Title 15
SECTION 742.4
742.4 National security.
§ 742.4 National security.(a) License requirements. It is the policy of the United States to restrict the export and reexport of items that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, a license is required for exports and reexports to all destinations, except Canada, for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. A license is required to all destinations except those in Country Group A:1 (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR), for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS column 2 in the Commerce Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section except those cameras in ECCN 6A003.b.4.b that have a focal plane array with 111,000 or fewer elements and a frame rate of 60 Hz or less. A license is required to all destinations except those in Country Group A:1 (see supplement no. 1 to part 740) for those cameras in ECCN 6A003.b.4.b that have a focal plane array with 111,000 or fewer elements and a frame rate of 60 Hz or less and for cameras being exported or reexported pursuant to an authorization described in § 742.6(a)(2)(iii) or (v) of the EAR. The purpose of the controls is to ensure that these items do not make a contribution to the military potential of countries in Country Group D:1 (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. License Exception GBS is available for the export and reexport of certain national security controlled items to Country Group B (see § 740.4 and supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).
(b) Licensing policy. (1)(i) The policy for national security controlled items exported or reexported to any country except a country in Country Group D:1 (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications unless there is a significant risk that the items will be diverted to a country in Country Group D:1.
(ii) When destined to a country listed in Country Group D:5 in supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR, however, items classified under 9x515 or “600 series” ECCNs will be reviewed consistent with United States arms embargo policies in § 126.1 of the ITAR.
(iii) When destined to the People's Republic of China or a country listed in Country Group E:1 in supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR, items classified under any 9x515 ECCN will be subject to a policy of denial.
(2) Except for those countries described in paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(7) of this section, the general policy for exports and reexports of items to Country Group D:1 (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for civilian use or would otherwise not make a significant contribution to the military potential of the country of destination that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.
(3) To permit such policy judgments to be made, each application is reviewed in the light of prevailing policies with full consideration of all aspects of the proposed transaction. The review generally includes:
(i) An analysis of the kinds and quantities of items to be shipped;
(ii) Their military or civilian uses;
(iii) The unrestricted availability abroad of the same or comparable items;
(iv) The country of destination;
(v) The ultimate end-users in the country of destination; and
(vi) The intended end-use.
(4) Although each proposed transaction is considered individually, items described in Advisory Notes on the Commerce Control List are more likely to be approved than others.
(5) In recognition of efforts made to adopt safeguard measures for exports and reexports, Kazakhstan and Mongolia are accorded enhanced favorable consideration licensing treatment.
(6) The general policy for Cambodia and Laos is to approve license applications when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for an authorized use in Cambodia or Laos and are not likely to be diverted to another country or use contrary to the national security or foreign policy controls of the United States.
(7)(i) For the People's Republic of China (PRC), Venezuela, and the Russian Federation, all applications will be reviewed to determine the risk of diversion to a military end user or military end use. There is a general policy of approval for license applications to export, reexport, or transfer items determined to be for civil end users for civil end uses. There is a presumption of denial for license applications to export, reexport, or transfer items that would make a material contribution to the “development,” “production,” maintenance, repair, or operation of weapons systems, subsystems, and assemblies, such as, but not limited to, those described in supplement no. 7 to part 742 of the EAR, of the PRC, Venezuela, or the Russian Federation.
(ii) The following factors are among those that will be considered in reviewing license applications described in paragraph (b)(7)(i) of this section:
(A) The appropriateness of the export, reexport, or transfer for the stated end use;
(B) The significance of the item for the weapons systems capabilities of the importing country;
(C) Whether any party is a `military end user' as defined in § 744.21(g) of the EAR;
(D) The reliability of the parties to the transaction, including whether:
(1) An export or reexport license application has previously been denied;
(2) Any parties are or have been engaged in unlawful procurement or diversion activities;
(3) The parties are capable of securely handling and storing the items; and
(4) End-use checks have been and may be conducted by BIS or another U.S. government agency on parties to the transaction;
(E) The involvement of any party to the transaction in military activities, including activities involving the “development,” “production,” maintenance, repair, or operation of weapons systems, subsystems, and assemblies;
(F) Government strategies and policies that support the diversion of exports from their stated civil end use and redirection towards military end use; and
(G) The scope and effectiveness of the export control system in the importing country.
(iii) The review will also include an assessment of the impact of a proposed export of an item on the United States defense industrial base and the denial of an application for a license that would have a significant negative impact, as defined in section 1756(d)(3) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4815(d)(3)), on such defense industrial base.
(8) For India, there is a general policy of approval for license applications to export, reexport, or transfer items, including “600 series” items, for civil or military end uses in India, for ultimate end use by the Government of India, for reexport to countries in Country Group A:5, or for return to the United States, so long as such items are not for use in nuclear, “missile,” or chemical or biological weapons activities.
(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.
(d) [Reserved]
[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 61 FR 64283, Dec. 4, 1996; 70 FR 67348, Nov. 7, 2005; 72 FR 33656, June 19, 2007; 74 FR 23946, May 22, 2009; 74 FR 68145, Dec. 23, 2009; 78 FR 22721, Apr. 16, 2013; 79 FR 27436, May 13, 2014; 79 FR 45679, Aug. 6, 2014; 79 FR 76873, Dec. 23, 2014; 80 FR 29443, May 21, 2015; 81 FR 94967, Dec. 27, 2016; 82 FR 6220, Jan. 19, 2017; 85 FR 68450, Oct. 29, 2020]