Supplement No. 1 to Part 766 - Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases
15:2.1.3.4.42.0.1.26.84 :
Supplement No. 1 to Part 766 - Guidance on Charging and Penalty
Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases
Introduction
This Supplement describes how the Office of Export Enforcement
(OEE) at the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) responds to
apparent violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
and, specifically, how OEE makes penalty determinations in the
settlement of civil administrative enforcement cases under part 764
of the EAR. This guidance does not apply to enforcement cases for
violations under part 760 of the EAR - Restrictive Trade Practices
or Boycotts. Supplement No. 2 to part 766 continues to apply to
civil administrative enforcement cases involving part 760
violations.
Because many administrative enforcement cases are resolved
through settlement, the process of settling such cases is integral
to the enforcement program. OEE carefully considers each settlement
offer in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, relevant
precedent, and OEE's objective to achieve in each case an
appropriate penalty and deterrent effect. In settlement
negotiations, OEE encourages parties to provide, and will give
serious consideration to, information and evidence that parties
believe are relevant to the application of this guidance to their
cases, to whether a violation has in fact occurred, or to whether
they have an affirmative defense to potential charges.
This guidance does not confer any right or impose any obligation
regarding what penalties OEE may seek in litigating a case or what
posture OEE may take toward settling a case. Parties do not have a
right to a settlement offer or particular settlement terms from
OEE, regardless of settlement positions OEE has taken in other
cases.
I. Definitions Note:
See also: Definitions contained in § 766.2 of the EAR.
Apparent violation means conduct that constitutes an
actual or possible violation of the Export Administration Act of
1979, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the EAR,
other statutes administered or enforced by BIS, as well as
executive orders, regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
issued pursuant thereto.
Applicable schedule amount means:
1. $1,000 with respect to a transaction valued at less than
$1,000;
2. $10,000 with respect to a transaction valued at $1,000 or
more but less than $10,000;
3. $25,000 with respect to a transaction valued at $10,000 or
more but less than $25,000;
4. $50,000 with respect to a transaction valued at $25,000 or
more but less than $50,000;
5. $100,000 with respect to a transaction valued at $50,000 or
more but less than $100,000;
6. $170,000 with respect to a transaction valued at $100,000 or
more but less than $170,000;
7. $250,000 with respect to a transaction valued at $170,000 or
more.
Note to definition of applicable schedule amount. The
applicable schedule amount may be adjusted in accordance with U.S.
law, e.g., the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Act Improvements Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-74, sec. 701).
Transaction value means the U.S. dollar value of a
subject transaction, as demonstrated by commercial invoices, bills
of lading, signed Customs declarations, AES filings or similar
documents. Where the transaction value is not otherwise
ascertainable, OEE may consider the market value of the items that
were the subject of the transaction and/or the economic benefit
derived by the Respondent from the transaction, in determining
transaction value. In situations involving a lease of U.S.-origin
items, the transaction value will generally be the value of the
lease. For purposes of these Guidelines, “transaction value” will
not necessarily have the same meaning, nor be applied in the same
manner, as that term is used for import valuation purposes at 19
CFR 152.103.
Voluntary self-disclosure means the self-initiated
notification to OEE of an apparent violation as described in and
satisfying the requirements of § 764.5 of the EAR.
II. Types of Responses to Apparent Violations
OEE, among other responsibilities, investigates apparent
violations of the EAR, or any order, license or authorization
issued thereunder. When it appears that such a violation may have
occurred, OEE investigations may lead to no action, a warning
letter or an administrative enforcement proceeding. A violation may
also be referred to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution. The type of enforcement action initiated by OEE will
depend primarily on the nature of the violation. Depending on the
facts and circumstances of a particular case, an OEE investigation
may lead to one or more of the following actions:
A. No Action. If OEE determines that there is
insufficient evidence to conclude that a violation has occurred,
determines that a violation did not occur and/or, based on an
analysis of the Factors outlined in Section III of these
Guidelines, concludes that the conduct does not rise to a level
warranting an administrative response, then no action will be
taken. In such circumstances, if the investigation was initiated by
a voluntary self-disclosure (VSD), OEE will issue a letter (a
no-action letter) indicating that the investigation is being closed
with no administrative action being taken. OEE may issue a
no-action letter in non-voluntarily disclosed cases at its
discretion. A no-action determination by OEE represents OEE's
disposition of the apparent violation, unless OEE later learns of
additional information regarding the same or similar transactions
or other relevant facts. A no-action letter is not a final agency
action with respect to whether a violation occurred.
B. Warning Letter. If OEE determines that a violation may
have occurred but a civil penalty is not warranted under the
circumstances, and believes that the underlying conduct could lead
to a violation in other circumstances and/or that a Respondent does
not appear to be exercising due diligence in assuring compliance
with the statutes, executive orders, and regulations that OEE
enforces, OEE may issue a warning letter. A warning letter may
convey OEE's concerns about the underlying conduct and/or the
Respondent's compliance policies, practices, and/or procedures. It
may also address an apparent violation of a technical nature, where
good faith efforts to comply with the law and cooperate with the
investigation are present, or where the investigation commenced as
a result of a voluntary self-disclosure satisfying the requirements
of § 764.5 of the EAR, provided that no aggravating factors exist.
In the exercise of its discretion, OEE may determine in certain
instances that issuing a warning letter, instead of bringing an
administrative enforcement proceeding, will achieve the appropriate
enforcement result. A warning letter will describe the apparent
violation and urge compliance. A warning letter represents OEE's
enforcement response to and disposition of the apparent violation,
unless OEE later learns of additional information concerning the
same or similar apparent violations. A warning letter does not
constitute a final agency action with respect to whether a
violation has occurred.
C. Administrative enforcement case. If OEE determines
that a violation has occurred and, based on an analysis of the
Factors outlined in Section III of these Guidelines, concludes that
the Respondent's conduct warrants a civil monetary penalty or other
administrative sanctions, OEE may initiate an administrative
enforcement case. The issuance of a charging letter under § 766.3
of the EAR initiates an administrative enforcement proceeding.
Charging letters may be issued when there is reason to believe that
a violation has occurred. Cases may be settled before or after the
issuance of a charging letter. See § 766.18 of the EAR. OEE
may prepare a proposed charging letter which could result in a case
being settled before issuance of an actual charging letter.
See § 766.18(a) of the EAR. If a case does not settle before
issuance of a charging letter and the case proceeds to
adjudication, the resulting charging letter may include more
violations than alleged in the proposed charging letter, and the
civil monetary penalty amounts assessed may be greater that those
provided for in Section IV of these Guidelines. Civil monetary
penalty amounts for cases settled before the issuance of a charging
letter will be determined as discussed in Section IV of these
Guidelines. A civil monetary penalty may be assessed for each
violation. The maximum amount of such a penalty per violation is
stated in § 764.3(a)(1), subject to adjustments under the Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461),
which are codified at 15 CFR 6.4. OEE will afford the Respondent an
opportunity to respond to a proposed charging letter. Responses to
charging letters following the institution of an enforcement
proceeding under part 766 of the EAR are governed by § 766.3 of the
EAR.
D. Civil Monetary Penalty. OEE may seek a civil monetary
penalty if OEE determines that a violation has occurred and, based
on the Factors outlined in Section III of these Guidelines,
concludes that the Respondent's conduct warrants a monetary
penalty. Section IV of these Guidelines will guide the agency's
exercise of its discretion in determining civil monetary penalty
amounts.
E. Criminal Referral. In appropriate circumstances, OEE
may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution. Apparent violations referred for criminal prosecution
also may be subject to a civil monetary penalty and/or other
administrative sanctions or action by BIS.
F. Other Administrative Sanctions or Actions. In addition
to or in lieu of other administrative actions, OEE may seek
sanctions listed in § 764.3 of the EAR. BIS may also take the
following administrative actions, among other actions, in response
to an apparent violation:
License Revision, Suspension or Revocation. BIS
authorizations to engage in a transaction pursuant to a license or
license exception may be revised, suspended or revoked in response
to an apparent violation as provided in §§ 740.2(b) and 750.8 of
the EAR.
Denial of Export Privileges. An order denying a
Respondent's export privileges may be issued, as described in §
764.3(a)(2) of the EAR. Such a denial may extend to all export
privileges, as set out in the standard terms for denial orders in
Supplement No. 1 to part 764 of the EAR, or may be narrower in
scope (e.g., limited to exports of specified items or to
specified destinations or customers). A denial order may also be
suspended in whole or in part in accordance with § 766.18(c).
Exclusion from practice. Under § 764.3(a)(3) of the EAR,
any person acting as an attorney, accountant, consultant, freight
forwarder or other person who acts in a representative capacity in
any matter before BIS may be excluded from practicing before
BIS.
Training and Audit Requirements. In appropriate cases,
OEE may require as part of a settlement agreement that the
Respondent provide training to employees as part of its compliance
program, adopt other compliance measures, and/or be subject to
internal or independent audits by a qualified outside person. In
those cases, OEE may suspend or defer a portion or all of the
penalty amount if the suspended amount is applied to comply with
such requirements.
G. Suspension or Deferral. In appropriate cases, payment
of a civil monetary penalty may be suspended or deferred during a
probationary period under a settlement agreement and order. If the
terms of the settlement agreement or order are not adhered to by
the Respondent, then suspension or deferral may be revoked and the
full amount of the penalty imposed. See § 764.3(a)(1)(iii)
of the EAR. In determining whether suspension or deferral is
appropriate, OEE may consider, for example, whether the Respondent
has demonstrated a limited ability to pay a penalty that would be
appropriate for such violations, so that suspended or deferred
payment can be expected to have sufficient deterrent value, and
whether, in light of all of the circumstances, such suspension or
deferral is necessary to make the financial impact of the penalty
consistent with the impact of penalties on other parties who
committed similar violations. OEE may also take into account when
determining whether or not to suspend or defer a civil penalty
whether the Respondent will apply a portion or all of the funds
suspended or deferred to audit, compliance, or training that may be
required under a settlement agreement and order, or the matter is
part of a “global settlement” as discussed in more detail
below.
III. Factors Affecting Administrative Sanctions
Many apparent violations are isolated occurrences, the result of
a good-faith misinterpretation, or involve no more than simple
negligence or carelessness. In such instances, absent the presence
of aggravating factors, the matter frequently may be addressed with
a no action determination letter or, if deemed necessary, a warning
letter. Where the imposition of an administrative penalty is deemed
appropriate, as a general matter, OEE will consider some or all of
the following Factors in determining the appropriate sanctions in
administrative cases, including the appropriate amount of a civil
monetary penalty where such a penalty is sought and is imposed as
part of a settlement agreement and order. These factors describe
circumstances that, in OEE's experience, are commonly relevant to
penalty determinations in settled cases. Factors that are
considered exclusively aggravating, such as willfulness, or
exclusively mitigating, such as situations where remedial measures
were taken, are set forth below. This guidance also identifies
General Factors - which can be either mitigating or aggravating -
such as the presence or absence of an internal compliance program
at the time the apparent violations occurred. Other relevant
Factors may also be considered at the agency's discretion.
While some violations of the EAR have a degree of knowledge or
intent as an element of the offense, OEE may regard a violation of
any provision of the EAR as knowing or willful if the facts and
circumstances of the case support that conclusion. For example,
evidence that a corporate entity had knowledge at a senior
management level may mean that a higher penalty may be appropriate.
OEE will also consider, in accordance with Supplement No. 3 to part
732 of the EAR, the presence of any red flags that should have
alerted the Respondent that a violation was likely to occur. The
aggravating factors identified in the Guidelines do not alter or
amend § 764.2(e) or the definition of “knowledge” in § 772.1, or
other provisions of parts 764 and 772 of the EAR. If the violations
are of such a nature and extent that a monetary fine alone
represents an insufficient penalty, a denial or exclusion order may
also be imposed to prevent future violations of the EAR.
Aggravating Factors
A. Willful or Reckless Violation of Law. OEE will
consider a Respondent's apparent willfulness or recklessness in
violating, attempting to violate, conspiring to violate, or causing
a violation of the law. Generally, to the extent the conduct at
issue appears to be the result of willful conduct - a deliberate
intent to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or
cause a violation of the law - the OEE enforcement response will be
stronger. Among the factors OEE may consider in evaluating apparent
willfulness or recklessness are:
1. Willfulness. Was the conduct at issue the result of a
decision to take action with the knowledge that such action would
constitute a violation of U.S. law? Did the Respondent know that
the underlying conduct constituted, or likely constituted, a
violation of U.S. law at the time of the conduct?
2. Recklessness/gross negligence. Did the Respondent
demonstrate reckless disregard or gross negligence with respect to
compliance with U.S. regulatory requirements or otherwise fail to
exercise a minimal degree of caution or care in avoiding conduct
that led to the apparent violation? Were there warning signs that
should have alerted the Respondent that an action or failure to act
would lead to an apparent violation?
3. Concealment. Was there a deliberate effort by the
Respondent to hide or purposely obfuscate its conduct in order to
mislead OEE, federal, state, or foreign regulators, or other
parties involved in the conduct, about an apparent violation?
Note:
Failure to voluntarily disclose an apparent violation to OEE
does not constitute concealment.
4. Pattern of Conduct. Did the apparent violation
constitute or result from a pattern or practice of conduct or was
it relatively isolated and atypical in nature? In determining both
whether to bring charges and, once charges are brought, whether to
treat the case as egregious, OEE will be mindful of certain
situations where multiple recurring violations resulted from a
single inadvertent error, such as misclassification. However, for
cases that settle before filing of a charging letter with an
Administrative Law Judge, OEE will generally charge only the most
serious violation per transaction. If OEE issues a proposed
charging letter and subsequently files a charging letter with an
Administrative Law Judge because a mutually agreeable settlement
cannot be reached, OEE will continue to reserve its authority to
proceed with all available charges in the charging letter based on
the facts presented. When determining a penalty, each violation is
potentially chargeable.
5. Prior Notice. Was the Respondent on notice, or should
it reasonably have been on notice, that the conduct at issue, or
similar conduct, constituted a violation of U.S. law?
6. Management Involvement. In cases of entities, at what
level within the organization did the willful or reckless conduct
occur? Were supervisory or managerial level staff aware, or should
they reasonably have been aware, of the willful or reckless
conduct?
B. Awareness of Conduct at Issue:The Respondent's awareness
of the conduct giving rise to the apparent violation.
Generally, the greater a Respondent's actual knowledge of, or
reason to know about, the conduct constituting an apparent
violation, the stronger the OEE enforcement response will be. In
the case of a corporation, awareness will focus on supervisory or
managerial level staff in the business unit at issue, as well as
other senior officers and managers. Among the factors OEE may
consider in evaluating the Respondent's awareness of the conduct at
issue are:
1. Actual Knowledge. Did the Respondent have actual
knowledge that the conduct giving rise to an apparent violation
took place, and remain willfully blind to such conduct, and fail to
take remedial measures to address it? Was the conduct part of a
business process, structure or arrangement that was designed or
implemented with the intent to prevent or shield the Respondent
from having such actual knowledge, or was the conduct part of a
business process, structure or arrangement implemented for other
legitimate reasons that consequently made it difficult or
impossible for the Respondent to have actual knowledge?
2. Reason to Know. If the Respondent did not have actual
knowledge that the conduct took place, did the Respondent have
reason to know, or should the Respondent reasonably have known,
based on all readily available information and with the exercise of
reasonable due diligence, that the conduct would or might take
place?
3. Management Involvement. In the case of an entity, was
the conduct undertaken with the explicit or implicit knowledge of
senior management, or was the conduct undertaken by personnel
outside the knowledge of senior management? If the apparent
violation was undertaken without the knowledge of senior
management, was there oversight intended to detect and prevent
violations, or did the lack of knowledge by senior management
result from disregard for its responsibility to comply with
applicable regulations and laws?
C. Harm to Regulatory Program Objectives: The actual or
potential harm to regulatory program objectives caused by the
conduct giving rise to the apparent violation. This factor
would be present where the conduct in question, in purpose or
effect, substantially implicated national security, foreign policy
or other essential interests protected by the U.S. export control
system, in view of such factors as the reason for controlling the
item to the destination in question; the sensitivity of the item;
the prohibitions or restrictions against the recipient of the item;
and the licensing policy concerning the transaction (such as
presumption of approval or denial). OEE, in its discretion, may
consult with other U.S. agencies or with licensing and enforcement
authorities of other countries in making its determination. Among
the factors OEE may consider in evaluating the harm to regulatory
program objectives are:
1. Implications for U.S. National Security: The impact that
the apparent violation had or could potentially have on the
national security of the United States. For example, if a
particular export could undermine U.S. military superiority or
endanger U.S. or friendly military forces or be used in a military
application contrary to U.S. interests, OEE would consider the
implications of the apparent violation to be significant.
2. Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy: The effect that the
apparent violation had or could potentially have on U.S. foreign
policy objectives. For example, if a particular export is, or
is likely to be, used by a foreign regime to monitor communications
of its population in order to suppress free speech and persecute
dissidents, OEE would consider the implications of the apparent
violation to be significant.
General Factors
D. Individual Characteristics: The particular circumstances
and characteristics of a Respondent. Among the factors OEE may
consider in evaluating individual characteristics are:
1. Commercial Sophistication: The commercial sophistication
and experience of the Respondent. Is the Respondent an
individual or an entity? If an individual, was the conduct
constituting the apparent violation for personal or business
reasons?
2. Size and Sophistication of Operations: The size of a
Respondent's business operations, where such information is
available and relevant. At the time of the violation, did the
Respondent have any previous export experience and was the
Respondent familiar with export practices and requirements?
Qualification of the Respondent as a small business or organization
for the purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act, as determined by reference to the applicable
standards of the Small Business Administration, may also be
considered.
3. Volume and Value of Transactions: The total volume and
value of transactions undertaken by the Respondent on an annual
basis, with attention given to the volume and value of the apparent
violations as compared with the total volume and value of all
transactions. Was the quantity and/or value of the exports
high, such that a greater penalty may be necessary to serve as an
adequate penalty for the violation or deterrence of future
violations, or to make the penalty proportionate to those for
otherwise comparable violations involving exports of lower quantity
or value?
4. Regulatory History: The Respondent's regulatory history,
including OEE's issuance of prior penalties, warning letters, or
other administrative actions (including settlements), other than
with respect to antiboycott matters under part 760 of the EAR.
OEE will generally only consider a Respondent's regulatory history
for the five years preceding the date of the transaction giving
rise to the apparent violation. When an acquiring firm takes
reasonable steps to uncover, correct, and voluntarily disclose or
cause the voluntary self-disclosure to OEE of conduct that gave
rise to violations by an acquired business before the acquisition,
OEE typically will not take such violations into account in
applying these factors in settling other violations by the
acquiring firm.
5. Other illegal conduct in connection with the export.
Was the transaction in support of other illegal conduct, for
example the export of firearms as part of a drug smuggling
operation, or illegal exports in support of money laundering?
6. Criminal Convictions. Has the Respondent been
convicted of an export-related criminal violation?
Note:
Where necessary to effective enforcement, the prior involvement
in export violation(s) of a Respondent's owners, directors,
officers, partners, or other related persons may be imputed to a
Respondent in determining whether these criteria are satisfied.
E. Compliance Program: The existence, nature and adequacy of
a Respondent's risk-based BIS compliance program at the time of the
apparent violation. OEE will take account of the extent to
which a Respondent complies with the principles set forth in BIS's
Export Management System (EMS) Guidelines. Information about the
EMS Guidelines can be accessed through the BIS Web site at
www.bis.doc.gov. In this context, OEE will also consider
whether a Respondent's export compliance program uncovered a
problem, thereby preventing further violations, and whether the
Respondent has taken steps to address compliance concerns raised by
the violation, to include the submission of a VSD and steps to
prevent reoccurrence of the violation that are reasonably
calculated to be effective.
Mitigating Factors
F. Remedial Response: The Respondent's corrective action
taken in response to the apparent violation. Among the factors OEE
may consider in evaluating the remedial response are:
1. The steps taken by the Respondent upon learning of the
apparent violation. Did the Respondent immediately stop the conduct
at issue? Did the Respondent undertake to file a VSD?
2. In the case of an entity, the processes followed to resolve
issues related to the apparent violation. Did the Respondent
discover necessary information to ascertain the causes and extent
of the apparent violation, fully and expeditiously? Was senior
management fully informed? If so, when?
3. In the case of an entity, whether it adopted new and more
effective internal controls and procedures to prevent the
occurrence of similar apparent violations. If the entity did not
have a BIS compliance program in place at the time of the apparent
violation, did it implement one upon discovery of the apparent
violation? If it did have a BIS compliance program, did it take
appropriate steps to enhance the program to prevent the recurrence
of similar violations? Did the entity provide the individual(s)
and/or managers responsible for the apparent violation with
additional training, and/or take other appropriate action, to
ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future?
4. Where applicable, whether the Respondent undertook a thorough
review to identify other possible violations.
G. Exceptional Cooperation with OEE: The nature and extent of
the Respondent's cooperation with OEE, beyond those actions set
forth in Factor F. Among the factors OEE may consider in
evaluating exceptional cooperation are:
1. Did the Respondent provide OEE with all relevant information
regarding the apparent violation at issue in a timely,
comprehensive and responsive manner (whether or not voluntarily
self-disclosed), including, if applicable, overseas records?
2. Did the Respondent research and disclose to OEE relevant
information regarding any other apparent violations caused by the
same course of conduct?
3. Did the Respondent provide substantial assistance in another
OEE investigation of another person who may have violated the
EAR?
4. Has the Respondent previously made substantial voluntary
efforts to provide information (such as providing tips that led to
enforcement actions against other parties) to federal law
enforcement authorities in support of the enforcement of U.S.
export control regulations?
5. Did the Respondent enter into a statute of limitations
tolling agreement, if requested by OEE (particularly in situations
where the apparent violations were not immediately disclosed or
discovered by OEE, in particularly complex cases, and in cases in
which the Respondent has requested and received additional time to
respond to a request for information from OEE)? If so, the
Respondent's entering into a tolling agreement will be deemed a
mitigating factor.
Note:
A Respondent's refusal to enter into a tolling agreement will
not be considered by OEE as an aggravating factor in assessing a
Respondent's cooperation or otherwise under the Guidelines.
H. License Was Likely To Be Approved. Would an export
license application have likely been approved for the transaction
had one been sought? Would the export have qualified for a License
Exception? Some license requirements sections in the EAR also set
forth a licensing policy (i.e., a statement of the policy
under which license applications will be evaluated), such as a
general presumption of denial or case by case review. OEE may also
consider the licensing history of the specific item to that
destination and if the item or end-user has a history of export
denials.
Other Relevant Factors Considered on a Case-by-Case Basis
I. Related Violations. Frequently, a single export
transaction can give rise to multiple violations. For example, an
exporter who inadvertently misclassifies an item on the Commerce
Control List may, as a result of that error, export the item
without the required export license and file Electronic Export
Information (EEI) to the Automated Export System (AES) that both
misstates the applicable Export Control Classification Number
(ECCN) and erroneously identifies the export as qualifying for the
designation “NLR” (no license required) or cites a license
exception that is not applicable. In so doing, the exporter commits
three violations: one violation of § 764.2(a) of the EAR for the
unauthorized export and two violations of § 764.2(g) of the EAR for
the two false statements on the EEI filing to the AES. OEE will
consider whether the violations stemmed from the same underlying
error or omission, and whether they resulted in distinguished or
separate harm. OEE generally does not charge multiple violations on
a single export, and would not consider the existence of such
multiple violations as an aggravating factor in and of itself. It
is within OEE's discretion to charge separate violations and settle
the case for a penalty that is less than would be appropriate for
unrelated violations under otherwise similar circumstances, or to
charge fewer violations and pursue settlement in accordance with
that charging decision. OEE generally will consider inadvertent,
compounded clerical errors as related and not separate infractions
when deciding whether to bring charges and in determining if a case
is egregious.
J. Multiple Unrelated Violations. In cases involving
multiple unrelated violations, OEE is more likely to seek a denial
of export privileges and/or a greater monetary penalty than OEE
would otherwise typically seek. For example, repeated unauthorized
exports could warrant a denial order, even if a single export of
the same item to the same destination under similar circumstances
might warrant just a civil monetary penalty. OEE takes this
approach because multiple violations may indicate serious
compliance problems and a resulting greater risk of future
violations. OEE may consider whether a Respondent has taken
effective steps to address compliance concerns in determining
whether multiple violations warrant a denial order in a particular
case.
K. Other Enforcement Action. Other enforcement actions
taken by federal, state, or local agencies against a Respondent for
the apparent violation or similar apparent violations, including
whether the settlement of alleged violations of BIS regulations is
part of a comprehensive settlement with other federal, state, or
local agencies. Where an administrative enforcement matter under
the EAR involves conduct giving rise to related criminal or civil
charges, OEE may take into account the related violations, and
their resolution, in determining what administrative sanctions are
appropriate under part 766 of the EAR. A criminal conviction
indicates serious, willful misconduct and an accordingly high risk
of future violations, absent effective administrative sanctions.
However, entry of a guilty plea can be a sign that a Respondent
accepts responsibility for complying with the EAR and will take
greater care to do so in the future. In appropriate cases where a
Respondent is receiving substantial criminal penalties, OEE may
find that sufficient deterrence may be achieved by lesser
administrative sanctions than would be appropriate in the absence
of criminal penalties. Conversely, OEE might seek greater
administrative sanctions in an otherwise similar case where a
Respondent is not subjected to criminal penalties. The presence of
a related criminal or civil disposition may distinguish settlements
among civil penalty cases that appear otherwise to be similar. As a
result, the factors set forth for consideration in civil penalty
settlements will often be applied differently in the context of a
“global settlement” of both civil and criminal cases, or multiple
civil cases, and may therefore be of limited utility as precedent
for future cases, particularly those not involving a global
settlement.
L. Future Compliance/Deterrence Effect: The impact an
administrative enforcement action may have on promoting future
compliance with the regulations by a Respondent and similar
parties, particularly those in the same industry sector.
M. Other Factors That OEE Deems Relevant. On a
case-by-case basis, in determining the appropriate enforcement
response and/or the amount of any civil monetary penalty, OEE will
consider the totality of the circumstances to ensure that its
enforcement response is proportionate to the nature of the
violation.
IV. Civil Penalties A. Determining What Sanctions Are Appropriate
in a Settlement.
OEE will review the facts and circumstances surrounding an
apparent violation and apply the Factors Affecting Administrative
Sanctions in Section III above in determining the appropriate
sanction or sanctions in an administrative case, including the
appropriate amount of a civil monetary penalty where such a penalty
is sought and imposed. Penalties for settlements reached after the
initiation of litigation will usually be higher than those
described by these guidelines.
B. Amount of Civil Penalty.
1. Determining Whether a Case is Egregious. In those
cases in which a civil monetary penalty is considered appropriate,
OEE will make a determination as to whether a case is deemed
“egregious” for purposes of the base penalty calculation. If a case
is determined to be egregious, OEE also will also determine the
appropriate base penalty amount within the range of base penalty
amounts prescribed in paragraphs IV.B.2.a.iii and iv below. These
determinations will be based on an analysis of the applicable
factors. In making these determinations, substantial weight will
generally be given to Factors A (“willful or reckless violation of
law”), B (“awareness of conduct at issue”), C (“harm to regulatory
program objectives”), and D (“individual characteristics”), with
particular emphasis on Factors A, B, and C. A case will be
considered an “egregious case” where the analysis of the applicable
factors, with a focus on Factors A, B, and C, indicates that the
case represents a particularly serious violation of the law calling
for a strong enforcement response. A determination by OEE that a
case is “egregious” must have the concurrence of the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
2. Monetary Penalties in Egregious Cases and Non-Egregious
Cases. The civil monetary penalty amount shall generally be
calculated as follows, except that neither the base penalty amount
nor the penalty amount will exceed the applicable statutory
maximum:
a. Base Category Calculation and Voluntary Self-Disclosures.
i. In a non-egregious case, if the apparent violation is
disclosed through a voluntary self-disclosure, the base penalty
amount shall be one-half of the transaction value, capped at a
maximum base penalty amount of $125,000 per violation.
ii. In a non-egregious case, if the apparent violation comes to
OEE's attention by means other than a voluntary self-disclosure,
the base penalty amount shall be the “applicable schedule amount,”
as defined above (capped at a maximum base penalty amount of
$250,000 per violation).
iii. In an egregious case, if the apparent violation is
disclosed through a voluntary self-disclosure, the base penalty
amount shall be an amount up to one-half of the statutory maximum
penalty applicable to the violation.
iv. In an egregious case, if the apparent violation comes to
OEE's attention by means other than a voluntary self-disclosure,
the base penalty amount shall be an amount up to the statutory
maximum penalty applicable to the violation.
The following matrix represents the base penalty amount of the
civil monetary penalty for each category of violation:
Voluntary
Self-Disclosure? |
Egregious
Case? |
NO |
YES |
YES |
(1)
One-Half of the Transaction Value (capped at $125,000 per
violation) |
(3)
Up to One-Half of the Applicable Statutory Maximum. |
NO |
(2)
Applicable Schedule Amount (capped at $250,000 per violation) |
(4)
Up to the Applicable Statutory Maximum. |
Note to paragraph IV.B.2. The dollar values that appear
in IV.B.2.a.i and .ii, and in the Base Penalty Matrix may be
adjusted in accordance with U.S. law, e.g., the Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015
(Pub. L. 114-74, sec. 701).
b. Adjustment for Applicable Relevant Factors.
In non-egregious cases the base penalty amount of the civil
monetary penalty may be adjusted to reflect applicable Factors for
Administrative Action set forth in Section III of these Guidelines.
In egregious cases the base penalty amount of the civil monetary
penalty will be set based on applicable Factors for Administrative
Action set forth in Section III of these Guidelines. A Factor may
result in a lower or higher penalty amount depending upon whether
it is aggravating or mitigating or otherwise relevant to the
circumstances at hand. Mitigating factors may be combined for a
greater reduction in penalty, but mitigation will generally not
exceed 75 percent of the base penalty, except in the case of VSDs,
where full suspension is possible with conditions in certain
non-egregious cases. Subject to this limitation, as a general
matter, in those cases where the following Mitigating Factors are
present, OEE will adjust the base penalty amount in the following
manner:
In cases involving exceptional cooperation with OEE as set forth
in Mitigating Factor G, but no voluntary self-disclosure as defined
in § 764.5 of the EAR, the base penalty amount generally will be
reduced between 25 and 40 percent. Exceptional cooperation in cases
involving voluntary self-disclosure may also be considered as a
further mitigating factor.
In cases involving a Respondent's first violation, the base
penalty amount generally will be reduced by up to 25 percent. An
apparent violation generally will be considered a “first violation”
if the Respondent has not been convicted of an export-related
criminal violation or been subject to a BIS final order in five
years, preceding the date of the transaction giving rise to the
apparent violation. A group of substantially similar apparent
violations addressed in a single Charging Letter shall be
considered as a single violation for purposes of this subsection.
In those cases where a prior Charging Letter within the preceding
five years involved conduct of a substantially different nature
from the apparent violation at issue, OEE may consider the apparent
violation at issue a “first violation.” Warning Letters issued
within the preceding five years are not factored into account for
purposes of determining eligibility for “first offense” mitigation.
When an acquiring firm takes reasonable steps to uncover, correct,
and disclose or cause to be disclosed to OEE conduct that gave rise
to violations by an acquired business before the acquisition, OEE
typically will not take such violations into account as an
aggravating factor in settling other violations by the acquiring
firm.
iii. In cases involving charges pertaining to transactions where
a license exception would have been available or a license would
likely have been approved had one been sought as set forth in
Mitigating Factor H, the base penalty amount generally will be
reduced by up to 25 percent.
In all cases, the penalty amount will not exceed the applicable
statutory maximum. Similarly, while mitigating factors may be
combined for a greater reduction in penalty, mitigation will
generally not exceed 75 percent of the base penalty, except in the
case of VSDs, where full suspension is possible with conditions in
certain non-egregious cases.
C. Settlement Procedures.
The procedures relating to the settlement of administrative
enforcement cases are set forth in § 766.18 of the EAR.
[81 FR 40506, June 22, 2016]
Supplement No. 2 to Part 766 - Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases Involving Antiboycott Matters
15:2.1.3.4.42.0.1.26.85 :
Supplement No. 2 to Part 766 - Guidance on Charging and Penalty
Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases
Involving Antiboycott Matters
(a) Introduction - (1) Scope. This Supplement
describes how the Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC) responds
to violations of part 760 of the EAR “Restrictive Trade Practices
or Boycotts” and to violations of part 762 “Recordkeeping” when the
recordkeeping requirement pertains to part 760 (together referred
to in this supplement as the “antiboycott provisions”). It also
describes how BIS makes penalty determinations in the settlement of
administrative enforcement cases brought under parts 764 and 766 of
the EAR involving violations of the antiboycott provisions. This
supplement does not apply to enforcement cases for violations of
other provisions of the EAR.
(2) Policy Regarding Settlement. Because many
administrative enforcement cases are resolved through settlement,
the process of settling such cases is integral to the enforcement
program. BIS carefully considers each settlement offer in light of
the facts and circumstances of the case, relevant precedent, and
BIS's objective to achieve in each case an appropriate level of
penalty and deterrent effect. In settlement negotiations, BIS
encourages parties to provide, and will give serious consideration
to, information and evidence that the parties believe is relevant
to the application of this guidance to their cases, to whether a
violation has in fact occurred, and to whether they have a defense
to potential charges.
(3) Limitation. BIS's policy and practice is to treat
similarly situated cases similarly, taking into consideration that
the facts and combination of mitigating and aggravating factors are
different in each case. However, this guidance does not confer any
right or impose any obligation regarding what posture or penalties
BIS may seek in settling or litigating a case. Parties do not have
a right to a settlement offer or particular settlement terms from
BIS, regardless of settlement postures BIS has taken in other
cases.
(b) Responding to Violations. OAC within BIS investigates
possible violations of Section 8 of the Export Administration Act
of 1979, as amended (“Foreign Boycotts”), the antiboycott
provisions of EAR, or any order or authorization related thereto.
When BIS has reason to believe that such a violation has occurred,
BIS may issue a warning letter or initiate an administrative
enforcement proceeding. A violation may also be referred to the
Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.
(1) Issuing a warning letter. Warning letters represent
BIS's belief that a violation has occurred. In the exercise of its
discretion, BIS may determine in certain instances that issuing a
warning letter, instead of bringing an administrative enforcement
proceeding, will fulfill the appropriate enforcement objective. A
warning letter will fully explain the violation.
(i) BIS may issue warning letters where:
(A) The investigation commenced as a result of a voluntary
self-disclosure satisfying the requirements of § 764.8 of the EAR;
or
(B) The party has not previously committed violations of the
antiboycott provisions.
(ii) BIS may also consider the category of violation as
discussed in paragraph (d)(2) of this supplement in determining
whether to issue a warning letter or initiate an enforcement
proceeding. A violation covered by Category C (failure to report or
late reporting of receipt of boycott requests) might warrant a
warning letter rather than initiation of an enforcement
proceeding.
(iii) BIS will not issue a warning letter if it concludes, based
on available information, that a violation did not occur.
(iv) BIS may reopen its investigation of a matter should it
receive additional evidence or if it appears that information
previously provided to BIS during the course of its investigation
was incorrect.
(2) Pursuing an administrative enforcement case. The
issuance of a charging letter under § 766.3 of this part initiates
an administrative proceeding.
(i) Charging letters may be issued when there is reason to
believe that a violation has occurred. Cases may be settled before
or after the issuance of a charging letter. See § 766.18 of this
part.
(ii) Although not required to do so by law, BIS may send a
proposed charging letter to a party to inform the party of the
violations that BIS has reason to believe occurred and how BIS
expects that those violations would be charged. Issuance of the
proposed charging letter provides an opportunity for the party and
BIS to consider settlement of the case prior to the initiation of
formal enforcement proceedings.
(3) Referring for criminal prosecution. In appropriate
cases, BIS may refer a case to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution, in addition to pursuing an administrative
enforcement action.
(c) Types of administrative sanctions. Administrative
enforcement cases generally are settled on terms that include one
or more of three administrative sanctions:
(1) A monetary penalty may be assessed for each violation as
provided in § 764.3(a)(1) of the EAR;
Note to paragraph (c)(1):
The maximum penalty is subject to adjustments under the Federal
Civil Penalties Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461, note
(2000)), which are codified at 15 CFR 6.4. For violations that
occurred before March 9, 2006, the maximum monetary penalty per
violation is $11,000. For violations occurring on or after March 9,
2006, the maximum monetary penalty per violation is $50,000.
(2) An order denying a party's export privileges under the EAR
may be issued, under § 764.3(a)(2) of the EAR; or
(3) Exclusion from practice under § 764.3(a)(3) of the EAR.
(d) How BIS determines what sanctions are appropriate in a
settlement - (1) General Factors. BIS looks to the
following general factors in determining what administrative
sanctions are appropriate in each settlement.
(i) Degree of seriousness. In order to violate the
antiboycott provisions of the EAR, a U.S. person does not need to
have actual “knowledge” or a reason to know, as that term is
defined in § 772.1 of the EAR, of relevant U.S. laws and
regulations. Typically, in cases that do not involve knowing
violations, BIS will seek a settlement for payment of a civil
penalty (unless the matter is resolved with a warning letter).
However, in cases involving knowing violations, conscious disregard
of the antiboycott provisions, or other such serious violations
(e.g., furnishing prohibited information in response to a boycott
questionnaire with knowledge that such furnishing is in violation
of the EAR), BIS is more likely to seek a denial of export
privileges or an exclusion from practice, and/or a greater monetary
penalty as BIS considers such violations particularly
egregious.
(ii) Category of violations. In connection with its
activities described in paragraph (a)(1) of this supplement, BIS
recognizes three categories of violations under the antiboycott
provisions of the EAR. (See § 760.2, § 760.4 and § 760.5 of the EAR
for examples of each type of violation other than recordkeeping).
These categories reflect the relative seriousness of a violation,
with Category A violations typically warranting the most stringent
penalties, including up to the maximum monetary penalty, a denial
order and/or an exclusion order. Through providing these categories
in this penalty guidelines notice, BIS hopes to give parties a
general sense of how it views the seriousness of various
violations. This guidance, however, does not confer any right or
impose any obligation as to what penalties BIS may impose based on
its review of the specific facts of a case.
(A) The Category A violations and the sections of the EAR that
set forth their elements are:
(1) Discriminating against U.S. persons on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin - § 760.2(b);
(2) Refusing to do business or agreeing to refuse to do
business - § 760.2(a);
(3) Furnishing information about race, religion, sex, or
national origin of U.S. persons including, but not limited to,
providing information in connection with a boycott questionnaire
about the religion of employees - § 760.2(c);
(4) Evading the provisions of part 760 - § 760.4;
(5) Furnishing information about business relationships
with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons - § 760.2(d);
and
(6) Implementing letters of credit - § 760.2(f).
(B) The Category B violations and the sections of the EAR that
set forth their elements are:
(1) Furnishing information about associations with
charitable or fraternal organizations which support a boycotted
country - § 760.2(e); and
(2) Making recordkeeping violations - part 762.
(C) The Category C violation and the section of the EAR that
sets forth its elements is: Failing to report timely receipt of
boycott requests - § 760.5.
(iii) Violations arising out of related transactions.
Frequently, a single transaction can give rise to multiple
violations. Depending on the facts and circumstances, BIS may
choose to impose a smaller or greater penalty per violation. In
exercising its discretion, BIS typically looks to factors such as
whether the violations resulted from conscious disregard of the
requirements of the antiboycott provisions; whether they stemmed
from the same underlying error or omission; and whether they
resulted in distinguishable or separate harm. The three scenarios
set forth below are illustrative of how BIS might view transactions
that lead to multiple violations.
(A) First scenario. An exporter enters into a sales
agreement with a company in a boycotting country. In the course of
the negotiations, the company sends the exporter a request for a
signed statement certifying that the goods to be supplied do not
originate in a boycotted country. The exporter provides the signed
certification. Subsequently, the exporter fails to report the
receipt of the request. The exporter has committed two violations
of the antiboycott provisions, first, a violation of § 760.2(d) for
furnishing information concerning the past or present business
relationships with or in a boycotted country, and second, a
violation of § 760.5 for failure to report the receipt of a request
to engage in a restrictive trade practice or boycott. Although the
supplier has committed two violations, BIS may impose a smaller
mitigated penalty on a per violation basis than if the violations
had stemmed from two separate transactions.
(B) Second scenario. An exporter receives a boycott
request to provide a statement that the goods at issue in a sales
transaction do not contain raw materials from a boycotted country
and to include the signed statement along with the invoice. The
goods are shipped in ten separate shipments. Each shipment includes
a copy of the invoice and a copy of the signed boycott-related
statement. Each signed statement is a certification that has been
furnished in violation of § 760.2(d)'s bar on the furnishing of
prohibited business information. Technically, the exporter has
committed ten separate violations of § 760.2(d) and one violation
of § 760.5 for failure to report receipt of the boycott request.
Given that the violations arose from a single boycott request,
however, BIS may treat the violations as related and impose a
smaller penalty than it would if the furnishing had stemmed from
ten separate requests.
(C) Third scenario. An exporter has an ongoing
relationship with a company in a boycotting country. The company
places three separate orders for goods on different dates with the
exporter. In connection with each order, the company requests the
exporter to provide a signed statement certifying that the goods to
be supplied do not originate in a boycotted country. The exporter
provides a signed certification with each order of goods that it
ships to the company. BIS has the discretion to penalize the
furnishing of each of these three items of information as a
separate violation of § 760.2(d) of the EAR for furnishing
information concerning past or present business relationships with
or in a boycotted country.
(iv) Multiple violations from unrelated transactions. In
cases involving multiple unrelated violations, BIS is more likely
to seek a denial of export privileges, an exclusion from practice,
and/or a greater monetary penalty than in cases involving isolated
incidents. For example, the repeated furnishing of prohibited
boycott-related information about business relationships with or in
boycotted countries during a long period of time could warrant a
denial order, even if a single instance of furnishing such
information might warrant only a monetary penalty. BIS takes this
approach because multiple violations may indicate serious
compliance problems and a resulting risk of future violations. BIS
may consider whether a party has taken effective steps to address
compliance concerns in determining whether multiple violations
warrant a denial or exclusion order in a particular case.
(v) Timing of settlement. Under § 766.18 of this part,
settlement can occur before a charging letter is served, while a
case is before an administrative law judge, or while a case is
before the Under Secretary for Industry and Security under § 766.22
of this part. However, early settlement - for example, before a
charging letter has been filed - has the benefit of freeing
resources for BIS to deploy in other matters. In contrast, for
example, the BIS resources saved by settlement on the eve of an
adversary hearing under § 766.13 of this part are fewer, insofar as
BIS has already expended significant resources on discovery,
motions practice, and trial preparation. Given the importance of
allocating BIS resources to maximize enforcement of the EAR, BIS
has an interest in encouraging early settlement and will take this
interest into account in determining settlement terms.
(vi) Related criminal or civil violations. Where an
administrative enforcement matter under the antiboycott provisions
involves conduct giving rise to related criminal charges, BIS may
take into account the related violations and their resolution in
determining what administrative sanctions are appropriate under
part 766 of the EAR. A criminal conviction indicates serious,
willful misconduct and an accordingly high risk of future
violations, absent effective administrative sanctions. However,
entry of a guilty plea can be a sign that a party accepts
responsibility for complying with the antiboycott provisions and
will take greater care to do so in the future. In appropriate cases
where a party is receiving substantial criminal penalties, BIS may
find that sufficient deterrence may be achieved by lesser
administrative sanctions than would be appropriate in the absence
of criminal penalties. Conversely, BIS might seek greater
administrative sanctions in an otherwise similar case where a party
is not subjected to criminal penalties. The presence of a related
criminal or civil disposition may distinguish settlements among
civil penalty cases that appear to be otherwise similar. As a
result, the factors set forth for consideration in civil penalty
settlements will often be applied differently in the context of a
“global settlement” of both civil and criminal cases, or multiple
civil cases involving other agencies, and may therefore be of
limited utility as precedent for future cases, particularly those
not involving a global settlement.
(vii) Familiarity with the Antiboycott Provisions. Given
the scope and detailed nature of the antiboycott provisions, BIS
will consider whether a party is an experienced participant in the
international business arena who may possess (or ought to possess)
familiarity with the antiboycott laws. In this respect, the size of
the party's business, the presence or absence of a legal division
or corporate compliance program, and the extent of prior
involvement in business with or in boycotted or boycotting
countries, may be significant.
(2) Specific mitigating and aggravating factors. In
addition to the general factors described in paragraph (d)(1) of
this supplement, BIS also generally looks to the presence or
absence of the specific mitigating and aggravating factors in this
paragraph in determining what sanctions should apply in a given
settlement. These factors describe circumstances that, in BIS's
experience, are commonly relevant to penalty determinations in
settled cases. However, this listing of factors is not exhaustive
and BIS may consider other factors that may further indicate the
blameworthiness of a party's conduct, the actual or potential harm
associated with a violation, the likelihood of future violations,
and/or other considerations relevant to determining what sanctions
are appropriate. The assignment of mitigating or aggravating
factors will depend upon the attendant circumstances of the party's
conduct. Thus, for example, one prior violation should be given
less weight than a history of multiple violations, and a previous
violation reported in a voluntary self-disclosure by a party whose
overall compliance efforts are of high quality should be given less
weight than previous violation(s) not involving such mitigating
factors. Some of the mitigating factors listed in this paragraph
are designated as having “great weight.” When present, such a
factor should ordinarily be given considerably more weight than a
factor that is not so designated.
(i) Specific mitigating factors.
(A) Voluntary self-disclosure. (GREAT WEIGHT) The party
has made a voluntary self-disclosure of the violation, satisfying
the requirements of § 764.8 of the EAR.
(B) Effective compliance program. (GREAT WEIGHT)
(1) General policy or program pertaining to
Antiboycott Provisions. BIS will consider whether a party's
compliance efforts uncovered a problem, thereby preventing further
violations, and whether the party has taken steps to address
compliance concerns raised by the violation, including steps to
prevent recurrence of the violation, that are reasonably calculated
to be effective. The focus is on the party's demonstrated
compliance with the antiboycott provisions. Whether a party has an
effective export compliance program covering other provisions of
the EAR is not relevant as a mitigating factor. In the case of a
party that has done previous business with or in boycotted
countries or boycotting countries, BIS will examine whether the
party has an effective antiboycott compliance program and whether
its overall antiboycott compliance efforts have been of high
quality. BIS may deem it appropriate to review the party's internal
business documents relating to antiboycott compliance (e.g.,
corporate compliance manuals, employee training materials).
(2) Compliance with reporting and recordkeeping
requirements. In the case of a party that has received
reportable boycott requests in the past, BIS may examine whether
the party complied with the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements of the antiboycott provisions.
(C) Limited business with or in boycotted or boycotting
countries. The party has had little to no previous experience
in conducting business with or in boycotted or boycotting
countries. Prior to the current enforcement proceeding, the party
had not engaged in business with or in such countries, or had only
transacted such business on isolated occasions. BIS may examine the
volume of business that the party has conducted with or in
boycotted or boycotting countries as demonstrated by the size and
dollar amount of transactions or the percentage of a party's
overall business that such business constitutes.
(D) History of compliance with the Antiboycott Provisions of
the EAR.
(1) BIS will consider it to be a mitigating factor
if:
(i) The party has never been convicted of a criminal
violation of the antiboycott provisions;
(ii) In the past 5 years, the party has not entered into
a settlement or been found liable in a boycott-related
administrative enforcement case with BIS or another U.S. government
agency;
(iii) In the past 3 years, the party has not received a
warning letter from BIS relating to the antiboycott provisions;
or
(iv) In the past 5 years, the party has not otherwise
violated the antiboycott provisions.
(2) Where necessary to ensure effective enforcement, the
prior involvement in violations of the antiboycott provisions of a
party's owners, directors, officers, partners, or other related
persons may be imputed to a party in determining whether these
criteria are satisfied. When an acquiring firm takes reasonable
steps to uncover, correct, and disclose to BIS conduct that gave
rise to violations that the acquired business committed before the
acquisition, BIS typically will not take such violations into
account in applying this factor in settling other violations by the
acquiring firm.
(E) Exceptional cooperation with the investigation. The
party has provided exceptional cooperation to OAC during the course
of the investigation.
(F) Clarity of request to furnish prohibited information or
take prohibited action. The party responded to a request to
furnish information or take action that was ambiguously worded or
vague.
(G) Violations arising out of a party's “passive” refusal to
do business in connection with an agreement. The party has
acquiesced in or abided by terms or conditions that constitute a
prohibited refusal to do business (e.g., responded to a tender
document that contains prohibited language by sending a bid). See
“active” agreements to refuse to do business in paragraph
(d)(2)(ii)(I) of this supplement.
(H) Isolated occurrence of violation. The violation was
an isolated occurrence. (Compare to long duration or high frequency
of violations as an aggravating factor in paragraph (d)(2)(ii)(F)
of this supplement.)
(ii) Specific Aggravating Factors.
(A) Concealment or obstruction. The party made a
deliberate effort to hide or conceal the violation. (GREAT
WEIGHT)
(B) Serious disregard for compliance responsibilities.
(GREAT WEIGHT] There is evidence that the party's conduct
demonstrated a serious disregard for responsibilities associated
with compliance with the antiboycott provisions (e.g.: knowing
violation of party's own compliance policy or evidence that a party
chose to treat potential penalties as a cost of doing business
rather than develop a compliance policy).
(C) History of compliance with the Antiboycott
Provisions.
(1) BIS will consider it to be an aggravating factor
if:
(i) The party has been convicted of a criminal violation
of the antiboycott provisions;
(ii) In the past 5 years, the party has entered into a
settlement or been found liable in a boycott-related administrative
enforcement case with BIS or another U.S. government agency;
(iii) In the past 3 years, the party has received a
warning letter from BIS relating to the antiboycott provisions;
or
(iv) In the past 5 years, the party has otherwise
violated the antiboycott provisions.
(2) Where necessary to ensure effective enforcement, the
prior involvement in violations of the antiboycott provisions of a
party's owners, directors, officers, partners, or other related
persons may be imputed to a party in determining whether these
criteria are satisfied.
(3) When an acquiring firm takes reasonable steps to
uncover, correct, and disclose to BIS conduct that gave rise to
violations that the acquired firm committed before being acquired,
BIS typically will not take such violations into account in
applying this factor in settling other violations by the acquiring
firm.
(D) Familiarity with the type of transaction at issue in the
violation. For example, in the case of a violation involving a
letter of credit or related financial document, the party routinely
pays, negotiates, confirms, or otherwise implements letters of
credit or related financial documents in the course of its standard
business practices.
(E) Prior history of business with or in boycotted countries
or boycotting countries. The party has a prior history of
conducting business with or in boycotted and boycotting countries.
BIS may examine the volume of business that the party has conducted
with or in boycotted and boycotting countries as reflected by the
size and dollar amount of transactions or the percentage of a
party's overall business that such business constitutes.
(F) Long duration or high frequency of violations.
Violations that occur at frequent intervals or repeated violations
occurring over an extended period of time may be treated more
seriously than a single violation or related violations that are
committed within a brief period of time, particularly if the
violations are committed by a party with a history of business with
or in boycotted and boycotting countries. (Compare to isolated
occurrence of violation in paragraph (d)(2)(i)(H) of this
supplement.)
(G) Clarity of request to furnish prohibited information or
take prohibited action. The request to furnish information or
take other prohibited action (e.g., enter into agreement to refuse
to do business with a boycotted country or entity blacklisted by a
boycotting country) is facially clear as to its intended
purpose.
(H) Violation relating to specific information concerning an
individual entity or individual. The party has furnished
prohibited information about business relationships with specific
companies or individuals.
(I) Violations relating to “active” conduct concerning an
agreement to refuse to do business. The party has taken action
that involves altering, editing, or enhancing prohibited terms or
language in an agreement to refuse to do business, including a
letter of credit, or drafting a clause or provision including
prohibited terms or language in the course of negotiating an
agreement to refuse to do business, including a letter of credit.
See “passive” agreements to refuse to do business in paragraph
(d)(2)(i)(G) of this supplement.
(e) Determination of Scope of Denial or Exclusion Order.
In deciding whether and what scope of denial or exclusion order is
appropriate, the following factors are particularly relevant: The
presence of mitigating or aggravating factors of great weight; the
degree of seriousness involved; the extent to which senior
management participated in or was aware of the conduct in question;
the number of violations; the existence and seriousness of prior
violations; the likelihood of future violations (taking into
account relevant efforts to comply with the antiboycott
provisions); and whether a civil monetary penalty can be expected
to have a sufficient deterrent effect.
(f) How BIS Makes Suspension and Deferral Decisions - (1)
Civil Penalties. In appropriate cases, payment of a civil
monetary penalty may be deferred or suspended. See §
764.3(a)(1)(iii) of the EAR. In determining whether suspension or
deferral is appropriate, BIS may consider, for example, whether the
party has demonstrated a limited ability to pay a penalty that
would be appropriate for such violations, so that suspended or
deferred payment can be expected to have sufficient deterrent
value, and whether, in light of all the circumstances, such
suspension or deferral is necessary to make the impact of the
penalty consistent with the impact of BIS penalties on other
parties who committed similar violations.
(2) Denial of Export Privileges and Exclusion from
Practice. In deciding whether a denial or exclusion order
should be suspended, BIS may consider, for example, the adverse
economic consequences of the order on the party, its employees, and
other persons, as well as on the national interest in maintaining
or promoting the competitiveness of U.S. businesses. An otherwise
appropriate denial or exclusion order will be suspended on the
basis of adverse economic consequences only if it is found that
future violations of the antiboycott provisions are unlikely and if
there are adequate measures (usually a substantial civil monetary
penalty) to achieve the necessary deterrent effect.
[72 FR 39006, July 17, 2007]