Title 15

PART 742 APPENDIX



Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

15:2.1.3.4.27.0.1.20.36 :

Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Note:

Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application.

(1) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl methylphosphonate, phosphorous oxychloride, thiodiglycol, dimethylamine hydrochloride, dimethylamine, ethylene chlorohydrin (2-chloroethanol), and potassium fluoride is April 28, 1986.

(2) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), methyl phosphonyldichloride, 3-quinuclidinol, N,N-diisopropylamino-ethane-2-thiol, N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride, 3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, trimethyl phosphite, phosphorous trichloride, and thionyl chloride is July 6, 1987.

(3) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of items in ECCNs 1C351, 1C353 and 1C354 is February 22, 1989.

(4) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran of dimethyl methylphosphonate, phosphorus oxychloride, and thiodiglycol is February 22, 1989.

(5) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of potassium hydrogen fluoride, ammonium hydrogen fluoride, sodium fluoride, sodium bifluoride, phosphorus pentasulfide, sodium cyanide, triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989.

(6) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of phosphorus trichloride, trimethyl phosphite, and thionyl chloride is December 12, 1989. For exports to Iran or Syria, paragraph (2) of this supplement applies.

(7) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of 2-chloroethanol and triethanolamine is January 15, 1991. For exports of 2-chloroethanol to Iran or Syria, paragraph (1) of this Supplement applies. For exports of triethanolamine to Iran or Syria, paragraph (5) of this Supplement applies.

(8) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of chemicals controlled by ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except for applications to export the following chemicals: 2-chloroethanol, dimethyl methylphosphonate, dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), phosphorus oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride, thiodiglycol, thionyl chloride triethanolamine, and trimethyl phosphite. (See also paragraphs (6) and (7) of this Supplement.) For exports to Iran or Syria, see paragraphs (1) through (6) of this Supplement.

(9) The contract sanctity date for exports and reexports of the following commodities and technical data is March 7, 1991:

(i) Equipment (for producing chemical weapon precursors and chemical warfare agents) described in ECCNs 2B350 and 2B351;

(ii) Equipment and materials (for producing biological agents) described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C353, 1C354, and 2B352; and

(iii) Technology (for the development, production, and use of equipment described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C353, 1C354, 2B350, 2B351, and 2B352) described in ECCNs 2E001, 2E002, and 2E301.

(10) The contract sanctity date for license applications subject to § 742.2(b)(3) of this part is March 7, 1991.

(11) The contract sanctity date for reexports of chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except that the contract sanctity date for reexports of these chemicals to Iran or Syria is December 12, 1989.

(12) The contract sanctity date for reexports of human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens controlled by ECCNs 1C351, 1C353 and 1C354 is March 7, 1991.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25459, May 9, 1997; 69 FR 42865, July 19, 2004; 71 FR 51718, Aug. 31, 2006; 80 FR 34271, June 16, 2015]


Supplement No. 2 to Part 742 - Anti-Terrorism Controls: North Korea, Syria Contract Sanctity Dates and Related Policies

15:2.1.3.4.27.0.1.20.37 :

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742 - Anti-Terrorism Controls: North Korea, Syria Contract Sanctity Dates and Related Policies Note:

Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application. BIS will determine any applicable contract sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting documents is submitted.

(a) Terrorist-supporting countries. The Secretary of State has designated North Korea, and Syria as countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).

(b) Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a). Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any of these countries could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory control under EAA section 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before a license for such an item may be issued.

(1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the export to North Korea, or Syria of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this Supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-users in any of these countries.

(2) License applications for items controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.

(3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 6(a) to North Korea, and Syria are:

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and

(ii) The following items to all end-users: for North Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(45) of this Supplement; and for Syria, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of this Supplement.

(c) The license requirements and licensing policies for items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons to Syria and North Korea are generally described in §§ 742.9 and 742.19 of this part, respectively. This Supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for North Korea and Syria and related contract sanctity dates that may be available for transactions benefiting from pre-existing contracts involving Syria.

(1) All items subject to national security controls.

(i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available for items valued at $7 million or more to military end-users or end-uses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(2) All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls. Applications for all end-users in North Korea and Syria of these items will generally be denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates for Syria.

(3) All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR). Applications for all end-users in North Korea and Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Syria are not available.

(4) All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls (NRL). (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport to non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(5) All military-related items, i.e., applications for export and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number “18”.

(i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(6) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied.

(A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at $3 million or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.

(B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.

(C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: December 16, 1986.

(D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(7) Heavy duty, on-highway tractors (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(8) Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9t (10 tons) or more. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(9) Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts to power tank transporters. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(10) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. A license is required for all national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of any such equipment will generally be denied.

(11) Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(12) Electronic test equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(13) Mobile communications equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile communications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(14) Acoustic underwater detection equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. A license is required for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(15) Portable electric power generator. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(16) Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(17) Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower). (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(18) Underwater photographic equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(19) Submersible systems. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(20) Scuba gear and related equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) [Reserved]

(iii) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(21) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) [Reserved]

(iii) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(22) Computer numerically controlled machine tools. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer numerically controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(23) Vibration test equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(24) Digital computers with an APP of .00001 WT or above, assemblies, related equipment, equipment for development or production of magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for fabrication of head/disk assemblies. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. (A) Computers with an APP exceeding 0.0004 WT: Applications for all end-users will generally be denied.

(B) Computers with an APP equal to or less than 0.0004 WT: Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(25) Telecommunications equipment. (i) A license is required for the following telecommunications equipment:

(A) Radio relay systems or equipment operating at a frequency equal to or greater than 19.7 GHz or “spectral efficiency” greater than 3 bit/s/Hz; (B) Fiber optic systems or equipment operating at a wavelength greater than 1000 nm; (C) “Telecommunications transmission systems” or equipment with a “digital transfer rate” at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45 Mb/s.

(ii) [Reserved]

(iii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iv) [Reserved]

(v) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(26) Microprocessors - (i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.

(A) [Reserved]

(B) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(1) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(2) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.

(C) [Reserved]

(ii) With a processing speed of 0.5 GFLOPS or above.

(A) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(B) [Reserved]

(27) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For Syria, Sudan, or North Korea, a license is required for all such equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.

(i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(28) Software specially designed for the computer-aided design and manufacture of integrated circuits. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(29) Packet switches. Equipment described in ECCN 5A991.c. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(30) Specially designed software for air traffic control applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic tracking. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(31) Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(32) Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(33) Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C006.d for cooling fluids for radar. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(34) High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(35) Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(36) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(37) Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 2B996. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional inspection machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(38) Robots capable of employing feedback information in real time processing to generate or modify programs. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(39) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983 - (i) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.

(A) [Reserved]

(B) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(C) [Reserved]

(D) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(ii) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, not controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.

(A) [Reserved]

(B) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(C) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(D) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(40) “Software” described in ECCN 2D983 specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(41) “Technology” described in ECCN 2E983 specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(42) Production technology controlled under ECCN 1C355 on the CCL -

(i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(43) Commercial Charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992 on the CCL. (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(44) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, under ECCN 1C997 on the CCL (i) [Reserved]

(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.

(iii) [Reserved]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.

(45) Specific processing equipment, materials and software controlled under ECCNs 0A999, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL. (i) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) [Reserved]

(46) Concealed object detection equipment described in ECCN 2A984. (i) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these commodities will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

(ii) [Reserved]

(iii) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these commodities will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

(47) “Software” described in ECCN 2D984 “required” for the “development”, “production” or “use” of concealed object detection equipment controlled by 2A984. (i) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these software will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

(ii) [Reserved]

(iii) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these software will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

(48) “Technology” described in ECCN 2E984 “required” for the “development”, “production” or “use” of concealed object detection equipment controlled by 2A984, or the “development” of “software” controlled by 2D984. (i) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

(ii) [Reserved]

(iii) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 19, 2010.

[69 FR 23630, Apr. 29, 2004, as amended at 69 FR 46076, July 30, 2004; 70 FR 14391, Mar. 22, 2005; 71 FR 20885, Apr. 24, 2006; 71 FR 51718, Aug. 31, 2006; 72 FR 20223, Apr. 24, 2007; 72 FR 62532, Nov. 5, 2007; 74 FR 2357, Jan. 15, 2009; 75 FR 14340, Mar. 25, 2010; 80 FR 43318, July 22, 2015; 82 FR 4783, Jan. 17, 2017; 86 FR 4933, Jan. 19, 2021]


Supplement Nos. 3-5 to Part 742 [Reserved]

15:2.1.3.4.27.0.1.20.38 :

Supplement Nos. 3-5 to Part 742 [Reserved]


Supplement No. 6 to Part 742 - Technical Questionnaire for Encryption and Other “Information Security” Items

15:2.1.3.4.27.0.1.20.39 :

Supplement No. 6 to Part 742 - Technical Questionnaire for Encryption and Other “Information Security” Items

(a) For all items:

(1) State the name(s) of each product being submitted for classification or other consideration (as a result of a request by BIS) and provide a brief non-technical description of the type of product (e.g., routers, disk drives, cell phones, and chips) being submitted, and provide brochures, data sheets, technical specifications or other information that describes the item(s).

(2) Indicate whether there have been any prior classifications of the product(s), if they are applicable to the current submission. For products with minor changes in encryption functionality, you must include a cover sheet with complete reference to the previous review (Commodity Classification Automated Tracking System (CCATS) number, Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), authorization paragraph) along with a clear description of the changes.

(3) Describe how encryption is used in the product and the categories of encrypted data (e.g., stored data, communications, management data, and internal data).

(4) For ‘mass market’ encryption products, describe specifically to whom and how the product is being marketed and state how this method of marketing and other relevant information (e.g., cost of product and volume of sales) are described by the Cryptography Note (Note 3 to Category 5, Part 2).

(5) Is any “encryption source code” being provided (shipped or bundled) as part of this offering? If yes, is this source code publicly available source code, unchanged from the code obtained from an open source Web site, or is it proprietary “encryption source code?”

(b) For classification requests and other submissions, provide the following information

(1) Description of all the symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms and key lengths and how the algorithms are used, including relevant parameters, inputs and settings. Specify which encryption modes are supported (e.g., cipher feedback mode or cipher block chaining mode).

(2) Describe how encryption keys are generated or managed by your product, including algorithms and modulus sizes supported.

(3) Describe whether the products incorporate or use “non-standard cryptography” defined as incorporating or using proprietary, unpublished cryptographic functionality, including encryption algorithms or protocols that have not been adopted or approved by a duly recognized international standards body. Provide a textual description and the source code of the algorithm.

(4) Describe the pre-processing methods (e.g., data compression or data interleaving) that are applied to the plaintext data prior to encryption.

(5) Describe the post-processing methods (e.g., packetization, encapsulation) that are applied to the cipher text data after encryption.

(6) State all communication protocols (e.g., X.25, Telnet, TCP, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16, SIP . . .) and cryptographic protocols and methods (e.g., SSL, TLS, SSH, IPSEC, IKE, SRTP, ECC, MD5, SHA, X.509, PKCS standards . . .), including application programming interfaces (APIs), that are supported and describe how they are used.

(7) State how the product is written to preclude user modification of the encryption algorithms, key management and key space.

(8) Describe the cryptographic functionality that is provided by third-party hardware or software encryption components (if any). Identify the manufacturers of the hardware or software components, including specific part numbers and version information as needed to describe the product. Describe whether the encryption software components (if any) are statically or dynamically linked.

(9) Identify the version(s) and type(s) of compilers, runtime interpreters or code assemblers used, as applicable.

(10) With respect to your company's encryption products, are any of the products (or its encryption components) manufactured outside the United States? If yes, provide manufacturing locations (city and country).

(11) See § 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR. Describe whether the item meets any of the § 740.17(b)(2) criteria. Provide a comparison of your item against the criteria listed in each paragraph of § 740.17(b)(2). Give specific data for each of the parameters listed, as applicable (e.g., maximum aggregate encrypted throughput, maximum number of encrypted endpoints, maximum satellite or terrestrial wireless transmission rates, terrestrial wireless operating range, customized cryptography, network penetration capability, cryptanalytic capability and “non-standard cryptography”).

(12) See § 740.17(b)(3) of the EAR. Describe whether the product meets any of the criteria described under each of the paragraphs in § 740.17(b)(3) (e.g., chip, chipset, electronic assembly, programmable logic device, cryptographic library, cryptographic development kit, “non-standard cryptography,” digital forensics, and “cryptographic activation”).

(13) See § 740.17(b)(2)(iii) of the EAR. For products which incorporate an “open cryptographic interface” as defined in part 772 of the EAR, describe the cryptographic interface.

(14) For products with IPsec capabilities:

(i) Please describe your product's implementation of IKE vendor IDs, including vendor specific and capability IDs; and

(ii) Please specify which version of IKE you use (IKEv1 or IKEv2).

(c) For classification requests for hardware or software “encryption components” other than source code (i.e., chips, toolkits, executable or linkable modules intended for use in or production of another encryption item) provide the following additional information:

(1) Reference the application for which the components are used in, if known;

(2) State if there is a general programming interface to the component;

(3) State whether the component is constrained by function; and

(4) Identify the encryption component and include the name of the manufacturer, component model number or other identifier.

(d) For classification requests for “encryption source code” provide the following information:

(1) If applicable, reference the executable (object code) product that was previously classified by BIS;

(2) Include whether the source code has been modified, and the technical details on how the source code was modified; and

(3) Upon request, include a copy of the sections of the source code that contain the encryption algorithm, key management routines and their related calls.

[75 FR 36497, June 25, 2010, as amended at 81 FR 64674, Sept. 20, 2016]


Supplement No. 7 to Part 742 - Description of Major Weapons Systems

15:2.1.3.4.27.0.1.20.40 :

Supplement No. 7 to Part 742 - Description of Major Weapons Systems

(1) Battle Tanks: Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armored fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high-level of self protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tons unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimeters caliber.

(2) Armored Combat Vehicles: Tracked, semi-tracked, or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armored protection and cross-country capability, either designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or armed with an integral or organic weapon of a least 12.5 millimeters caliber or a missile launcher.

(3) Large-Caliber Artillery Systems: Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a caliber of 75 millimeters and above.

(4) Combat Aircraft: Fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft designed, equipped, or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defense or reconnaissance missions. The term “combat aircraft” does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed, equipped, or modified as described above.

(5) Attack Helicopters: Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armor, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft that perform specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.

(6) Warships: Vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 750 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 750 metric tons that are equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometers or torpedoes with a similar range.

(7) Missiles and Missile Launchers:

(a) Guided or unguided rockets, or ballistic, or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometers, and those items that are designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets, if not covered by systems identified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this Supplement. For purposes of this rule, systems in this paragraph include remotely piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined in this paragraph but do not include ground-to-air missiles;

(b) Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS); or

(c) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of any type, including sensors for guidance and control of these systems, except model airplanes.

(8) Offensive Space Weapons: Systems or capabilities that can deny freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies or hinder the United States and its allies from denying an adversary the ability to take action in space. This includes systems such as anti-satellite missiles, or other systems designed to defeat or destroy assets in space.

(9) Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR): Systems that support military commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over assigned forces across the range of military operations; collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret information concerning foreign countries or areas; systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area, including Undersea communications. Also includes sensor technologies.

(10) Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), including “smart bombs”: Weapons used in precision bombing missions such as specially designed weapons, or bombs fitted with kits to allow them to be guided to their target.

(11) Night vision equipment: Any electro-optical device that is used to detect visible and infrared energy and to provide an image. This includes night vision goggles, forward-looking infrared systems, thermal sights, and low-light level systems that are night vision devices, as well as infrared focal plane array detectors and cameras specifically designed, developed, modified, or configured for military use; image intensification and other night sighting equipment or systems specifically designed, modified or configured for military use; second generation and above military image intensification tubes specifically designed, developed, modified, or configured for military use, and infrared, visible and ultraviolet devices specifically designed, developed, modified, or configured for military application.

[72 FR 33656, June 19, 2007, as amended at 73 FR 58037, Oct. 6, 2008]


Supplement No. 8 to Part 742 - Self-Classification Report for Encryption Items

15:2.1.3.4.27.0.1.20.41 :

Supplement No. 8 to Part 742 - Self-Classification Report for Encryption Items

This supplement provides certain instructions and requirements for self-classification reporting to BIS and the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator (Ft. Meade, MD) of encryption commodities, software and components exported or reexported pursuant to § 740.17(b)(1) of the EAR. See § 740.17(e)(3) of the EAR for additional instructions and requirements pertaining to this supplement, including when to report and how to report.

(a) Information to report. The following information is required in the file format as described in paragraph (b) of this supplement, for each encryption item subject to the requirements of this supplement and §§ 740.17(b)(1) and 740.17(e)(3) of the EAR:

(1) Name of product (50 characters or less).

(2) Model/series/part number (50 characters or less.) If necessary, enter ‘NONE’ or ‘N/A’.

(3) Primary manufacturer (50 characters or less). Enter ‘SELF’ if you are the primary manufacturer of the item. If there are multiple manufacturers for the item but none is clearly primary, either enter the name of one of the manufacturers or else enter ‘MULTIPLE’. If necessary, enter ‘NONE’ or ‘N/A’.

(4) Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), selected from one of the following:

(i) 5A002

(ii) 5B002

(iii) 5D002

(iv) 5A992

(v) 5D992

(5) Encryption authorization type identifier, selected from one of the following, which denote eligibility under License Exception ENC § 740.17(b)(1):

(i) ENC

(ii) MMKT

(6) Item type descriptor, selected from one of the following:

(i) Access point;

(ii) Cellular;

(iii) Computer or computing platforms;

(iv) Computer forensics;

(v) Cryptographic accelerator;

(vi) Data backup and recovery;

(vii) Database;

(viii) Disk/drive encryption;

(ix) Distributed computing;

(x) Email communications;

(xi) Fax communications;

(xii) File encryption;

(xiii) Firewall;

(xiv) Gateway;

(xv) Intrusion detection;

(xvi) Identity management;

(xvii) Key exchange;

(xviii) Key management;

(xix) Key storage;

(xx) Link encryption;

(xxi) Local area networking (LAN);

(xxii) Metropolitan area networking (MAN);

(xxiii) Mobility and mobile applications n.e.s.;

(xxiv) Modem;

(xxv) Multimedia n.e.s.;

(xxvi) Network convergence or infrastructure n.e.s.;

(xxvii) Network forensics;

(xxviii) Network intelligence;

(xxix) Network or systems management (OAM/OAM&P);

(xxx) Network security monitoring;

(xxxi) Network vulnerability and penetration testing;

(xxxii) Operating system;

(xxxiii) Optical networking;

(xxxiv) Radio communications;

(xxxv) Router;

(xxxvi) Satellite communications;

(xxxvii) Short range wireless n.e.s.;

(xxxviii) Storage Area Networking (SAN);

(xxxix) 3G/4G/5G/LTE/WiMAX;

(xl) Trusted computing;

(xli) Videoconferencing;

(xlii) Virtual private networking (VPN);

(xliii) Voice communications n.e.s.;

(xliv) Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP);

(xlv) Wide Area Networking (WAN);

(xlvi) Wireless Local Area Networking (WLAN);

(xlvii) Wireless Personal Area Networking (WPAN);

(xlviii) Test equipment n.e.s.; or

(xlix) Other (please specify).

(7) Name of company or individual submitting the report (50 characters or less).

(8) Telephone number (50 characters or less).

(9) Email address (50 characters or less).

(10) Mailing address (50 characters or less).

(11) With respect to your company's encryption products, do they incorporate encryption components produced or furnished by non-U.S. sources or vendors? Enter 'YES', 'NO', or if necessary, 'N/A' (250 characters or less).

(12) With respect to your company's encryption products, are any of them manufactured in non-U.S. locations?” If yes, list the non-U.S. manufacturing locations by city and country. If necessary, enter 'NONE' or 'N/A' (250 characters or less).

(b) File format requirements. (1) The information described in paragraph (a) of this supplement must be provided in tabular or spreadsheet form, as an electronic file in comma separated values format (.csv), only. No file formats other than .csv will be accepted, as your encryption self-classification report must be directly convertible to tabular or spreadsheet format, where each row (and all entries within a row) properly correspond to the appropriate encryption item.

Note to paragraph (b)(1):

An encryption self-classification report data table created and stored in spreadsheet format (e.g., file extension .xls, .numbers, .qpw, .wb*, .wrk, and .wks) can be converted and saved into a comma delimited file format directly from the spreadsheet program. This .csv file is then ready for submission.

(2) Each line of your encryption self-classification report (.csv file) must consist of twelve entries as further described in this supplement.

(3) The first line of the .csv file must consist of the following twelve entries (i.e., match the following) without alteration or variation: PRODUCT NAME, MODEL NUMBER, MANUFACTURER, ECCN, AUTHORIZATION TYPE, ITEM TYPE, SUBMITTER NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER, E-MAIL ADDRESS, MAILING ADDRESS, NON-U.S. COMPONENTS, NON-U.S. MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS.

Note to paragraph (b)(3):

These first twelve entries (i.e., first row) of an encryption self-classification report in .csv format correspond to the twelve column headers of a spreadsheet data file. The responses provided under column headers 7 through 12 (SUBMITTER NAME through NON-U.S. MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS) relate to the company as a whole, and thus should be entered the same for each product (i.e., only one point of contact, one 'YES' or 'NO' answer to whether any of the reported products incorporate non-U.S. sourced encryption components, and one list of non-U.S. manufacturing locations, is required for the report). However, even though the information is the same for each product, please duplicate this information into each row of the spreadsheet, leaving no entry blank, so each product has the same identifying company information.

(4) Each subsequent line of the .csv file must correspond to a single encryption item (or a distinguished series of products) as described in paragraph (c) of this supplement.

(5) Each line must consist of six entries as described in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6) of this supplement. No entries may be left blank. Each entry must be separated by a comma (,). Certain additional instructions are as follows:

(i) Line entries (a)(1) (‘PRODUCT NAME’) and (a)(4) (‘ECCN’) must be completed with relevant information.

(ii) For entries (a)(2) (‘MODEL NUMBER’) and (a)(3) (‘MANUFACTURER’), if these entries do not apply to your item or situation you may enter ‘NONE’ or ‘N/A’.

(iii) For entries (a)(5) (‘AUTHORIZATION TYPE’), if none of the provided choices apply to your situation, you may enter ‘OTHER’.

(6) Because of .csv file format requirements, the only permitted use of a comma is as the necessary separator between line entries. You may not use a comma for any other reason in your encryption self-classification report.

(c) Other instructions. (1) The information provided in accordance with this supplement and §§ 740.17(b)(1) and 740.17(e)(3) of the EAR must identify product offerings as they are typically distinguished in inventory, catalogs, marketing brochures and other promotional materials.

(2) For families of products where all the information described in paragraph (a) of this supplement is identical except for the model/series/part number (entry (a)(2)), you may list and describe these products with a single line in your .csv file using an appropriate model/series/part number identifier (e.g., ‘300’ or ‘3xx’) for entry (a)(2), provided each line in your .csv file corresponds to a single product series (or product type) within an overall product family.

(3) For example, if Company A produces, markets and sells both a ‘100’ (‘1xx’) and a ‘300’ (‘3xx’) series of product, in its encryption self-classification report (.csv file) Company A must list the ‘100’ product series in one line (with entry (a)(2) completed as ‘100’ or ‘1xx’) and the ‘300’ product series in another line (with entry (a)(2) completed as ‘300’ or ‘3xx’), even if the other required information is common to all products in the ‘100’ and ‘300’ series.

(4) Only products self-classified by the exporter or reexporter must be reported. Products submitted for classification by the Bureau of Industry and Security for which a CCATS is issued do not need to be reported.

[75 FR 36498, June 25, 2010, as amended at 81 FR 64675, Sept. 20, 2016]