Appendix A to Part 710 - Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (June 8, 2017)
10:4.0.2.5.6.4.63.4.14 : Appendix A
Appendix A to Part 710 - Security Executive Agent Directive 4,
National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (June 8, 2017)
(The following guidelines, included in this part for
reference purposes only, are reproduced by DOE with minor
formatting changes to comply with the Document Drafting Handbook
issued by the Office of the Federal Register. The original
guidelines were signed by James Clapper, Security Executive Agent,
on December 10, 2016, with an effective date 180 days after
signature (June 8, 2017). For any discrepancies between the
original guidelines and the guidelines published in this appendix,
the original guidelines control.)
A. Authority: The National Security Act of 1947, as
amended; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA), as amended; Executive Order (E.O.) 10450, Security
Requirements for Government Employment, as amended; EO 12968,
Access to Classified Information, as amended; E.O. 13467, Reforming
Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness
for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified
National Security Information; E.O. 13549, Classified National
Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal and Private
Sector Entities; Performance Accountability Council memorandum,
Assignment of Functions Relating to Coverage of Contractor Employee
Fitness in the Federal Investigative Standards, 6 December 2012;
and other applicable provisions of law.
B. Purpose: This Security Executive Agent (SecEA)
Directive establishes the single, common adjudicative criteria for
all covered individuals who require initial or continued
eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position. The Guidelines reflected herein
supersede all previously issued national security adjudicative
criteria or guidelines.
C. Applicability: This Directive applies to any executive
branch agency authorized or designated to conduct adjudications of
covered individuals to determine eligibility for initial or
continued access to classified national security information or
eligibility to hold a sensitive position.
D. Definitions: As used in this Directive, the following
terms have the meanings set forth in the following paragraphs 1
through 8:
1. Agency: Any “Executive agency” as defined in Section
105 of Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), including the
“military departments,” as defined in Section 102 of Title 5,
U.S.C. and any other entity within the Executive Branch that comes
into possession of classified information or has positions
designated as sensitive.
2. Authorized adjudicative agency: An agency authorized
by law, executive order, or designation by the SecEA to determine
eligibility for access to classified information in accordance with
E.O. 12968, as amended, or eligibility to hold a sensitive
position.
3. Authorized investigative agency: An agency authorized
by law, executive order, or designation by the SecEA to conduct a
background investigation of individuals who are proposed for access
to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive
position or to ascertain whether such individuals continue to
satisfy the criteria for retaining access to such information or
eligibility to hold such positions.
4. Classified national security information or
classified information: Information that has been determined
pursuant to E.O. 13526 or any predecessor or successor order, or
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure.
5. Covered individual:
a. A person who performs work for or on behalf of the executive
branch or who seeks to perform work for or on behalf of the
executive branch, but does not include the President or (except to
the extent otherwise directed by the President) employees of the
President under 3 U.S.C. 105 or 107, the Vice President, or (except
to the extent otherwise directed by the Vice President) employees
of the Vice President under 3 U.S.C. 106 or annual legislative
branch appropriations acts;
b. A person who performs work for or on behalf of a state,
local, tribal, or private sector entity as defined in E.O. 13549
requiring eligibility for access to classified information;
c. A person working in or for the legislative or judicial
branches requiring eligibility for access to classified information
and the investigation or determination is conducted by the
executive branch, but does not include members of Congress;
Justices of the Supreme Court; and Federal judges appointed by the
President.
d. Covered individuals are not limited to government employees
and include all persons, not excluded under paragraphs D.5.a., b.,
or c. of this appendix, who require eligibility for access to
classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position,
including, but not limited to, contractors, subcontractors,
licensees, certificate holders, grantees, experts, consultants, and
government employees.
6. Foreign Intelligence Entity: Known or suspected
foreign state or non-state organizations or persons that conduct
intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, block or
impair U.S. intelligence collection, influence U.S. policy, or
disrupt U.S. systems and programs. The term includes foreign
intelligence and security services and international
terrorists.
7. National Security Eligibility: Eligibility for access
to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive
position, to include access to sensitive compartmented information,
restricted data, and controlled or special access program
information.
8. Sensitive Position: Any position within or in support
of an agency in which the occupant could bring about, by virtue of
the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the
national security regardless of whether the occupant has access to
classified information, and regardless of whether the occupant is
an employee, military service member, or contractor.
E. Policy:
1. The National Security Adjudicative Guidelines in annex A to
this appendix shall be used by all authorized adjudicative agencies
when rendering a determination for initial or continued eligibility
for access to classified information or initial or continued
eligibility to hold a sensitive position.
2. Annex B to this appendix sets forth statutory restrictions on
agencies making certain eligibility determinations for access to
classified information, as well as waiver and congressional
reporting requirements. These amendments to the IRTPA are commonly
referred to as the Bond Amendment. By definition, the risk to
national security is equivalent for covered individuals with access
to classified information and covered individuals occupying a
sensitive position. Occupants of sensitive positions could bring
about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse
effect on the national security regardless of whether the occupant
has access to classified information. Due to the equivalent adverse
effect on the national security and to ensure uniformity,
consistency, and reciprocity of national security background
investigations and adjudications, the statutory restrictions
imposed by the Bond Amendment are extended to apply to all covered
individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access
to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive
position. Authorized adjudicative agencies shall maintain a record
of the number and type of meritorious waivers granted under Bond
Amendment criteria, to include the rationale for each waiver, and
shall report this data annually to the SecEA in advance of the
annual report to Congress. Authorized adjudicative agencies will
also maintain a record of all disqualifications due to Bond
Amendment criteria.
3. Exceptions, as provided for in annex C to this appendix,
shall be used when a favorable adjudicative decision to grant
initial or continued eligibility for access to classified
information or to hold a sensitive position is made, despite
failure to meet adjudicative or investigative standards.
4. Eligibility shall be determined by appropriately trained
adjudicative personnel through the evaluation of all information
bearing on an individual's loyalty and allegiance to the United
States, including any information relevant to strength of
character, honesty, discretion, sound judgment, reliability,
ability to protect classified or sensitive information, and
trustworthiness. Eligibility for access to classified information
or eligibility to occupy a sensitive position shall only be granted
when the evaluation of all such information demonstrates that such
eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of the United
States; any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the national
security.
5. All adjudicative determinations, including any associated
exceptions, shall be recorded in either Scattered Castles, the
Joint Personnel Adjudication System within the Department of
Defense, or the Central Verification System database within U.S.
Office of Personnel Management or successor databases, unless
authorized by the SecEA to withhold information from the database
for national security purposes.
6. When an adjudicative determination is made to deny or revoke
eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position, review proceedings, to the extent they
are made available in E.O. 12968, as amended, Part 5, shall be
afforded covered individuals at a minimum.
7. The agency with adjudicative authority remains responsible
for the final determination.
8. Agencies shall update internal policies and replace existing
national security adjudicative criteria or guidelines with the
guidelines in this appendix A no later than June 8, 2017.
9. This Directive is not intended to, and does not, create any
right to administrative or judicial review, or any other right or
benefit, or trust responsibility substantive or procedural,
enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
F. Effective Date: This Directive becomes effective June
8, 2017.
Annex A to Appendix A to Part 710 - National Security Adjudicative
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position 1.
Introduction
(a) The following National Security Adjudicative Guidelines
(“guidelines”) are established as the single common criteria for
all U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, consultants,
contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their
employees, and other individuals who require initial or continued
eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position, to include access to sensitive
compartmented information, restricted data, and controlled or
special access program information (hereafter referred to as
“national security eligibility”). These guidelines shall be used by
all Executive Branch Agencies when rendering any final national
security eligibility determination.
(b) National security eligibility determinations take into
account a person's stability, trustworthiness, reliability,
discretion, character, honesty, and judgment. Individuals must be
unquestionably loyal to the United States. No amount of oversight
or security procedures can replace the self-discipline and
integrity of an individual entrusted to protect the nation's
secrets or occupying a sensitive position. When a person's life
history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness,
questions arise as to whether the individual can be relied upon and
trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working in an
environment where protecting the national security is
paramount.
(c) The U.S. Government does not discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual
orientation in making a national security eligibility
determination. No negative inference concerning eligibility under
these guidelines may be raised solely on the basis of mental health
counseling. No adverse action concerning these guidelines may be
taken solely on the basis of polygraph examination technical calls
in the absence of adjudicatively significant information.
(d) In accordance with E.O. 12968, as amended, eligibility for
covered individuals shall be granted only when facts and
circumstances indicate that eligibility is clearly consistent with
the national security interests of the United States, and any doubt
shall be resolved in favor of national security.
2. The Adjudicative Process
(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient
period and a careful weighing of a number of variables of an
individual's life to make an affirmative determination that the
individual is an acceptable security risk. This is known as the
whole-person concept. All available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be
considered in reaching a national security eligibility
determination.
(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and the final
determination remains the responsibility of the authorized
adjudicative agency. Any doubt concerning personnel being
considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in
favor of the national security.
(c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or
continuing of national security eligibility is clearly consistent
with the interests of national security must be an overall common
sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the following
guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the
whole person.
(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States (2) GUIDELINE B:
Foreign Influence (3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign Preference (4) GUIDELINE
D: Sexual Behavior (5) GUIDELINE E: Personal Conduct (6) GUIDELINE
F: Financial Considerations (7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol Consumption
(8) GUIDELINE H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse (9)
GUIDELINE I: Psychological Conditions (10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal
Conduct (11) GUIDELINE K: Handling Protected Information (12)
GUIDELINE L: Outside Activities (13) GUIDELINE M: Use of
Information Technology
(d) In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the
adjudicator should consider the following factors:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the
conduct;
(5) The extent to which participation is voluntary;
(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes;
(7) The motivation for the conduct;
(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and
(9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
(e) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion
may not be sufficient for an unfavorable eligibility determination,
the individual may be found ineligible if available information
reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment,
irresponsibility, or unstable behavior. However, a single criterion
may be sufficient to make an unfavorable eligibility determination
even in the absence of a recent occurrence or a recurring pattern.
Notwithstanding the whole-person concept, pursuit of further
investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative
agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse
information.
(f) When information of security concern becomes known about an
individual who is currently eligible for access to classified
information or eligible to hold a sensitive position, the
adjudicator should consider whether the individual:
(1) Voluntarily reported the information;
(2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where
appropriate;
(4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security
concern;
(5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior; and
(6) Should have his or her national security eligibility
suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
(g) If after evaluating information of security concern, the
adjudicator decides the information is serious enough to warrant a
recommendation of denial or revocation of the national security
eligibility, but the specific risk to national security can be
managed with appropriate mitigation measures, an adjudicator may
recommend approval to grant initial or continued eligibility for
access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position
with an exception as defined in Appendix C of this document.
(h) If after evaluating information of security concern, the
adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to
warrant a recommendation of denial or revocation of the national
security eligibility, an adjudicator may recommend approval with a
warning that future incidents of a similar nature or other
incidents of adjudicative concern may result in revocation of
national security eligibility.
(i) It must be noted that the adjudicative process is predicated
upon individuals providing relevant information pertaining to their
background and character for use in investigating and adjudicating
their national security eligibility. Any incident of intentional
material falsification or purposeful non-cooperation with security
processing is of significant concern. Such conduct raises questions
about an individual's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness
and may be predictive of their willingness or ability to protect
the national security.
Guidelines Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States
3. The Concern. The willingness to safeguard classified
or sensitive information is in doubt if there is any reason to
suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States. There is
no positive test for allegiance, but there are negative indicators.
These include participation in or support for acts against the
United States or placing the welfare or interests of another
country above those of the United States. Finally, the failure to
adhere to the laws of the United States may be relevant if the
violation of law is harmful to stated U.S. interests. An individual
who engages in acts against the United States or provides support
or encouragement to those who do has already demonstrated
willingness to compromise national security.
4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy
of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition
against the United States;
(b) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to
commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts; and
(c) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other
illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
(1) Overthrow or influence the U.S. Government or any state or
local government;
(2) Prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from
performing their official duties;
(3) Gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal,
state, or local government; and
(4) Prevent others from exercising their rights under the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the
individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of
these;
(b) The individual's involvement was humanitarian and permitted
under U.S. law;
(c) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a
short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic
interest; and
(d) The involvement or association with such activities occurred
under such unusual circumstances, or so much time has elapsed, that
it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's
current reliability, trustworthiness, or allegiance.
Guideline B: Foreign Influence
6. The Concern. Foreign contacts and interests,
including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property
interests, are a national security concern if they result in
divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if
they create circumstances in which the individual may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S.
interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests
should consider the country in which the foreign contact or
interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain
classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.
7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is
a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or
country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive
information or technology and the individual's desire to help a
foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or
technology;
(c) Failure to report or fully disclose, when required,
association with a foreign person, group, government, or
country;
(d) Counterintelligence information, whether classified or
unclassified, that indicates the individual's access to classified
information or eligibility for a sensitive position may involve
unacceptable risk to national security;
(e) Shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless
of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened
risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion;
(f) Substantial business, financial, or property interests in a
foreign country, or in any foreignowned or foreign-operated
business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of
foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of
interest;
(g) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent,
associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence entity;
(h) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign
country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual
to possible future exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion; and
(i) Conduct, especially while traveling or residing outside the
U.S., that may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation,
pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or
country.
8. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the
country in which these persons are located, or the positions or
activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to
choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the United
States;
(b) There is no conflict of interest, either because the
individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person,
or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and
loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest;
(c) Contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual
and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create
a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;
(d) The foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government
business or are approved by the agency head or designee;
(e) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or
threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign
country; and
(f) The value or routine nature of the foreign business,
financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to
result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to
influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Guideline C: Foreign Preference
9. The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as
to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United
States, then he or she may provide information or make decisions
that are harmful to the interests of the United States. Foreign
involvement raises concerns about an individual's judgment,
reliability, and trustworthiness when it is in conflict with U.S.
national interests or when the individual acts to conceal it. By
itself, the fact that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of
another country is not disqualifying without an objective showing
of such conflict or attempt at concealment. The same is true for a
U.S. citizen's exercise of any right or privilege of foreign
citizenship and any action to acquire or obtain recognition of a
foreign citizenship.
10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other
country;
(b) Failure to report, or fully disclose when required, to an
appropriate security official, the possession of a passport or
identity card issued by any country other than the United
States;
(c) Failure to use a U.S. passport when entering or exiting the
U.S.;
(d) Participation in foreign activities, including but not
limited to:
(1) Assuming or attempting to assume any type of employment,
position, or political office in a foreign government or military
organization; and
(2) Otherwise acting to serve the interests of a foreign person,
group, organization, or government in any way that conflicts with
U.S. national security interests;
(e) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business
interests in another country in violation of U.S. law; and
(f) An act of expatriation from the United States such as
declaration of intent to renounce U.S. citizenship, whether through
words or actions.
11. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The foreign citizenship is not in conflict with U.S.
national security interests;
(b) Dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship or
birth in a foreign country, and there is no evidence of foreign
preference;
(c) The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce the
foreign citizenship that is in conflict with U.S. national security
interests;
(d) The exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of
foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S.
citizen;
(e) The exercise of the entitlements or benefits of foreign
citizenship do not present a national security concern;
(f) The foreign preference, if detected, involves a foreign
country, entity, or association that poses a low national security
risk;
(g) Civil employment or military service was authorized under
U.S. law, or the employment or service was otherwise consented to
as required by U.S. law; and
(h) Any potentially disqualifying activity took place after
receiving the approval by the agency head or designee.
Guideline D: Sexual Behavior
12. The Concern. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal
offense; reflects a lack of judgment or discretion; or may subject
the individual to undue influence of coercion, exploitation, or
duress. These issues, together or individually, may raise questions
about an individual's judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and
ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Sexual
behavior includes conduct occurring in person or via audio, visual,
electronic, or written transmission. No adverse inference
concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on
the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.
13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the
individual has been prosecuted;
(b) A pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk
sexual behavior that the individual is unable to stop;
(c) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable
to coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
(d) Sexual behavior of a public nature or that reflects lack of
discretion or judgment.
14. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and
there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(b) The sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently,
or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability,
trustworthiness, or judgment;
(c) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion,
exploitation, or duress;
(d) The sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and
discreet; and
(e) The individual has successfully completed an appropriate
program of treatment, or is currently enrolled in one, has
demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment
plan, and/or has received a favorable prognosis from a qualified
mental health professional indicating the behavior is readily
controllable with treatment.
Guideline E: Personal Conduct
15. The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment,
lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules
and regulations can raise questions about an individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or
sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to
cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national
security investigative or adjudicative processes. The following
will normally result in an unfavorable national security
eligibility determination, security clearance action, or
cancellation of further processing for national security
eligibility:
(a) Refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or
cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to
meeting with a security investigator for subject interview,
completing security forms or releases, cooperation with medical or
psychological evaluation, or polygraph examination, if authorized
and required; and
(b) Refusal to provide full, frank, and truthful answers to
lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other
official representatives in connection with a personnel security or
trustworthiness determination.
16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of
relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal
history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations,
determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status,
determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or
award fiduciary responsibilities;
(b) Deliberately providing false or misleading information; or
concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an
employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or
mental health professional involved in making a recommendation
relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other
official government representative;
(c) Credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any
other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole,
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to
comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics
indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard
classified or sensitive information;
(d) Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered
under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for
an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all
available information, supports a whole-person assessment of
questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of
candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or
other characteristics indicating that the individual may not
properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This
includes, but is not limited to, consideration of:
(1) Untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information,
unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected
information;
(2) Any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate
behavior;
(3) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and
(4) Evidence of significant misuse of Government or other
employer's time or resources;
(e) Personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other
individual or group. Such conduct includes:
(1) Engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the
person's personal, professional, or community standing;
(2) While in another country, engaging in any activity that is
illegal in that country;
(3) While in another country, engaging in any activity that,
while legal there, is illegal in the United States;
(f) Violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the
individual to the employer as a condition of employment; and
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
17. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct
the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted
with the facts;
(b) The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or
concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by advice of
legal counsel or of a person with professional responsibilities for
advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning
security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to
cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated
fully and truthfully;
(c) The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt
on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment;
(d) The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to
alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed
to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and
such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or
eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or
duress;
(f) The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of
questionable reliability; and
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activities was
unwitting, has ceased, or occurs under circumstances that do not
cast doubt upon the individual's reliability, trustworthiness,
judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations.
Guideline F: Financial Considerations
18. The Concern. Failure to live within one's means,
satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor
self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules
and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an
individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect
classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be
caused or exacerbated by, and thus can be a possible indicator of,
other issues of personnel security concern such as excessive
gambling, mental health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol
abuse or dependence. An individual who is financially overextended
is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise
questionable acts to generate funds. Affluence that cannot be
explained by known sources of income is also a security concern
insofar as it may result from criminal activity, including
espionage.
19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Inability to satisfy debts;
(b) Unwillingness to satisfy debts regardless of the ability to
do so;
(c) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
(d) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as
embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, expense account fraud,
mortgage fraud, filing deceptive loan statements and other
intentional financial breaches of trust;
(e) Consistent spending beyond one's means or frivolous or
irresponsible spending, which may be indicated by excessive
indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, a history of late
payments or of non-payment, or other negative financial
indicators;
(f) Failure to file or fraudulently filing annual Federal,
state, or local income tax returns or failure to pay annual
Federal, state, or local income tax as required;
(g) Unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard
of living, increase in net worth, or money transfers that are
inconsistent with known legal sources of income;
(h) Borrowing money or engaging in significant financial
transactions to fund gambling or pay gambling debts; and
(i) Concealing gambling losses, family conflict, or other
problems caused by gambling.
20. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or
occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The conditions that resulted in the financial problem were
largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of
employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a
death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory
lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted
responsibly under the circumstances;
(c) The individual has received or is receiving financial
counseling for the problem from a legitimate and credible source,
such as a non-profit credit counseling service, and there are clear
indications that the problem is being resolved or is under
control;
(d) The individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith
effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts;
(e) The individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the
legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem
and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the
dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue;
(f) The affluence resulted from a legal source of income;
and
(g) The individual has made arrangements with the appropriate
tax authority to file or pay the amount owed and is in compliance
with those arrangements.
Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption
21. The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often
leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to
control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's
reliability and trustworthiness.
22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving
while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse,
disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of
the frequency of the individual's alcohol use or whether the
individual has been diagnosed with alcohol use disorder;
(b) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for
work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, drinking on
the job, or jeopardizing the welfare and safety of others,
regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed with alcohol use
disorder;
(c) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of
impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is
diagnosed with alcohol use disorder;
(d) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical or mental health
professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist,
psychiatrist, or licensed clinical social worker) of alcohol use
disorder;
(e) The failure to follow treatment advice once diagnosed;
(f) Alcohol consumption, which is not in accordance with
treatment recommendations, after a diagnosis of alcohol use
disorder; and
(g) Failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol
education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.
23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) So much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent,
or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely
to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current
reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment;
(b) The individual acknowledges his or her pattern of
maladaptive alcohol use, provides evidence of actions taken to
overcome this problem, and has demonstrated a clear and established
pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with
treatment recommendations;
(c) The individual is participating in counseling or a treatment
program, has no previous history of treatment and relapse, and is
making satisfactory progress in a treatment program; and
(d) The individual has successfully completed a treatment
program along with any required aftercare, and has demonstrated a
clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence
in accordance with treatment recommendations.
Guideline H: Drug Involvement 1 and Substance Misuse
1 Reference annex B to this appendix regarding statutory
requirements contained in Public Law 110-118 (Bond Amendment)
applicable to this guideline.
24. The Concern. The illegal use of controlled
substances, to include the misuse of prescription and
non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause
physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent
with their intended purpose can raise questions about an
individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such
behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and
because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness
to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled
substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21
U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in
this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed in this
paragraph.
25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Any substance misuse (see definition listed in paragraph
24);
(b) Testing positive for an illegal drug;
(c) Illegal possession of a controlled substance, including
cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or
distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia;
(d) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical or mental health
professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist,
psychiatrist, or licensed clinical social worker) of substance use
disorder;
(e) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program
prescribed by a duly qualified medical or mental health
professional;
(f) Any illegal drug use while granted access to classified
information or holding a sensitive position; and
(g) Expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance
misuse, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to
discontinue such misuse.
26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and
substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome
this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence,
including, but not limited to:
(1) Disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) Changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used;
and
(3) Providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all
drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any
future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national
security eligibility;
(c) Abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged
illness during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has
since ended; and
(d) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment
program, including, but not limited to, rehabilitation and
aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a
favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional.
Guideline I: Psychological Conditions 2
2 Reference annex B to this appendix regarding statutory
requirements contained in Public Law 110-118 (Bond Amendment)
applicable to this guideline.
27. The Concern. Certain emotional, mental, and
personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or
trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required
for there to be a concern under this guideline. A duly qualified
mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or
psychiatrist) employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the
U.S. Government, should be consulted when evaluating potentially
disqualifying and mitigating information under this guideline and
an opinion, including prognosis, should be sought. No negative
inference concerning the standards in this guideline may be raised
solely on the basis of mental health counseling.
28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Behavior that casts doubt on an individual's judgment,
stability, reliability, or trustworthiness, not covered under any
other guideline and that may indicate an emotional, mental, or
personality condition, including, but not limited to,
irresponsible, violent, self-harm, suicidal, paranoid,
manipulative, impulsive, chronic lying, deceitful, exploitative, or
bizarre behaviors;
(b) An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional
that the individual has a condition that may impair judgment,
stability, reliability, or trustworthiness;
(c) Voluntary or involuntary inpatient hospitalization;
(d) Failure to follow a prescribed treatment plan related to a
diagnosed psychological/psychiatric condition that may impair
judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness, including,
but not limited to, failure to take prescribed medication or
failure to attend required counseling sessions; and
(e) Pathological gambling, the associated behaviors of which may
include unsuccessful attempts to stop gambling; gambling for
increasingly higher stakes, usually in an attempt to cover losses;
concealing gambling losses; borrowing or stealing money to fund
gambling or pay gambling debts; and family conflict resulting from
gambling.
29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) The identified condition is readily controllable with
treatment, and the individual has demonstrated ongoing and
consistent compliance with the treatment plan;
(b) The individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or
treatment program for a condition that is amenable to treatment,
and the individual is currently receiving counseling or treatment
with a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health
professional;
(c) Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health
professional employed by, or acceptable to and approved by, the
U.S. Government that an individual's previous condition is under
control or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence or
exacerbation;
(d) The past psychological/psychiatric condition was temporary,
the situation has been resolved, and the individual no longer shows
indications of emotional instability;
(e) There is no indication of a current problem.
Guideline J: Criminal Conduct 3
3 Reference annex B to this appendix regarding statutory
requirements contained in Public Law 110-118 (Bond Amendment)
applicable to this guideline.
30. The Concern. Criminal activity creates doubt about a
person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very
nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to
comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) A pattern of minor offenses, any one of which on its own
would be unlikely to affect a national security eligibility
decision, but which in combination cast doubt on the individual's
judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness;
(b) Evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible
allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of
criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally
charged, prosecuted, or convicted;
(c) Individual is currently on parole or probation;
(d) Violation or revocation of parole or probation, or failure
to complete a court-mandated rehabilitation program; and
(e) Discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces for reasons
less than “Honorable.”
32. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it
is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual was pressured or coerced into committing the
act and those pressures are no longer present in the person's
life;
(c) No reliable evidence to support that the individual
committed the offense; and
(d) There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including,
but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of
criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole
or probation, job training or higher education, good employment
record, or constructive community involvement.
Guideline K: Handling Protected Information
33. The Concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to
comply with rules and regulations for handling protected
information - which includes classified and other sensitive
government information, and proprietary information - raises doubt
about an individual's trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or
willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a
serious security concern.
34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Deliberate or negligent disclosure of protected information
to unauthorized persons, including, but not limited to, personal or
business contacts, the media, or persons present at seminars,
meetings, or conferences;
(b) Collecting or storing protected information in any
unauthorized location;
(c) Loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing,
transmitting, or otherwise handling protected information,
including images, on any unauthorized equipment or medium;
(d) Inappropriate efforts to obtain or view protected
information outside one's need to know;
(e) Copying or modifying protected information in an
unauthorized manner designed to conceal or remove classification or
other document control markings;
(f) Viewing or downloading information from a secure system when
the information is beyond the individual's need-to-know;
(g) Any failure to comply with rules for the protection of
classified or sensitive information;
(h) Negligence or lax security practices that persist despite
counseling by management; and
(i) Failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in
damage to the national security, regardless of whether it was
deliberate or negligent.
35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has
happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that
it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial
security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward
the discharge of security responsibilities;
(c) The security violations were due to improper or inadequate
training or unclear instructions; and
(d) The violation was inadvertent, it was promptly reported,
there is no evidence of compromise, and it does not suggest a
pattern.
Guideline L: Outside Activities
36. The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside
employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a
conflict of interest with an individual's security responsibilities
and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of
classified or sensitive information.
37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer,
with:
(1) The government of a foreign country;
(2) Any foreign national, organization, or other entity;
(3) A representative of any foreign interest; and
(4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or
person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material
on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology;
and
(b) Failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when
this is required.
38. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity by the
appropriate security or counterintelligence office indicates that
it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security
responsibilities or with the national security interests of the
United States; and
(b) The individual terminated the employment or discontinued the
activity upon being notified that it was in conflict with his or
her security responsibilities.
Guideline M: Use of Information Technology
39. The Concern. Failure to comply with rules,
procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information
technology systems may raise security concerns about an
individual's reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question
the willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems,
networks, and information. Information Technology includes any
computer-based, mobile, or wireless device used to create, store,
access, process, manipulate, protect, or move information. This
includes any component, whether integrated into a larger system or
not, such as hardware, software, or firmware, used to enable or
facilitate these operations.
40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Unauthorized entry into any information technology
system;
(b) Unauthorized modification, destruction, or manipulation of,
or denial of access to, an information technology system or any
data in such a system;
(c) Use of any information technology system to gain
unauthorized access to another system or to a compartmented area
within the same system;
(d) Downloading, storing, or transmitting classified, sensitive,
proprietary, or other protected information on or to any
unauthorized information technology system;
(e) Unauthorized use of any information technology system;
(f) Introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware,
software, or media to or from any information technology system
when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations or
when otherwise not authorized;
(g) Negligence or lax security practices in handling information
technology that persists despite counseling by management; and
(h) Any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or
negligent, that results in damage to the national security.
41. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns
include:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The misuse was minor and done solely in the interest of
organizational efficiency and effectiveness;
(c) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was
followed by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation
and by notification to appropriate personnel; and
(d) The misuse was due to improper or inadequate training or
unclear instructions.
Annex B to Appendix A to Part 710 - Bond Amendment Guidance
On January 28, 2008, Congress amended the IRTPA of 2004, adding
statutory restrictions on certain eligibility determinations and
establishing waiver and congressional reporting requirements. These
modifications are collectively referred to as the “Bond Amendments”
and were made effective on January 1, 2008. 4 For the reasons
identified in paragraph E.2 of this appendix, application of the
Bond Amendment's statutory restrictions will be applied to all
adjudications covered under this Directive.
4 IRTPA of 2004 section 3002, 50 U.S.C. 3343.
1. Prohibition: Heads of agencies are prohibited from
granting or renewing national security eligibility for any covered
individual who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance or is
an addict as defined. If an authorized adjudicative agency has a
case pending review that involves an unlawful user of a controlled
substance or an addict, the statutory prohibition must be applied
and the individual will receive the agency's established
administrative review procedures. A meritorious waiver may not be
authorized with reference to this prohibition. For purposes of this
prohibition:
(a) An “addict” is any individual who habitually uses any
narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety,
or welfare; or is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as
to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his
addiction.
(b) A “controlled substance” means any “controlled substance” as
defined in 21 U.S.C. 802.
2. Disqualification: The Bond Amendment also contains
disqualification provisions which apply only to those covered
individuals seeking access to Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI), Special Access Programs (SAP), or Restricted Data (RD).
Heads of agencies may not grant or renew access to SCI, SAP, or RD
to a covered individual who:
(a) Has been convicted in any court of the U.S. of a crime, was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and was
incarcerated as a result of that sentence for not less than one
year;
(b) Has been discharged or dismissed from the Armed Forces under
dishonorable conditions; or
(c) Is determined to be mentally incompetent; an individual is
“mentally incompetent” when he or she has been declared mentally
incompetent as determined by competency proceedings conducted in a
court or administrative agency with proper jurisdiction.
3. Waiver Standard and Procedures: When a disqualifier
reflected in paragraphs 2(a) through (c) of this annex B exists,
the adjudicator will proceed with the adjudication using the
appropriate mitigation conditions found in these adjudicative
guidelines. If the adjudicator would have arrived at a favorable
decision but for the Bond Amendment disqualification, a meritorious
waiver may be appropriate.
(a) Meritorious waivers will be considered an “Exception” to the
adjudicative guidelines and will be annotated as a “Waiver” in the
adjudicative decision recorded in the appropriate databases listed
in paragraph E.5 of this appendix. Adjudicators will provide a
detailed justification for the meritorious waiver in the final
adjudicative report.
(b) If, after applying the appropriate mitigating factors listed
in these adjudicative guidelines, a meritorious waiver is not
appropriate, the SCI, SAP, or RD access will be denied or revoked
with a written explanation that cites the adjudicative guidelines
applied and the Bond Amendment disqualifier. The authorized
adjudicative agency's established administrative review procedures
shall be followed in all such cases.
(c) Each authorized adjudicative agency shall maintain a record
of the number and type of meritorious waivers granted, to include
the rationale for each waiver, and shall report this data annually
to the SecEA in advance of the annual report to Congress.
Authorized adjudicative agencies will also maintain a record of all
disqualifications, broken down by type, due to Bond Amendment
requirements.
4. Authorized adjudicative agencies often have no ability to
predict whether the covered individual for whom national security
eligibility determinations are being made will also require access
to SCI, SAP, or RD. Accordingly, the guidance in paragraphs 4(a)
and (b) applies to all national security adjudicative
determinations:
(a) All adjudicators will determine whether any of the Bond
Amendment disqualifiers in paragraphs 2(a) through (c) of this
annex B apply to the case being adjudicated.
(b) If a disqualifier exists, adjudicators shall annotate that
fact in one of the databases identified in paragraph E.5 of this
annex B to ensure that any subsequent requests for access to SCI,
SAP, or RD for the individual will undergo appropriate
re-adjudication and waiver procedures in meritorious cases.
Annex C to Appendix A to Part 710 - Exceptions
Exceptions are an adjudicative decision to grant initial or
continued eligibility for access to classified information or to
hold a sensitive position despite failure to meet the full
adjudicative or investigative standards. The authorized exceptions
are defined below and supersede the definitions in Office of
Management and Budget memorandum, Reciprocal Recognition of
Existing Personnel Security Clearances, 14 November 2007.
Waiver (W): Eligibility granted or continued despite the
presence of substantial issue information that would normally
preclude eligibility. Approval authorities may approve a waiver
only when the benefit of initial or continued eligibility clearly
outweighs any security concerns. A waiver may also require
conditions for eligibility as described below.
Condition (C): Eligibility granted or continued, despite
the presence of issue information that can be partially but not
completely mitigated, with the provision that additional security
measures shall be required to mitigate the issue(s). Such measures
include, but are not limited to, additional security monitoring,
access restrictions, submission of periodic financial statements,
or attendance at counseling sessions.
Deviation (D): Eligibility granted or continued despite
either a significant gap in coverage or scope of the investigation.
“Significant gap” for this purpose means either complete lack of
coverage for a period of six months or longer within the most
recent five years investigated or the lack of one or more relevant
investigative scope components (e.g., employment checks,
financial review, or a subject interview) in its entirety.
Out of Scope (O): Reinvestigation is overdue.
[82 FR 57108, Dec. 4, 2017]