m) for a period of at least one year and can demonstrate the effectiveness of the model through the results of ongoing model validation efforts including robust benchmarking, the greater of:
(1) The swap dealer's modeled measure of all price risk determined according to the requirements in paragraph (b) of this appendix; or
(2) The total specific risk add-on that would apply to the swap dealer's modeled correlation trading positions as calculated under paragraph (k) of this appendix multiplied by 8.0 percent.
(2) Requirements for modeling all price risk. If a swap dealer uses an internal model to measure the price risk of a portfolio of correlation trading positions:
(i) The internal model must measure comprehensive risk over a one-year time horizon at a one-tail, 99.9 percent confidence level, either under the assumption of a constant level of risk, or under the assumption of constant positions.
(ii) The model must capture all material price risk, including but not limited to the following:
(A) The risks associated with the contractual structure of cash flows of the position, its issuer, and its underlying exposures;
(B) Credit spread risk, including nonlinear price risks;
(C) The volatility of implied correlations, including nonlinear price risks such as the cross-effect between spreads and correlations;
(D) Basis risk;
(E) Recovery rate volatility as it relates to the propensity for recovery rates to affect tranche prices; and
(F) To the extent the comprehensive risk measure incorporates the benefits of dynamic hedging, the static nature of the hedge over the liquidity horizon must be recognized. In such cases, a swap dealer must:
(1) Choose to model the rebalancing of the hedge consistently over the relevant set of trading positions;
(2) Demonstrate that including rebalancing results in a more appropriate risk measurement;
(3) Demonstrate that the market for the hedge is sufficiently liquid to permit rebalancing during periods of stress; and
(4) Capture in the comprehensive risk model any residual risks arising from such hedging strategies;
(iii) The swap dealer must use market data that are relevant in representing the risk profile of the swap dealer's correlation trading positions in order to ensure that the swap dealer fully captures the material risks of the correlation trading positions in its comprehensive risk measure in accordance with this appendix; and
(iv) The swap dealer must be able to demonstrate that its model is an appropriate representation of comprehensive risk in light of the historical price variation of its correlation trading positions.
(3) Requirements for stress testing. (i) A swap dealer must at least weekly apply specific, supervisory stress scenarios to its portfolio of correlation trading positions that capture changes in:
(A) Default rates;
(B) Recovery rates;
(C) Credit spreads;
(D) Correlations of underlying exposures; and
(E) Correlations of a correlation trading position and its hedge.
(ii) Other requirements. (A) A swap dealer must retain and make available to the Commission and to the registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member the results and all assumptions and parameters of the supervisory stress testing, including comparisons with the capital requirements generated by the swap dealer's comprehensive risk model.
(B) A swap dealer must report promptly to the Commission and to the registered futures association of which it is a member any instances where the stress tests indicate any material deficiencies in the comprehensive risk model.
(n) Securitization Exposures. (1) To use the simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA) to determine the specific risk-weighting factor for a securitization position, a swap dealer must have data that enables it to assign accurately the parameters described in paragraph (n)(2) of this appendix. Data used to assign the parameters described in paragraph (n)(2) of this appendix must be the most currently available data; if the contracts governing the underlying exposures of the securitization require payments on a monthly or quarterly basis, the data used to assign the parameters described in paragraph (n)(2) of this appendix must be no more than 91 calendar days old. A swap dealer that does not have the appropriate data to assign the parameters described in paragraph (n)(2) of this appendix must assign a specific risk-weighting of 100 percent to the position.
(2) SSFA parameters. To calculate the specific risk-weighting factor for a securitization position using the SSFA, a swap dealer must have accurate information on the five inputs to the SSFA calculation described in paragraphs (n)(2)(i) through (n)(2)(v) of this appendix.
(i) KG is the weighted-average (with unpaid principal used as the weight for each exposure) total capital requirement of the underlying exposures calculated for a swap dealer's credit risk. KG is expressed as a decimal value between zero and one (that is, an average risk weight of 100 percent presents a value of KG equal to 0.08).
(ii) Parameter W is expressed as a decimal value between zero and one. Parameter W is the ratio of the sum of the dollar amounts of any underlying exposures of the securitization that meet any of the criteria as set forth in paragraphs (n)(2)(ii)(A) through (F) of this appendix to the balance, measured in dollars, of underlying exposures:
(A) Ninety days or more past due;
(B) Subject to a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding;
(C) In the process of foreclosure;
(D) Held as real estate owned;
(E) Has contractually deferred payments for 90 days or more, other than principal or interest payments deferred on;
(1) Federally-guaranteed student loans, in accordance with the terms of those guarantee programs; or
(2) Consumer loans, including non-federally guaranteed student loans, provided that such payments are deferred pursuant to provisions included in the contract at the time funds are disbursed that provide for period(s) of deferral that are not initiated based on changes in the creditworthiness of the borrower; or
(F) Is in default.
(iii) Parameter A is the attachment point for the position, which represents the threshold at which credit losses will first be allocated to the position. Except as provided in 12 CFR 217.210(b)(2)(vii)(D) for nth to default derivatives, parameter A equals the ratio of the current dollar amount of underlying exposures that are subordinated to the position of the swap dealer to the current dollar amount of underlying exposures. Any reserve account funded by the accumulated cash flows from the underlying exposures that is subordinated to the position that contains the swap dealer's securitization exposure may be included in the calculation of parameter A to the extent that cash is present in the account. Parameter A is expressed as a decimal value between zero and one.
(iv) Parameter D is the detachment point for the position, which represents the threshold at which credit losses of principal allocated to the position would result in a total loss of principal. Except as provided in 12 CFR 210(b)(2)(vii)(D) for nth-to-default credit derivatives, parameter D equals parameter A plus the ratio of the current dollar amount of the securitization positions that are pari passu with the position (that is, have equal seniority with respect to credit risk) to the current dollar amount of the underlying exposures. Parameter D is expressed as a decimal value between zero and one.
(v) A supervisory calibration parameter, p, is equal to 0.5 for securitization positions that are not resecuritization positions and equal to 1.5 for resecuritization positions.
(3) Mechanics of the SSFA. KG and W are used to calculate KA, the augmented value of KG, which reflects the observed credit quality of the underlying exposures. KA is defined in paragraph (n)(4) of this appendix. The values of parameters A and D, relative to KA determine the specific risk-weighting factor assigned to a securitization position, or portion of a position, as appropriate, is the larger of the specific risk-weighting factor determined in accordance with this paragraph (n)(3), paragraph (n)(4) of this appendix, and a specific risk-weighting factor of 1.6 percent.
(i) When the detachment point, parameter D, for a securitization position is less than or equal to KA, the position must be assigned a specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent.
(ii) When the attachment point, parameter A, for a securitization position is greater than or equal to KA, the swap dealer must calculate the specific risk-weighting factor in accordance with paragraph (n)(4) of this appendix.
(iii) When A is less than KA and D is greater than KA, the specific risk-weighting factor is a weighted-average of 1.00 and KSSFA calculated under paragraphs (n)(3)(iii)(A) and (3)(iii)(B) of this appendix. For the purpose of this calculation:
(A) The weight assigned to 1.00 equals
(iii) The specific risk-weighting factor for the position (expressed as a percent) is equal to KSSFA × 100.
(o) Additional conditions. As a condition for the swap dealer to use this Appendix A to calculate certain of its capital charges, the Commission, or registered futures association of which the swap dealer is a member, may impose additional conditions on the swap dealer, which may include, but are not limited to restricting the swap dealer's business on a product-specific, category-specific, or general basis; submitting to the Commission or the registered futures association a plan to increase the swap dealer's regulatory capital; filing more frequent reports with the Commission or the registered futures association; modifying the swap dealer's internal risk management control procedures; or computing the swap dealer's deductions for market and credit risk in accordance with §§ 23.102 as appropriate. If the Commission or registered futures association finds it is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission or registered futures association may impose additional conditions on the swap dealer, if:
(1) The swap dealer is required to provide notice to the Commission or the registered futures association that the swap dealer's regulatory capital is less than $100 million;
(2) The swap dealer fails to meet the reporting requirements set forth in § 23.105;
(3) Any event specified in § 23.105 occurs;
(4) There is a material deficiency in the internal risk management control system or in the mathematical models used to price securities or to calculate deductions for market and credit risk or allowances for market and credit risk, as applicable, of the swap dealer;
(5) The swap dealer fails to comply with this Appendix A; or
(6) The Commission finds that imposition of other conditions is necessary or appropriate in the public interest.
[85 FR 57556, Sept. 15, 2020]Appendix A to Subpart H of Part 23 - Guidance on the Application of §§ 23.434 and 23.440 for Swap Dealers That Make Recommendations to Counterparties or Special Entities
17:1.0.1.1.22.5.7.17.20 : Appendix A
Appendix A to Subpart H of Part 23 - Guidance on the Application of §§ 23.434 and 23.440 for Swap Dealers That Make Recommendations to Counterparties or Special EntitiesThe following provides guidance on the application of §§ 23.434 and 23.440 to swap dealers that make recommendations to counterparties or Special Entities.
Section 23.434 - Recommendations to Counterparties - Institutional SuitabilityA swap dealer that recommends a swap or trading strategy involving a swap to a counterparty, other than a swap dealer, major swap participant, security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant, must undertake reasonable diligence to understand the potential risks and rewards associated with the recommended swap or trading strategy involving a swap - general suitability (§ 23.434(a)(1)) - and have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommended swap or trading strategy involving a swap is suitable for the counterparty - specific suitability (§ 23.434(a)(2)). To satisfy the general suitability obligation, a swap dealer must undertake reasonable diligence that will vary depending on, among other things, the complexity of and risks associated with the swap or swap trading strategy and the swap dealer's familiarity with the swap or swap trading strategy. At a minimum, a swap dealer's reasonable diligence must provide it with an understanding of the potential risks and rewards associated with the recommended swap or swap trading strategy.
Recommendation. Whether a communication between a swap dealer and a counterparty is a recommendation will turn on the facts and circumstances of the particular situation. There are, however, certain factors the Commission will consider in reaching such a determination. The facts and circumstances determination of whether a communication is a “recommendation” requires an analysis of the content, context, and presentation of the particular communication or set of communications. The determination of whether a “recommendation” has been made, moreover, is an objective rather than a subjective inquiry. An important factor in this regard is whether, given its content, context, and manner of presentation, a particular communication from a swap dealer to a counterparty reasonably would be viewed as a “call to action,” or suggestion that the counterparty enter into a swap. An analysis of the content, context, and manner of presentation of a communication requires examination of the underlying substantive information transmitted to the counterparty and consideration of any other facts and circumstances, such as any accompanying explanatory message from the swap dealer. Additionally, the more individually tailored the communication to a specific counterparty or a targeted group of counterparties about a swap, group of swaps or trading strategy involving the use of a swap, the greater the likelihood that the communication may be viewed as a “recommendation.”
Safe harbor. A swap dealer may satisfy the safe harbor requirements of § 23.434(b) to fulfill its counterparty-specific suitability duty under § 23.434(a)(2) if: (1) The swap dealer reasonably determines that the counterparty, or an agent to which the counterparty has delegated decision-making authority, is capable of independently evaluating investment risks with regard to the relevant swap or trading strategy involving a swap; (2) the counterparty or its agent represents in writing that it is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the recommendations of the swap dealer; (3) the swap dealer discloses in writing that it is acting in its capacity as a counterparty and is not undertaking to assess the suitability of the recommendation; and (4) in the case of a counterparty that is a Special Entity, the swap dealer complies with § 23.440 where the recommendation would cause the swap dealer to act as an advisor to a Special Entity within the meaning of § 23.440(a).
To reasonably determine that the counterparty, or an agent to which the counterparty has delegated decision-making authority, is capable of independently evaluating investment risks of a recommendation, the swap dealer can rely on the written representations of the counterparty, as provided in § 23.434(c). Section 23.434(c)(1) provides that a swap dealer will satisfy § 23.434(b)(1)'s requirement with respect to a counterparty other than a Special Entity if it receives representations that the counterparty has complied in good faith with the counterparty's policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that the persons responsible for evaluating the recommendation and making trading decisions on behalf of the counterparty are capable of doing so. Section § 23.434(c)(2) provides that a swap dealer will satisfy § 23.434(b)(1)'s requirement with respect to a Special Entity if it receives representations that satisfy the terms of § 23.450(d) regarding a Special Entity's qualified independent representative.
Prong (4) of the safe harbor clarifies that § 23.434's application is broader than § 23.440 - Requirements for Swap Dealers Acting as Advisors to Special Entities. Section 23.434 is triggered when a swap dealer recommends any swap or trading strategy that involves a swap to any counterparty. However, § 23.440 is limited to a swap dealer's recommendations (1) to a Special Entity (2) of swaps that are tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity. Thus, a swap dealer that recommends a swap to a Special Entity that is tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity may comply with its suitability obligation by satisfying the safe harbor in § 23.434(b); however, the swap dealer must also comply with § 23.440 in such circumstances.
Section 23.440 - Requirements for Swap Dealers Acting as Advisors to Special EntitiesA swap dealer “acts as an advisor to a Special Entity” under § 23.440 when the swap dealer recommends a swap or trading strategy involving a swap that is tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity. A swap dealer that “acts as an advisor to a Special Entity” has a duty to make a reasonable determination that a recommendation is in the “best interests” of the Special Entities and must undertake “reasonable efforts” to obtain information necessary to make such a determination.
Whether a swap dealer “acts as an advisor to a Special Entity” will depend on: (1) Whether the swap dealer has made a recommendation to a Special Entity; and (2) whether the recommendation concerns a swap or trading strategy involving a swap that is tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity. To determine whether a communication between a swap dealer and counterparty is a recommendation, the Commission will apply the same factors as under § 23.434, the suitability rule. However, unlike the suitability rule, which covers recommendations regarding any type of swap or trading strategy involving a swap, the “acts as an advisor rule” and “best interests” duty will be triggered only if the recommendation is of a swap or trading strategy involving a swap that is “tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity.”
Whether a swap is tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity will depend on the facts and circumstances. Swaps with terms that are tailored or customized to a specific Special Entity's needs or objectives, or swaps with terms that are designed for a targeted group of Special Entities that share common characteristics, e.g., school districts, are likely to be viewed as tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity. Generally, however, the Commission would not view a swap that is “made available for trading” on a designated contract market or swap execution facility, as provided in Section 2(h)(8) of the Act, as tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity.
Safe harbor. Under § 23.440(b)(2), when dealing with a Special Entity (including a Special Entity that is an employee benefit plan as defined in § 23.401(c)(3)), 1 a swap dealer will not “act as an advisor to a Special Entity” if: (1) The swap dealer does not express an opinion as to whether the Special Entity should enter into a recommended swap or swap trading strategy that is tailored to the particular needs or characteristics of the Special Entity; (2) the Special Entity represents in writing, in accordance with § 23.402(d), that it will not rely on the swap dealer's recommendations and will rely on advice from a qualified independent representative within the meaning of § 23.450; and (3) the swap dealer discloses that it is not undertaking to act in the best interests of the Special Entity.
1 The guidance in this appendix regarding the safe harbor to § 23.440 is limited to the safe harbor for any Special Entity under § 23.440(b)(2). A swap dealer may separately comply with the safe harbor under § 23.440(b)(1) for its communications to a Special Entity that is an employee benefit plan as defined in § 23.401(c)(3).
A swap dealer that elects to communicate within the safe harbor to avoid triggering the “best interests” duty must appropriately manage its communications. To clarify the type of communications that they will make under the safe harbor, the Commission expects that swap dealers may specifically represent that they will not express an opinion as to whether the Special Entity should enter into a recommended swap or trading strategy, and that for such advice the Special Entity should consult its own advisor. Nothing in the final rule would preclude such a representation from being included in counterparty relationship documentation. However, such a representation would not act as a safe harbor under the rule where, contrary to the representation, the swap dealer does express an opinion to the Special Entity as to whether it should enter into a recommended swap or trading strategy.
If a swap dealer complies with the terms of the safe harbor, the following types of communications would not be subject to the “best interests” duty: 2 (1) Providing information that is general transaction, financial, educational, or market information; (2) offering a swap or trading strategy involving a swap, including swaps that are tailored to the needs or characteristics of a Special Entity; (3) providing a term sheet, including terms for swaps that are tailored to the needs or characteristics of a Special Entity; (4) responding to a request for a quote from a Special Entity; (5) providing trading ideas for swaps or swap trading strategies, including swaps that are tailored to the needs or characteristics of a Special Entity; and (6) providing marketing materials upon request or on an unsolicited basis about swaps or swap trading strategies, including swaps that are tailored to the needs or characteristics of a Special Entity. This list of communications is not exclusive and should not create a negative implication that other types of communications are subject to a “best interests” duty.
2 Communications on the list that are not within the meaning of the term “acts as an advisor to a Special Entity” are outside the requirements of § 23.440. By including such communications on the list, the Commission does not intend to suggest that they are “recommendations.” Thus, a swap dealer that does not “act as an advisor to a Special Entity” within the meaning of § 23.440(a) is not required to comply with the safe harbor to avoid the “best interests” duty with respect to its communications.
The safe harbor in § 23.440(b)(2) allows a wide range of communications and interactions between swap dealers and Special Entities without invoking the “best interests” duty, including discussions of the advantages or disadvantages of different swaps or trading strategies. The Commission notes, however, that depending on the facts and circumstances, some of the examples on the list could be “recommendations” that would trigger a suitability obligation under § 23.434. However, the Commission has determined that such activities would not, by themselves, prompt the “best interests” duty in § 23.440, provided that the parties comply with the other requirements of § 23.440(b)(2). All of the swap dealer's communications, however, must be made in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith in compliance with § 23.433.
Swap dealers engage in a wide variety of communications with counterparties in the normal course of business, including but not limited to the six types of communications listed above. Whether any particular communication will be deemed to be a “recommendation” within the meaning of §§ 23.434 or 23.440 will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular communication considered in light of the guidance in this appendix with respect to the meaning of the term “recommendation.” Swap dealers that choose to manage their communications to comply with the safe harbors provided in §§ 23.434 and 23.440 will be able to limit the duty they owe to counterparties, including Special Entities, provided that the parties exchange the appropriate representations.